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14 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hughesred1 sentence2007NOTES [1] Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). [2] State v. Hughes, 154 Wash.2d 118, 137, 140, 142 , 110 P.3d 192 (2005), overruled on other grounds by Washington v. Recuenco, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2546 , 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006). [3] Subsection 2 of RCW 9.94A.535, in its entirety, reads: (2) Aggravating Circumstances—Considered and Imposed by the Court The trial court may impose an aggravated exceptional sentence without a finding of fact by a jury under the following circumstances: (a) The defendant and the state both stipulate that justice is best s | 1 | 1 |
State v. Grewegreen2 sentences1997See also State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 214 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991). 1997See also State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 214 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ermels
green
2 sentences2009Mr. Brandenburg contends there is no factual basis for this aggravating factor. ¶10 “By statute, a Washington court may impose an exceptional sentence outside the standard range if it concludes that ‘there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.’ ” State v. Ermels, 156 Wn.2d 528, 535 , 131 P.3d 299 (2006) (quoting RCW 9.94A.535). 2009Mr. Brandenburg contends there is no factual basis for this aggravating factor. ¶ 10 "By statute, a Washington court may impose an exceptional sentence outside the standard range if it concludes that `there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.'" State v. Ermels, 156 Wash.2d 528, 535 , 131 P.3d 299 (2006) (quoting RCW 9.94A.535). | 2 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Ermels
green
2 sentences2009Mr. Brandenburg contends there is no factual basis for this aggravating factor. ¶10 “By statute, a Washington court may impose an exceptional sentence outside the standard range if it concludes that ‘there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.’ ” State v. Ermels, 156 Wn.2d 528, 535 , 131 P.3d 299 (2006) (quoting RCW 9.94A.535). 2009Mr. Brandenburg contends there is no factual basis for this aggravating factor. ¶ 10 "By statute, a Washington court may impose an exceptional sentence outside the standard range if it concludes that `there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.'" State v. Ermels, 156 Wash.2d 528, 535 , 131 P.3d 299 (2006) (quoting RCW 9.94A.535). | 2 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Pascal
green
2 sentences2005Former RCW 9.94A. 120(2) (emphasis added). 34 ¶66 Former RCW 9.94A.390 contained a list of “illustrative factors,” but cautioned that the factors “are illustrative only and are not intended to be exclusive reasons for exceptional sentences.” Id. 2005Former RCW 9.94A.120(2) (emphasis added). [13] ¶ 65 Former RCW 9.94A.390 contained a list of "illustrative factors," but cautions that the factors "are illustrative only and are not intended to be exclusive reasons for exceptional sentences." Id. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Gore
red
2 sentences2004RCW 9.94A.535; State v. Gore, 143 Wash.2d 288, 315 , 21 P.3d 262 (2001). 2004RCW 9.94A.535; State v. Gore, 143 Wn.2d 288, 315 , 21 P.3d 262 (2001). | 2 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Gore
red
2 sentences2004RCW 9.94A.535; State v. Gore, 143 Wash.2d 288, 315 , 21 P.3d 262 (2001). 2004RCW 9.94A.535; State v. Gore, 143 Wn.2d 288, 315 , 21 P.3d 262 (2001). | 2 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Friedlund
green
2 sentences2026In turn, whenever “a sentence outside the standard sentence range is imposed, the court shall set forth the reasons for its decision in written findings of fact and conclusions of law.” RCW 9.94A.535 (emphasis added); State v. Friedlund, 182 Wn.2d 388, 390-91 , 341 P.3d 280 (2015). 2026In turn, whenever “a sentence outside the standard sentence range is imposed, the court shall set forth the reasons for its decision in written findings of fact and conclusions of law.” RCW 9.94A.535 (emphasis added); State v. Friedlund, 182 Wn.2d 388, 390-91 , 341 P.3d 280 (2015). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Zhao
green
1 sentence2024If a court finds an exceptional sentence outside the standard range should be imposed, “the sentence is subject to review only as provided for in RCW 9.94A.585(4).” Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Nordby
green
1 sentence2023The Court of Appeals held that two of its three reasons did, but one did not, because the third was a factor necessarily 11 No. 39504-9-III State v. Mittlestadt considered in computing the presumptive range for the offense. 106 Wn.2d at 518-19 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
In re the Personal Restraint of Breedlove
green
1 sentence2020Although her standard sentencing range for vehicular assault was 3-9 months, the State and Pangelinan agreed to an exceptional sentence of 24 months.1 The plea agreement stated: The Parties stipulate that justice is best served by the imposition of an exceptional sentence outside the standard range, that they will recommend the following exceptional sentence provisions, and that a factual basis exists for this exceptional sentence, predicated upon In re Breedlove, 138 Wn.2d 298 (1999) and State v. Hilyard, 63 Wn. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Hilyard
green
