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6 California opinions name it 2 courts 2012–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitationgreen2 sentences2021(Jones v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1379 (Jones).) Sterling’s claim is based on a disparate treatment theory. 2021(Jones v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1379 (Jones).) Sterling’s claim is based on a disparate treatment theory. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Waltreusgreen2 sentences2012Both claims were raised and rejected on appeal (see Memro II, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 838-843, 846-847) and so are, in any event, barred by the Waltreus rule (In re Waltreus, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 225). 2012Both claims were raised and rejected on appeal (see Memro II, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 838-843, 846-847) and so are, in any event, barred by the Waltreus rule (In re Waltreus, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 225). | 2 | 2 |
In Re Harrisgreen2 sentences2012(See also In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 169 [citing Sterling with approval]; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 830 [same].) ―We do not believe that petitioner may at this date employ the writ of habeas corpus to attack the introduction of evidence which allegedly has been illegally obtained.‖ (Lessard, at p. 503.) We explained the Lessard/Sterling rule in In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 767 : ―[T]he erroneous admission of unlawfully seized evidence presented no risk that an innocent defendant might be convicted, and ‗[t]he risk that the deterrent effect of the [exclusionary] 2012(See In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 169 [citing Sterling with approval]; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 830 [same].) “We do not believe that petitioner may at this date employ the writ of habeas corpus to attack the introduction of evidence which allegedly has been illegally obtained.” (Lessard, at p. 503.) We explained the Lessard/Sterling rule in In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 767: “[T]he erroneous admission of unlawfully seized evidence presented no risk that an innocent defendant might be convicted, and ‘[t]he risk that the deterrent effect of the [exclusionary] rule | 2 | 2 |
In Re Robbinsgreen2 sentences2012He next claims we should review claim Nos. 1 and 3 due to ―inadequate representation by trial, appellate and prior habeas counsel,‖ referring the reader to the claims in which he contends trial counsel was ineffective.36 (Petitioner, however, makes no specific allegations concerning the actions and omissions of prior appellate and habeas corpus counsel.) But although claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are independent arguments that are not barred by the Lessard/Sterling rule (cf. In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 814, fn. 34 [discussing the intersection of the Waltreus rule and a 2012He next claims we should review claims Nos. 1 and 3 due to “inadequate representation by trial, appellate and prior habeas counsel,” referring the reader to the claims in which he contends trial counsel was ineffective. 36 (Petitioner, however, makes no specific allegations concerning the actions and omissions of prior appellate and habeas corpus counsel.) But although claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are independent arguments that are not barred by the Lessard/Sterling rule (cf. In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 814, fn. 34 [discussing the intersection of the Waltreus rule and | 2 | 2 |
Hanouchian v. Steelegreen2 sentences2026(See Hanouchian v. Steele, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 111; see generally Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 676 [“[A] duty to take affirmative action to control the wrongful acts of a third party will be imposed only where such conduct can be reasonably anticipated”].) Accordingly, Mesri did not state and cannot proceed on her causes of action against the Sterling defendants. 2026(See Hanouchian v. Steele, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 111; see generally Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 676 [“[A] duty to take affirmative action to control the wrongful acts of a third party will be imposed only where such conduct can be reasonably anticipated”].) Accordingly, Mesri did not state and cannot proceed on her causes of action against the Sterling defendants. | 1 | 1 |
Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Centergreen2 sentences2026(See Hanouchian v. Steele, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 111; see generally Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 676 [“[A] duty to take affirmative action to control the wrongful acts of a third party will be imposed only where such conduct can be reasonably anticipated”].) Accordingly, Mesri did not state and cannot proceed on her causes of action against the Sterling defendants. 2026(See Hanouchian v. Steele, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 111; see generally Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 676 [“[A] duty to take affirmative action to control the wrongful acts of a third party will be imposed only where such conduct can be reasonably anticipated”].) Accordingly, Mesri did not state and cannot proceed on her causes of action against the Sterling defendants. | 1 | 1 |
Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospitalgreen2 sentences2012(Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 305, fn. 9 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 510 , 907 P.2d 358 ] [“Neither Insurance Code section 533 nor related policy exclusions for intentionally caused injury or damage preclude a California insurer from indemnifying an employer held vicariously liable for an employee’s willful acts. 2012(Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 305, fn. 9 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 510 , 907 P.2d 358 ] [“Neither Insurance Code section 533 nor related policy exclusions for intentionally caused injury or damage preclude a California insurer from indemnifying an employer held vicariously liable for an employee’s willful acts. | 1 | 1 |
