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14 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 2003–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Couch v. Department of Correctionsgreen2 sentences2005The majority states that “[u]nder some circumstances, the specifics of [the conditions of release contained in a judgment and sentence] may limit the State’s duty.” Majority at 315 (citing Couch, 113 Wn. 2005See RCW 9.94A.650(2); see also Pls' Ex. 6, part 4.4, where the sentencing judge utilized the first time offender waiver. [4] The majority states that "[u]nder some circumstances, the specifics of [the conditions of release contained in a judgment and sentence] may limit the State's duty." Majority at 830 (citing Couch, 113 Wash.App. 556 , 54 P.3d 197 ). | 2 | 5 |
State v. McGillgreen2 sentences2009See State v. McGill, 112 Wash.App. 95, 99-100 , 47 P.3d 173 (2002) (this statute prohibits appeals of only the length of time imposed and not the legal basis to impose such a sentence). 2009See State v. McGill, 112 Wn. | 2 | 2 |
Couch v. Wa. Dep't of Correctionsgreen2 sentences2005See RCW 9.94A.650(2); see also Pls' Ex. 6, part 4.4, where the sentencing judge utilized the first time offender waiver. [4] The majority states that "[u]nder some circumstances, the specifics of [the conditions of release contained in a judgment and sentence] may limit the State's duty." Majority at 830 (citing Couch, 113 Wash.App. 556 , 54 P.3d 197 ). 2005See RCW 9.94A.650(2); see also Pls' Ex. 6, part 4.4, where the sentencing judge utilized the first time offender waiver. [4] The majority states that "[u]nder some circumstances, the specifics of [the conditions of release contained in a judgment and sentence] may limit the State's duty." Majority at 830 (citing Couch, 113 Wash.App. 556 , 54 P.3d 197 ). | 1 | 3 |
Sherman v. Stategreen1 sentence2017Compare State v. Ha'mim, 132 Wn.2d 834, 845 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997)(describing the first-time offender waiver statute as concerning the grant of an exceptional sentence downward), overruled on other grounds by State v. O'Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 696 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015); State v. Freitag, 127 Wn.2d 141 , 144 n.2, 896 P.2d 1254 , 905 P.2d 355 (1995)("The sentencing guidelines provide that an exceptional sentence may be imposed for some first-time offenders."); State v. Gaines, 65 Wn. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gainesgreen2 sentences2017Compare State v. Ha'mim, 132 Wn.2d 834, 845 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997)(describing the first-time offender waiver statute as concerning the grant of an exceptional sentence downward), overruled on other grounds by State v. O'Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 696 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015); State v. Freitag, 127 Wn.2d 141 , 144 n.2, 896 P.2d 1254 , 905 P.2d 355 (1995)("The sentencing guidelines provide that an exceptional sentence may be imposed for some first-time offenders."); State v. Gaines, 65 Wn. 2017App. 790 , 793 n.1, 830 P.2d 367 (1992)("Under two other exceptions not applicable here, the court may also impose an exceptional sentence in cases involving first-time and sexual offenders."), reversed on other grounds, 122 Wn.2d 502 , 859 P.2d 36 (1993), with State v. Stately, 152 Wn. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ha'Mimred1 sentence2017Compare State v. Ha'mim, 132 Wn.2d 834, 845 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997)(describing the first-time offender waiver statute as concerning the grant of an exceptional sentence downward), overruled on other grounds by State v. O'Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 696 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015); State v. Freitag, 127 Wn.2d 141 , 144 n.2, 896 P.2d 1254 , 905 P.2d 355 (1995)("The sentencing guidelines provide that an exceptional sentence may be imposed for some first-time offenders."); State v. Gaines, 65 Wn. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ha'mimred1 sentence2017Compare State v. Ha'mim, 132 Wn.2d 834, 845 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997)(describing the first-time offender waiver statute as concerning the grant of an exceptional sentence downward), overruled on other grounds by State v. O'Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 696 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015); State v. Freitag, 127 Wn.2d 141 , 144 n.2, 896 P.2d 1254 , 905 P.2d 355 (1995)("The sentencing guidelines provide that an exceptional sentence may be imposed for some first-time offenders."); State v. Gaines, 65 Wn. | 1 | 1 |
