14 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1989–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State of Texas v. Esparza, Carlosgreen2 sentences2020Appellee responds that the Sterling factors are not exclusive, that the court of appeals implicitly considered at least some of them, that lack of attenuation can be decided as a matter of fact and not just law, and that the video evidence of the second interview is not indisputable because it must be examined in light of the first interview. 27 State v. Esparza, 413 S.W.3d 81, 85-86 (Tex. Crim. 2020Appellee responds that the Sterling factors are not exclusive, that the court of appeals implicitly considered at least some of them, that lack of attenuation can be decided as a matter of fact and not just law, and that the video evidence of the second interview is not indisputable because it must be examined in light of the first interview. 27 State v. Esparza, 413 S.W.3d 81, 85-86 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Sterling v. Stategreen2 sentences2019Sterling, 800 S.W.2d at 518, 520 . –11– The majority indicates it is “not our job” to reweigh each Sterling factor. 2019Sterling, 800 S.W.2d at 518, 520 . –11– The majority indicates it is “not our job” to reweigh each Sterling factor. | 2 | 2 |
McBride v. Stategreen2 sentences2019See McBride, 803 S.W.2d at 745–46.9 I recognize few cases have considered the Sterling factors over the past twenty-five years, and those cases involve a defendant’s appeal of the trial court denying a motion to suppress rather than a State’s appeal. 2019See McBride, 803 S.W.2d at 745–46.9 I recognize few cases have considered the Sterling factors over the past twenty-five years, and those cases involve a defendant’s appeal of the trial court denying a motion to suppress rather than a State’s appeal. | 2 | 2 |
Geodyne Energy Income Production Partnership I-E v. Newton Corp.green2 sentences2004See Geodyne Energy Income Production P’ship I-E v. Newton Corp., 97 S.W.3d 779, 789-90 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, pet. granted) (holding segregation was required, in part because the “claims have *691 significantly different elements than [the claim for which attorney’s fees are recoverable]”); Z.A.O., Inc,, v. Yarbrough Drive Cent. 2004See Geodyne Energy Income Production P’ship I-E v. Newton Corp., 97 S.W.3d 779, 789-90 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, pet. granted) (holding segregation was required, in part because the “claims have *691 significantly different elements than [the claim for which attorney’s fees are recoverable]”); Z.A.O., Inc,, v. Yarbrough Drive Cent. | 2 | 2 |
Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. and Brien Garcia v. Nury Chapagreen2 sentences2025Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313–14 (addressing concern that Sterling exception easily swallowed rule); see, e.g., Varner v. Cardenas, 218 S.W.3d 68, 69 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam). 2025“Intertwined facts do not make tort [attorney’s] fees recoverable; it is only when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.” Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313–14 (recognizing that while “[i]t is certainly true that Chapa’s fraud, contract, and DTPA claims were all ‘dependent upon the same set of facts or circumstances,’ . . . that does not mean they all required the same research, discovery, proof, or legal expertise” (footnote omitted)); see, e.g., Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411, 427 (Tex. 2017) (statin | 1 | 2 |
Varner v. Cardenasgreen1 sentence2025Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313–14 (addressing concern that Sterling exception easily swallowed rule); see, e.g., Varner v. Cardenas, 218 S.W.3d 68, 69 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam). | 1 | 1 |
Virginia O. Kinsel, as Attorney-In-Fact for J. Frank Kinsel, J. Frank Kinsel, Jr., Carole K. Edwards, and Catherine K. Collins v. Jane O. Lindsey, Individually and as Co-Trustee of the Lesey B. Kinsel Trust, Robert N. Oliver, Keith Branyon and Jackson Walker, Llpgreen1 sentence2025“Intertwined facts do not make tort [attorney’s] fees recoverable; it is only when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.” Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313–14 (recognizing that while “[i]t is certainly true that Chapa’s fraud, contract, and DTPA claims were all ‘dependent upon the same set of facts or circumstances,’ . . . that does not mean they all required the same research, discovery, proof, or legal expertise” (footnote omitted)); see, e.g., Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411, 427 (Tex. 2017) (statin | 1 | 1 |
Gill Savings Ass'n v. Chair King, Inc.green1 sentence2014Chair King, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 674, 680 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989), 72 A Westlaw search shows more than one modified, 797 S.W.2d 31 , 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. hundred published and unpublished opinions J. 42 (Tex. 1990)(remanded to the trial addressing the Sterling exception since 1991. | 1 | 1 |