Herrera v. Collinsgreen2 sentences2012Although these six claims concern the conduct of the hearing on petitioner’s suppression motion, the claims, as alleged, rely on petitioner’s right to a fair trial (U.S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends.) and his right to counsel (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.) and so do not implicate the Lessard!Sterling rule. 36 See claim No. 85 (alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to examine police notes), claim No. 88 (alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach police witnesses), and claims Nos. 89 and 94 (alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to use the report of 2012Although these six claims concern the conduct of the hearing on petitioner’s suppression motion, the claims, as alleged, rely on petitioner’s right to a fair trial (U.S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends.) and his right to counsel (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.) and so do not implicate the Lessard!Sterling rule. 36 See claim No. 85 (alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to examine police notes), claim No. 88 (alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach police witnesses), and claims Nos. 89 and 94 (alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to use the report of | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mosbygreen2 sentences2012In In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ], for example, we adopted a judicial rule of criminal procedure requiring Boykin-Tahl admonitions (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ]) to be given not just before a person confesses to a crime but also “ ‘before a court accepts an accused’s admission that he has suffered prior felony convictions’ ” (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 360 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 92 P.3d 841 ]). 2012In In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ], for example, we adopted a judicial rule of criminal procedure requiring Boykin-Tahl admonitions (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ]) to be given not just before a person confesses to a crime but also “ ‘before a court accepts an accused’s admission that he has suffered prior felony convictions’ ” (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 360 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 92 P.3d 841 ]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
green
2 sentences2021In analyzing claims of discrimination or retaliation under the FEHA, California courts have long applied the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 [ 36 L.Ed.2d 668 ]. 2021In analyzing claims of discrimination or retaliation under the FEHA, California courts have long applied the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 [ 36 L.Ed.2d 668 ]. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Memro
green
2 sentences2012Both claims were raised and rejected on appeal (see Memro II, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 838-843, 846-847) and so are, in any event, barred by the Waltreus rule (In re Waltreus, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 225). 2012Both claims were raised and rejected on appeal (see Memro II, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 838-843, 846-847) and so are, in any event, barred by the Waltreus rule (In re Waltreus, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 225). | 2 | 2012–2012 |
In Re Harris
green
2 sentences2012(See In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 169 [citing Sterling with approval]; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 830 [same].) “We do not believe that petitioner may at this date employ the writ of habeas corpus to attack the introduction of evidence which allegedly has been illegally obtained.” (Lessard, at p. 503.) We explained the Lessard/Sterling rule in In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 767: “[T]he erroneous admission of unlawfully seized evidence presented no risk that an innocent defendant might be convicted, and ‘[t]he risk that the deterrent effect of the [exclusionary] rule 2012(See In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 169 [citing Sterling with approval]; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 830 [same].) “We do not believe that petitioner may at this date employ the writ of habeas corpus to attack the introduction of evidence which allegedly has been illegally obtained.” (Lessard, at p. 503.) We explained the Lessard/Sterling rule in In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 767: “[T]he erroneous admission of unlawfully seized evidence presented no risk that an innocent defendant might be convicted, and ‘[t]he risk that the deterrent effect of the [exclusionary] rule | 2 | 2012–2012 |
In Re Clark
yellow
2 sentences2012(See also In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 169 [citing Sterling with approval]; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 830 [same].) ―We do not believe that petitioner may at this date employ the writ of habeas corpus to attack the introduction of evidence which allegedly has been illegally obtained.‖ (Lessard, at p. 503.) We explained the Lessard/Sterling rule in In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 767 : ―[T]he erroneous admission of unlawfully seized evidence presented no risk that an innocent defendant might be convicted, and ‗[t]he risk that the deterrent effect of the [exclusionary] 2012(See In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 169 [citing Sterling with approval]; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 830 [same].) “We do not believe that petitioner may at this date employ the writ of habeas corpus to attack the introduction of evidence which allegedly has been illegally obtained.” (Lessard, at p. 503.) We explained the Lessard/Sterling rule in In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 767: “[T]he erroneous admission of unlawfully seized evidence presented no risk that an innocent defendant might be convicted, and ‘[t]he risk that the deterrent effect of the [exclusionary] rule | 2 | 2012–2012 |
In Re Sakarias
green
2 sentences2012(See also In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 169 [citing Sterling with approval]; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 830 [same].) ―We do not believe that petitioner may at this date employ the writ of habeas corpus to attack the introduction of evidence which allegedly has been illegally obtained.‖ (Lessard, at p. 503.) We explained the Lessard/Sterling rule in In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 767 : ―[T]he erroneous admission of unlawfully seized evidence presented no risk that an innocent defendant might be convicted, and ‗[t]he risk that the deterrent effect of the [exclusionary] 2012(See In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 169 [citing Sterling with approval]; In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 830 [same].) “We do not believe that petitioner may at this date employ the writ of habeas corpus to attack the introduction of evidence which allegedly has been illegally obtained.” (Lessard, at p. 503.) We explained the Lessard/Sterling rule in In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 767: “[T]he erroneous admission of unlawfully seized evidence presented no risk that an innocent defendant might be convicted, and ‘[t]he risk that the deterrent effect of the [exclusionary] rule | 2 | 2012–2012 |
United States of America, Cross-Appellant v. Joseph P. Balistrieri and Angelina J. Hurdelbrink, Cross-Appellees