State v. O'Dellgreen2 sentences2017Compare State v. Ha'mim, 132 Wn.2d 834, 845 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997)(describing the first-time offender waiver statute as concerning the grant of an exceptional sentence downward), overruled on other grounds by State v. O'Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 696 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015); State v. Freitag, 127 Wn.2d 141 , 144 n.2, 896 P.2d 1254 , 905 P.2d 355 (1995)("The sentencing guidelines provide that an exceptional sentence may be imposed for some first-time offenders."); State v. Gaines, 65 Wn. 2017Compare State v. Ha'mim, 132 Wn.2d 834, 845 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997)(describing the first-time offender waiver statute as concerning the grant of an exceptional sentence downward), overruled on other grounds by State v. O'Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 696 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015); State v. Freitag, 127 Wn.2d 141 , 144 n.2, 896 P.2d 1254 , 905 P.2d 355 (1995)("The sentencing guidelines provide that an exceptional sentence may be imposed for some first-time offenders."); State v. Gaines, 65 Wn. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Freitaggreen2 sentences2017Compare State v. Ha'mim, 132 Wn.2d 834, 845 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997)(describing the first-time offender waiver statute as concerning the grant of an exceptional sentence downward), overruled on other grounds by State v. O'Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 696 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015); State v. Freitag, 127 Wn.2d 141 , 144 n.2, 896 P.2d 1254 , 905 P.2d 355 (1995)("The sentencing guidelines provide that an exceptional sentence may be imposed for some first-time offenders."); State v. Gaines, 65 Wn. 2017Compare State v. Ha'mim, 132 Wn.2d 834, 845 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997)(describing the first-time offender waiver statute as concerning the grant of an exceptional sentence downward), overruled on other grounds by State v. O'Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 696 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015); State v. Freitag, 127 Wn.2d 141 , 144 n.2, 896 P.2d 1254 , 905 P.2d 355 (1995)("The sentencing guidelines provide that an exceptional sentence may be imposed for some first-time offenders."); State v. Gaines, 65 Wn. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Statelygreen1 sentence2017App. 790 , 793 n.1, 830 P.2d 367 (1992)("Under two other exceptions not applicable here, the court may also impose an exceptional sentence in cases involving first-time and sexual offenders."), reversed on other grounds, 122 Wn.2d 502 , 859 P.2d 36 (1993), with State v. Stately, 152 Wn. | 1 | 1 |
State v. McGillgreen1 sentence2009See State v. McGill, 112 Wash.App. 95, 99-100 , 47 P.3d 173 (2002) (this statute prohibits appeals of only the length of time imposed and not the legal basis to impose such a sentence). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Barclaygreen2 sentences2003See State v. Barclay, 51 Wash.App. 404, 405 , 753 p.2d 1015 , review denied, 111 Wash.2d 1010 (1988). [31] DOC acknowledges that Stewart's supervision might have produced liability for DOC under Taggart if he had assaulted his girlfriend again and the CCO had not reported violations of no contact, no weapons, or counseling conditions, which would have led to re-incarceration. [32] The report reflects that as of March 1997, DOC believed Stewart was homeless, but that because the notice of violation had not been returned when mailed to his father's home, it now believed he was no longer homeless 2003See State v. Barclay, 51 Wash.App. 404, 405 , 753 p.2d 1015 , review denied, 111 Wash.2d 1010 (1988). [31] DOC acknowledges that Stewart's supervision might have produced liability for DOC under Taggart if he had assaulted his girlfriend again and the CCO had not reported violations of no contact, no weapons, or counseling conditions, which would have led to re-incarceration. [32] The report reflects that as of March 1997, DOC believed Stewart was homeless, but that because the notice of violation had not been returned when mailed to his father's home, it now believed he was no longer homeless | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Johnson
neutral
2 sentences2024State v. Johnson, 97 Wn. 2019State v. Johnson, 97 Wn. | 3 | 2019–2024 |
State v. Garcia-Martinez
green
2 sentences2017The sentencing court erred, she asserts, because the court denied her waiver request and imposed a standard range sentence after listening to her voluntary allocution and determining that she did not acknowledge responsibility for her criminal conduct. 5 No. 74713-4-1/6 "Generally, a defendant cannot appeal a sentence within the standard range." State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474, 481 , 139 P.3d 334 (2006)(citing RCW 9.94A.585(1); State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. 2017App. 322, 330 , 944 P.2d 1104 (1997)). -13- No. 74436-4-1/ 14 The first-time offender waiver allows a sentencing court to waive the imposition of a sentence within the standard sentence range and impose a lesser sentence that may include up to 90 days of confinement and community custody.29 The trial court has broad discretion in sentencing a defendant under the first-time offender option or in refusing to grant a first-time offender waiver.30 Here, the record does not support Bauml's claim that the trial court categorically refused to impose a first-time offender waiver. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Christensen v. Ellsworth