Ski River Development, Inc. v. McCallagreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., Ski River Dev., Inc. v. McCalla, 167 S.W.3d 121, 143 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. denied); Marrs and Smith P’ship v. D.K. 2006See, e.g., Ski River Dev., Inc. v. McCalla, 167 S.W.3d 121, 143 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. denied); Marrs and Smith P’ship v. D.K. | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Neatherlingreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., Park Cities Ltd P = Ship v. Transpo Funding Corp ., 131 S.W.3d 654, 662 (Tex. App. C Dallas 2004, pet. filed); Hamrick , 125 S.W.3d at 585 B 86; Willis v. Donnelly , 118 S.W.3d 10 , 46 B 47 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. filed); Young v. Neatherlin , 102 S.W.3d 415, 420 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.); West Beach Marina, Ltd. v. Erdeljac , 94 S.W.3d 248, 268 (Tex. App. C Austin 2002, no pet.); Chilton Ins. 2004See, e.g., Park Cities Ltd P = Ship v. Transpo Funding Corp ., 131 S.W.3d 654, 662 (Tex. App. C Dallas 2004, pet. filed); Hamrick , 125 S.W.3d at 585 B 86; Willis v. Donnelly , 118 S.W.3d 10 , 46 B 47 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. filed); Young v. Neatherlin , 102 S.W.3d 415, 420 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.); West Beach Marina, Ltd. v. Erdeljac , 94 S.W.3d 248, 268 (Tex. App. C Austin 2002, no pet.); Chilton Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Park Cities Ltd. Partnership v. Transpo Funding Corp.green2 sentences2004See, e.g., Park Cities Ltd P = Ship v. Transpo Funding Corp ., 131 S.W.3d 654, 662 (Tex. App. C Dallas 2004, pet. filed); Hamrick , 125 S.W.3d at 585 B 86; Willis v. Donnelly , 118 S.W.3d 10 , 46 B 47 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. filed); Young v. Neatherlin , 102 S.W.3d 415, 420 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.); West Beach Marina, Ltd. v. Erdeljac , 94 S.W.3d 248, 268 (Tex. App. C Austin 2002, no pet.); Chilton Ins. 2004See, e.g., Park Cities Ltd P = Ship v. Transpo Funding Corp ., 131 S.W.3d 654, 662 (Tex. App. C Dallas 2004, pet. filed); Hamrick , 125 S.W.3d at 585 B 86; Willis v. Donnelly , 118 S.W.3d 10 , 46 B 47 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. filed); Young v. Neatherlin , 102 S.W.3d 415, 420 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.); West Beach Marina, Ltd. v. Erdeljac , 94 S.W.3d 248, 268 (Tex. App. C Austin 2002, no pet.); Chilton Ins. | 1 | 1 |
West Beach Marina, Ltd. v. Erdeljacgreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., Park Cities Ltd P = Ship v. Transpo Funding Corp ., 131 S.W.3d 654, 662 (Tex. App. C Dallas 2004, pet. filed); Hamrick , 125 S.W.3d at 585 B 86; Willis v. Donnelly , 118 S.W.3d 10 , 46 B 47 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. filed); Young v. Neatherlin , 102 S.W.3d 415, 420 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.); West Beach Marina, Ltd. v. Erdeljac , 94 S.W.3d 248, 268 (Tex. App. C Austin 2002, no pet.); Chilton Ins. 2004See, e.g., Park Cities Ltd P = Ship v. Transpo Funding Corp ., 131 S.W.3d 654, 662 (Tex. App. C Dallas 2004, pet. filed); Hamrick , 125 S.W.3d at 585 B 86; Willis v. Donnelly , 118 S.W.3d 10 , 46 B 47 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. filed); Young v. Neatherlin , 102 S.W.3d 415, 420 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.); West Beach Marina, Ltd. v. Erdeljac , 94 S.W.3d 248, 268 (Tex. App. C Austin 2002, no pet.); Chilton Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Garza v. Alviargreen1 sentence1989Brown v. Goldstein, 685 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex.1985); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Tex.1965). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Goldsteingreen1 sentence1989Brown v. Goldstein, 685 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex.1985); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Tex.1965). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Oregon v. Elstad
green
2 sentences2020CASTANEDANIETO — 17 The court of appeals contrasted the present case with Sterling by pointing out that Sterling’s motion to suppress was denied by the trial court but Appellee’s was granted.18 The court of appeals emphasized that the trial court had wide discretion and concluded that the videos of the interviews did not contain indisputable evidence contrary to the exercise of that discretion.19 And focusing on the video of the second interview, the court of appeals said that nothing in it demonstrated that Appellee “was not under the influence of the detectives’ declarations that he would sp 2020CASTANEDANIETO — 17 The court of appeals contrasted the present case with Sterling by pointing out that Sterling’s motion to suppress was denied by the trial court but Appellee’s was granted.18 The court of appeals emphasized that the trial court had wide discretion and concluded that the videos of the interviews did not contain indisputable evidence contrary to the exercise of that discretion.19 And focusing on the video of the second interview, the court of appeals said that nothing in it demonstrated that Appellee “was not under the influence of the detectives’ declarations that he would sp | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Bennett Truck Transport, LLC v. Williams Bros. Construction
green
1 sentence2019Constr., 256 S.W.3d 730 , 733 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (“[W]hen an insurer pays an owner’s loss, it becomes the owner of the cause of action and therefore does not need an assignment.”).4 4 To the extent that Uddin argues that STIC lacked standing when it filed its original petition in 2012 because it had not fully paid Sterling’s claim, we note that this argument is unavailing for several reasons. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Gill Savings Ass'n v. Chair King, Inc.