green
1 sentence2012An individual plaintiff must show injury in fact (San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 1998) 159 F.3d 470 , 475), whereas the United States has to show a “pattern or practice”—more than an isolated or sporadic act—of discrimination (U.S. v. Balistrieri (7th Cir. 1992) 981 F.2d 916, 929 ) or that a group of persons has been denied rights and such denial raises “an issue of general public importance.” ( 42 U.S.C. § 3614 (a).) That a nonparty alleged victim of housing discrimination could have brought a separate common law action against the Sterling defendants based on the factua | 1 | 2012–2012 |
In Re Tahl
yellow
2 sentences2012In In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ], for example, we adopted a judicial rule of criminal procedure requiring Boykin-Tahl admonitions (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ]) to be given not just before a person confesses to a crime but also “ ‘before a court accepts an accused’s admission that he has suffered prior felony convictions’ ” (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 360 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 92 P.3d 841 ]). 2012In In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ], for example, we adopted a judicial rule of criminal procedure requiring Boykin-Tahl admonitions (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ]) to be given not just before a person confesses to a crime but also “ ‘before a court accepts an accused’s admission that he has suffered prior felony convictions’ ” (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 360 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 92 P.3d 841 ]). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
In Re Sterling
green
2 sentences2012(In re Lessard, supra, 62 Cal.2d 497 ; In re Sterling, supra, 63 Cal.2d 486 .)35 Neither the petition nor the informal reply betrays any awareness that claim Nos. 1 and 3 are noncognizable claims. 2012(In re Lessard, supra, 62 Cal.2d 497 ; In re Sterling, supra, 63 Cal.2d 486 .)35 Neither the petition nor the informal reply betrays any awareness that claim Nos. 1 and 3 are noncognizable claims. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
In re Lessard
green
2 sentences2012(In re Lessard, supra, 62 Cal.2d 497 ; In re Sterling, supra, 63 Cal.2d 486 .)35 Neither the petition nor the informal reply betrays any awareness that claim Nos. 1 and 3 are noncognizable claims. 2012(In re Lessard, supra, 62 Cal.2d 497 ; In re Sterling, supra, 63 Cal.2d 486 .)35 Neither the petition nor the informal reply betrays any awareness that claim Nos. 1 and 3 are noncognizable claims. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
In Re Yurko
green
2 sentences2012In In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ], for example, we adopted a judicial rule of criminal procedure requiring Boykin-Tahl admonitions (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ]) to be given not just before a person confesses to a crime but also “ ‘before a court accepts an accused’s admission that he has suffered prior felony convictions’ ” (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 360 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 92 P.3d 841 ]). 2012In In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ], for example, we adopted a judicial rule of criminal procedure requiring Boykin-Tahl admonitions (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ]) to be given not just before a person confesses to a crime but also “ ‘before a court accepts an accused’s admission that he has suffered prior felony convictions’ ” (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 360 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 92 P.3d 841 ]). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
In Re White
green
2 sentences2012Although these six claims concern the conduct of the hearing on petitioner’s suppression motion, the claims, as alleged, rely on petitioner’s right to a fair trial (U.S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends.) and his right to counsel (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.) and so do not implicate the Lessard!Sterling rule. 36 See claim No. 85 (alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to examine police notes), claim No. 88 (alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach police witnesses), and claims Nos. 89 and 94 (alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to use the report of 2012Although these six claims concern the conduct of the hearing on petitioner’s suppression motion, the claims, as alleged, rely on petitioner’s right to a fair trial (U.S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends.) and his right to counsel (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.) and so do not implicate the Lessard!Sterling rule. 36 See claim No. 85 (alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to examine police notes), claim No. 88 (alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach police witnesses), and claims Nos. 89 and 94 (alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to use the report of | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Boykin v. Alabama
green
2 sentences2012In In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ], for example, we adopted a judicial rule of criminal procedure requiring Boykin-Tahl admonitions (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ]) to be given not just before a person confesses to a crime but also “ ‘before a court accepts an accused’s admission that he has suffered prior felony convictions’ ” (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 360 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 92 P.3d 841 ]). 2012In In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ], for example, we adopted a judicial rule of criminal procedure requiring Boykin-Tahl admonitions (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ]) to be given not just before a person confesses to a crime but also “ ‘before a court accepts an accused’s admission that he has suffered prior felony convictions’ ” (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 360 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 92 P.3d 841 ]). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence2012An individual plaintiff must show injury in fact (San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 1998) 159 F.3d 470 , 475), whereas the United States has to show a “pattern or practice”—more than an isolated or sporadic act—of discrimination (U.S. v. Balistrieri (7th Cir. 1992) 981 F.2d 916, 929 ) or that a group of persons has been denied rights and such denial raises “an issue of general public importance.” ( 42 U.S.C. § 3614 (a).) That a nonparty alleged victim of housing discrimination could have brought a separate common law action against the Sterling defendants based on the factua | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.