green
2 sentences2009Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wash.2d 365, 373 , 173 P.3d 228 (2007). ¶ 5 A sentencing court may apply a first-time offender waiver only if sentencing an offender who has "never been previously convicted of a felony in this state, federal court, or another state, and who ha[s] never participated in a program of deferred prosecution for a felony, and who [is] convicted of a felony that is not," as relevant here, "[c]lassified as a violent offense ... under [ch. 9.94A RCW]." Former RCW 9.94A.650(1)(a). 2009Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wn.2d 365, 373 , 173 P.3d 228 (2007). ¶5 A sentencing court may apply a first-time-offender waiver only if sentencing an offender who has “never been previously convicted of a felony in this state, federal court, or another state, and who ha[s] never participated in a program of deferred prosecution for a felony, and who [is] convicted of a felony that is not,” as relevant here, “ [classified as a violent offense . . . under [ch. 9.94A RCW].” Former RCW 9.94A.650(1)(a). | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Christensen v. Ellsworth
green
2 sentences2009Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wash.2d 365, 373 , 173 P.3d 228 (2007). ¶ 5 A sentencing court may apply a first-time offender waiver only if sentencing an offender who has "never been previously convicted of a felony in this state, federal court, or another state, and who ha[s] never participated in a program of deferred prosecution for a felony, and who [is] convicted of a felony that is not," as relevant here, "[c]lassified as a violent offense ... under [ch. 9.94A RCW]." Former RCW 9.94A.650(1)(a). 2009Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wn.2d 365, 373 , 173 P.3d 228 (2007). ¶5 A sentencing court may apply a first-time-offender waiver only if sentencing an offender who has “never been previously convicted of a felony in this state, federal court, or another state, and who ha[s] never participated in a program of deferred prosecution for a felony, and who [is] convicted of a felony that is not,” as relevant here, “ [classified as a violent offense . . . under [ch. 9.94A RCW].” Former RCW 9.94A.650(1)(a). | 2 | 2009–2009 |
State v. STATELY
green
1 sentence2019App. 604 , 216 P.3d 1102 (2009), Denys first argues that the trial court erred when it categorically refused to consider the first-time offender waiver after determining that the waiver was not available for a vehicular homicide with disregard for the safety of others since the offense was a class A felony. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Osman
green
1 sentence2017The sentencing court erred, she asserts, because the court denied her waiver request and imposed a standard range sentence after listening to her voluntary allocution and determining that she did not acknowledge responsibility for her criminal conduct. 5 No. 74713-4-1/6 "Generally, a defendant cannot appeal a sentence within the standard range." State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474, 481 , 139 P.3d 334 (2006)(citing RCW 9.94A.585(1); State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Osman
green
1 sentence2017The sentencing court erred, she asserts, because the court denied her waiver request and imposed a standard range sentence after listening to her voluntary allocution and determining that she did not acknowledge responsibility for her criminal conduct. 5 No. 74713-4-1/6 "Generally, a defendant cannot appeal a sentence within the standard range." State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474, 481 , 139 P.3d 334 (2006)(citing RCW 9.94A.585(1); State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Gaines
green
2 sentences2017App. 790 , 793 n.1, 830 P.2d 367 (1992)("Under two other exceptions not applicable here, the court may also impose an exceptional sentence in cases involving first-time and sexual offenders."), reversed on other grounds, 122 Wn.2d 502 , 859 P.2d 36 (1993), with State v. Stately, 152 Wn. 2017App. 790 , 793 n.1, 830 P.2d 367 (1992)("Under two other exceptions not applicable here, the court may also impose an exceptional sentence in cases involving first-time and sexual offenders."), reversed on other grounds, 122 Wn.2d 502 , 859 P.2d 36 (1993), with State v. Stately, 152 Wn. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2014When defense counsel pointed out that former RCW 9.94A.650 authorized a community custody term of 24 months only if treatment was ordered, the court stated that if "the evaluator says there's no treatment available, or 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 2 No. 66295-3-1/3 needed, then [Lee] can petition the Court [to strike] the rest of the community custody." Lee did not object to imposition of the first time offender waiver sentence. 2014When defense counsel pointed out that former RCW 9.94A.650 authorized a community custody term of 24 months only if treatment was ordered, the court stated that if "the evaluator says there's no treatment available, or 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 2 No. 66295-3-1/3 needed, then [Lee] can petition the Court [to strike] the rest of the community custody." Lee did not object to imposition of the first time offender waiver sentence. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Petrich