1 sentence2020Although her standard sentencing range for vehicular assault was 3-9 months, the State and Pangelinan agreed to an exceptional sentence of 24 months.1 The plea agreement stated: The Parties stipulate that justice is best served by the imposition of an exceptional sentence outside the standard range, that they will recommend the following exceptional sentence provisions, and that a factual basis exists for this exceptional sentence, predicated upon In re Breedlove, 138 Wn.2d 298 (1999) and State v. Hilyard, 63 Wn. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Alvarado
green
1 sentence2013State v. Alvarado, 164 Wn.2d 556, 567 , 192 P.3d 345 (2008) (determining that this provision acted as an “automatic aggravator” without any additional findings of fact, which were necessary when the “clearly too lenient” language was in place). ¶26 Similarly, RCW 9.94A.535(2)(a) authorizes an exceptional sentence without a jury finding following Blakely when [t]he defendant and the state both stipulate that justice is best served by the imposition of an exceptional sentence outside the standard range, and the court finds the exceptional sentence to be consistent with and in furtherance of the | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Alvarado
green
1 sentence2013State v. Alvarado, 164 Wn.2d 556, 567 , 192 P.3d 345 (2008) (determining that this provision acted as an “automatic aggravator” without any additional findings of fact, which were necessary when the “clearly too lenient” language was in place). ¶26 Similarly, RCW 9.94A.535(2)(a) authorizes an exceptional sentence without a jury finding following Blakely when [t]he defendant and the state both stipulate that justice is best served by the imposition of an exceptional sentence outside the standard range, and the court finds the exceptional sentence to be consistent with and in furtherance of the | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Blakely v. Washington
green
2 sentences2007NOTES [1] Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). [2] State v. Hughes, 154 Wash.2d 118, 137, 140, 142 , 110 P.3d 192 (2005), overruled on other grounds by Washington v. Recuenco, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2546 , 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006). [3] Subsection 2 of RCW 9.94A.535, in its entirety, reads: (2) Aggravating Circumstances—Considered and Imposed by the Court The trial court may impose an aggravated exceptional sentence without a finding of fact by a jury under the following circumstances: (a) The defendant and the state both stipulate that justice is best s 2007NOTES [1] Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). [2] State v. Hughes, 154 Wash.2d 118, 137, 140, 142 , 110 P.3d 192 (2005), overruled on other grounds by Washington v. Recuenco, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2546 , 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006). [3] Subsection 2 of RCW 9.94A.535, in its entirety, reads: (2) Aggravating Circumstances—Considered and Imposed by the Court The trial court may impose an aggravated exceptional sentence without a finding of fact by a jury under the following circumstances: (a) The defendant and the state both stipulate that justice is best s | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Hughes
red
1 sentence2007NOTES [1] Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). [2] State v. Hughes, 154 Wash.2d 118, 137, 140, 142 , 110 P.3d 192 (2005), overruled on other grounds by Washington v. Recuenco, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2546 , 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006). [3] Subsection 2 of RCW 9.94A.535, in its entirety, reads: (2) Aggravating Circumstances—Considered and Imposed by the Court The trial court may impose an aggravated exceptional sentence without a finding of fact by a jury under the following circumstances: (a) The defendant and the state both stipulate that justice is best s | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Washington v. Recuenco
green
2 sentences2007NOTES [1] Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). [2] State v. Hughes, 154 Wash.2d 118, 137, 140, 142 , 110 P.3d 192 (2005), overruled on other grounds by Washington v. Recuenco, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2546 , 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006). [3] Subsection 2 of RCW 9.94A.535, in its entirety, reads: (2) Aggravating Circumstances—Considered and Imposed by the Court The trial court may impose an aggravated exceptional sentence without a finding of fact by a jury under the following circumstances: (a) The defendant and the state both stipulate that justice is best s 2007NOTES [1] Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). [2] State v. Hughes, 154 Wash.2d 118, 137, 140, 142 , 110 P.3d 192 (2005), overruled on other grounds by Washington v. Recuenco, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2546 , 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006). [3] Subsection 2 of RCW 9.94A.535, in its entirety, reads: (2) Aggravating Circumstances—Considered and Imposed by the Court The trial court may impose an aggravated exceptional sentence without a finding of fact by a jury under the following circumstances: (a) The defendant and the state both stipulate that justice is best s | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Mulligan
green
2 sentences1999IV Exceptional Sentence A sentencing court may impose an exceptional sentence outside the standard range if it finds “ ‘that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.’ ” RCW 9.94A.120(2); State v. Mulligan, 87 Wn. 1999App. 261, 264 , 941 P.2d 694 (1997), review *697 denied, 134 Wn.2d 1016 (1998). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.