green
1 sentence2014Chair King, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 674, 680 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989), 72 A Westlaw search shows more than one modified, 797 S.W.2d 31 , 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. hundred published and unpublished opinions J. 42 (Tex. 1990)(remanded to the trial addressing the Sterling exception since 1991. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Houston Livestock Show & Rodeo, Inc. v. Hamrick
green
2 sentences2004See, e.g., Park Cities Ltd P = Ship v. Transpo Funding Corp ., 131 S.W.3d 654, 662 (Tex. App. C Dallas 2004, pet. filed); Hamrick , 125 S.W.3d at 585 B 86; Willis v. Donnelly , 118 S.W.3d 10 , 46 B 47 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. filed); Young v. Neatherlin , 102 S.W.3d 415, 420 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.); West Beach Marina, Ltd. v. Erdeljac , 94 S.W.3d 248, 268 (Tex. App. C Austin 2002, no pet.); Chilton Ins. 2004See, e.g., Park Cities Ltd P = Ship v. Transpo Funding Corp ., 131 S.W.3d 654, 662 (Tex. App. C Dallas 2004, pet. filed); Hamrick , 125 S.W.3d at 585 B 86; Willis v. Donnelly , 118 S.W.3d 10 , 46 B 47 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. filed); Young v. Neatherlin , 102 S.W.3d 415, 420 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.); West Beach Marina, Ltd. v. Erdeljac , 94 S.W.3d 248, 268 (Tex. App. C Austin 2002, no pet.); Chilton Ins. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Willis v. Donnelly
green
2 sentences2004See, e.g., Park Cities Ltd P = Ship v. Transpo Funding Corp ., 131 S.W.3d 654, 662 (Tex. App. C Dallas 2004, pet. filed); Hamrick , 125 S.W.3d at 585 B 86; Willis v. Donnelly , 118 S.W.3d 10 , 46 B 47 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. filed); Young v. Neatherlin , 102 S.W.3d 415, 420 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.); West Beach Marina, Ltd. v. Erdeljac , 94 S.W.3d 248, 268 (Tex. App. C Austin 2002, no pet.); Chilton Ins. 2004See, e.g., Park Cities Ltd P = Ship v. Transpo Funding Corp ., 131 S.W.3d 654, 662 (Tex. App. C Dallas 2004, pet. filed); Hamrick , 125 S.W.3d at 585 B 86; Willis v. Donnelly , 118 S.W.3d 10 , 46 B 47 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. filed); Young v. Neatherlin , 102 S.W.3d 415, 420 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.); West Beach Marina, Ltd. v. Erdeljac , 94 S.W.3d 248, 268 (Tex. App. C Austin 2002, no pet.); Chilton Ins. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Texarkana Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Murdock
green
2 sentences1997In Texarkana Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Murdock, 946 S.W.2d 836 (Tex.1997), we applied the Sterling rule to remand a case involving unsegregated actual damages. 1997In Texarkana Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Murdock, 946 S.W.2d 836 (Tex.1997), we applied the Sterling rule to remand a case involving unsegregated actual damages. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences1989The Supreme Court in Vail expressly recognized, however, that Board Order 41454 could not be relied on in a situation such as this because the Order contains a prerequisite that the insurer must have engaged in the act with "such frequency as to indicate a general business practice.” 754 S.W.2d at 134-35 . 1989The Supreme Court in Vail expressly recognized, however, that Board Order 41454 could not be relied on in a situation such as this because the Order contains a prerequisite that the insurer must have engaged in the act with "such frequency as to indicate a general business practice.” 754 S.W.2d at 134-35 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.