red
2 sentences2004The trial court declined to grant the first-time offender waiver because Kinnemans theft amounted to a major economic offense and was an abuse of the trust. [3] Former RCW 9A.56.010(17)(c) (2000) (amended as RCW 9A.56.010(18)(c) by Laws 2001, ch. 10, § 6). [4] See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 115 Wash.2d 294, 299 , 797 P.2d 1141 (1990) (recognizing that prosecutors are vested with wide discretion in determining how and when to file criminal charges); State v. Petrich, 101 Wash.2d 566, 572 , 683 P.2d 173 (1984) ([w]hether the incidents are to be charged separately or brought as one charge is a decisi 2004The trial court declined to grant the first-time offender waiver because Kinnemans theft amounted to a major economic offense and was an abuse of the trust. [3] Former RCW 9A.56.010(17)(c) (2000) (amended as RCW 9A.56.010(18)(c) by Laws 2001, ch. 10, § 6). [4] See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 115 Wash.2d 294, 299 , 797 P.2d 1141 (1990) (recognizing that prosecutors are vested with wide discretion in determining how and when to file criminal charges); State v. Petrich, 101 Wash.2d 566, 572 , 683 P.2d 173 (1984) ([w]hether the incidents are to be charged separately or brought as one charge is a decisi | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Lewis
green
2 sentences2004The trial court declined to grant the first-time offender waiver because Kinnemans theft amounted to a major economic offense and was an abuse of the trust. [3] Former RCW 9A.56.010(17)(c) (2000) (amended as RCW 9A.56.010(18)(c) by Laws 2001, ch. 10, § 6). [4] See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 115 Wash.2d 294, 299 , 797 P.2d 1141 (1990) (recognizing that prosecutors are vested with wide discretion in determining how and when to file criminal charges); State v. Petrich, 101 Wash.2d 566, 572 , 683 P.2d 173 (1984) ([w]hether the incidents are to be charged separately or brought as one charge is a decisi 2004The trial court declined to grant the first-time offender waiver because Kinnemans theft amounted to a major economic offense and was an abuse of the trust. [3] Former RCW 9A.56.010(17)(c) (2000) (amended as RCW 9A.56.010(18)(c) by Laws 2001, ch. 10, § 6). [4] See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 115 Wash.2d 294, 299 , 797 P.2d 1141 (1990) (recognizing that prosecutors are vested with wide discretion in determining how and when to file criminal charges); State v. Petrich, 101 Wash.2d 566, 572 , 683 P.2d 173 (1984) ([w]hether the incidents are to be charged separately or brought as one charge is a decisi | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Pettitt
green
2 sentences2004The trial court declined to grant the first-time offender waiver because Kinnemans theft amounted to a major economic offense and was an abuse of the trust. [3] Former RCW 9A.56.010(17)(c) (2000) (amended as RCW 9A.56.010(18)(c) by Laws 2001, ch. 10, § 6). [4] See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 115 Wash.2d 294, 299 , 797 P.2d 1141 (1990) (recognizing that prosecutors are vested with wide discretion in determining how and when to file criminal charges); State v. Petrich, 101 Wash.2d 566, 572 , 683 P.2d 173 (1984) ([w]hether the incidents are to be charged separately or brought as one charge is a decisi 2004The trial court declined to grant the first-time offender waiver because Kinnemans theft amounted to a major economic offense and was an abuse of the trust. [3] Former RCW 9A.56.010(17)(c) (2000) (amended as RCW 9A.56.010(18)(c) by Laws 2001, ch. 10, § 6). [4] See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 115 Wash.2d 294, 299 , 797 P.2d 1141 (1990) (recognizing that prosecutors are vested with wide discretion in determining how and when to file criminal charges); State v. Petrich, 101 Wash.2d 566, 572 , 683 P.2d 173 (1984) ([w]hether the incidents are to be charged separately or brought as one charge is a decisi | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Joy
green
2 sentences2004State v. Joy, 121 Wash.2d 333, 339 , 851 P.2d 654 (1993). [6] RAP 10.3(g) provides: A separate assignment of error for each instruction which a party contends was improperly given or refused must be included with reference to each instruction or proposed instruction by number. 2004State v. Joy, 121 Wash.2d 333, 339 , 851 P.2d 654 (1993). [6] RAP 10.3(g) provides: A separate assignment of error for each instruction which a party contends was improperly given or refused must be included with reference to each instruction or proposed instruction by number. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.