Eleventh Amendment immunity in Alabama

2012One example of congressional abrogation of the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity is set forth in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 , 98 S.Ct. 2565 , 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 , constituted a congressional abrogation of the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to the payment of attorney fees in civil-rights actions.

2012One example of congressional abrogation of the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity is set forth in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 , 98 S.Ct. 2565 , 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 , constituted a congressional abrogation of the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to the payment of attorney fees in civil-rights actions.

2008In Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701, 737 , 109 S.Ct. 2702 , 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989), the Supreme Court further held that it is a court’s duty to identify governmental bodies “who speak with final policymaking authority for the local governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue.” However, it is well established that if a local government body is acting as an “arm of the State,” which includes agents or instrumentalities of the State, then Eleventh Amendment immunity bars the suit.

2008In Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701, 737 , 109 S.Ct. 2702 , 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989), the Supreme Court further held that it is a court’s duty to identify governmental bodies “who speak with final policymaking authority for the local governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue.” However, it is well established that if a local government body is acting as an “arm of the State,” which includes agents or instrumentalities of the State, then Eleventh Amendment immunity bars the suit.

2001Trans ., 483 U.S. 468 , 478 (1987) (holding that a state may not be sued in a federal court absent a clear congressional intent and stating: "Although our later decisions do not expressly overrule Parden , they leave no doubt that Parden 's discussion of congressional intent to negate Eleventh Amendment immunity is no longer good law."); Edelman v. Jordan , 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (holding that a state's acceptance of federal funding does not provide consent to suit in federal courts); Employees v. Department of Pub.

1992However, in 1987, Welch v. Texas Department of Highways Public Transportation , 483 U.S. 468 , 107 S.Ct. 2941 , 97 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987), expressly overruled that portion of Parden holding that a state that enters the business of operating a railroad waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity.

2012In Versiglio v. Board of Dental Examiners of Alabama, 651 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir.2011), decided after Wilkinson , the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue whether the Board was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from Versig-lio's claims asserted pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

2012In addressing this issue, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the Board "appearfed] to have a viable argument that it is an arm of the State under” the test set forth in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. Florida State Athletic Commission, 226 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir.2000). 651 F.3d at 1274 .

2012In addressing this issue, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the Board "appearfed] to have a viable argument that it is an arm of the State under” the test set forth in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. Florida State Athletic Commission, 226 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir.2000). 651 F.3d at 1274 .

2009Safety v. Sexton, 748 So.2d 200, 216 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) (citing in turn Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 , 112 S.Ct. 358 , 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991))); see Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 , 109 S.Ct. 2304 , 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that a state is not a “person” under § 1983 and therefore that a § 1983 action brought in state court could not be maintained against a state), and Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 , 99 S.Ct. 1139 , 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979) (holding in a § 1983 action brought in federal court that § 1983 does not override Eleventh Amendment immunity).

2009Safety v. Sexton, 748 So.2d 200, 216 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) (citing in turn Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 , 112 S.Ct. 358 , 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991))); see Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 , 109 S.Ct. 2304 , 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that a state is not a “person” under § 1983 and therefore that a § 1983 action brought in state court could not be maintained against a state), and Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 , 99 S.Ct. 1139 , 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979) (holding in a § 1983 action brought in federal court that § 1983 does not override Eleventh Amendment immunity).

2003The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that "[i]n the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, 100 Stat. 1845 , 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 , Congress abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title IX [of the Education Amendments of 1972, supra ]. . . ." Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools , 503 U.S. at 72 , 112 S.Ct. 1028 . "`Title IX [addressing sex discrimination]' . . . `was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [addressing racial discrimination].'" Alexander v. Sandoval , 532 U.S. 275 , 280 , 121 S.Ct. 1511 , 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001) (quoting Canno

2003The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that "[i]n the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, 100 Stat. 1845 , 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 , Congress abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title IX [of the Education Amendments of 1972, supra ]. . . ." Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools , 503 U.S. at 72 , 112 S.Ct. 1028 . "`Title IX [addressing sex discrimination]' . . . `was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [addressing racial discrimination].'" Alexander v. Sandoval , 532 U.S. 275 , 280 , 121 S.Ct. 1511 , 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001) (quoting Canno

2003See Kimel, supra, at 79 , 120 S.Ct. 631 . (`Under our firmly established precedent then, if the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act *400 of 1967] rests solely on Congress' Article I commerce power, the private petitioners in today's cases cannot maintain their suits against their state employers'); Seminole Tribe, supra, at 72-73 , 116 S.Ct. 1114 , (`The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction'); College Savings Bank, supra, at 672, 119 S.Ct. 2219 ," Florida P

2003See Kimel, supra , at 79, 120 S.Ct. 631 . (`Under our firmly established precedent then, if the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act *Page 400 of 1967] rests solely on Congress' Article I commerce power, the private petitioners in today's cases cannot maintain their suits against their state employers'); Seminole Tribe, supra , at 72-73, 116 S.Ct. 1114 , (`The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction'); College Savings Bank, supra , at 672, 119 S.Ct. 2219 ," Flo

2003See Kimel, supra , at 79, 120 S.Ct. 631 . (`Under our firmly established precedent then, if the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act *Page 400 of 1967] rests solely on Congress' Article I commerce power, the private petitioners in today's cases cannot maintain their suits against their state employers'); Seminole Tribe, supra , at 72-73, 116 S.Ct. 1114 , (`The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction'); College Savings Bank, supra , at 672, 119 S.Ct. 2219 ," Flo

2003See Kimel, supra , at 79, 120 S.Ct. 631 . (`Under our firmly established precedent then, if the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act *Page 400 of 1967] rests solely on Congress' Article I commerce power, the private petitioners in today's cases cannot maintain their suits against their state employers'); Seminole Tribe, supra , at 72-73, 116 S.Ct. 1114 , (`The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction'); College Savings Bank, supra , at 672, 119 S.Ct. 2219 ," Flo

2003See Kimel, supra, at 79 , 120 S.Ct. 631 . (`Under our firmly established precedent then, if the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act *400 of 1967] rests solely on Congress' Article I commerce power, the private petitioners in today's cases cannot maintain their suits against their state employers'); Seminole Tribe, supra, at 72-73 , 116 S.Ct. 1114 , (`The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction'); College Savings Bank, supra, at 672, 119 S.Ct. 2219 ," Florida P

2003See Kimel, supra , at 79, 120 S.Ct. 631 . (`Under our firmly established precedent then, if the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act *Page 400 of 1967] rests solely on Congress' Article I commerce power, the private petitioners in today's cases cannot maintain their suits against their state employers'); Seminole Tribe, supra , at 72-73, 116 S.Ct. 1114 , (`The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction'); College Savings Bank, supra , at 672, 119 S.Ct. 2219 ," Flo

2003See Kimel, supra , at 79, 120 S.Ct. 631 . (`Under our firmly established precedent then, if the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act *Page 400 of 1967] rests solely on Congress' Article I commerce power, the private petitioners in today's cases cannot maintain their suits against their state employers'); Seminole Tribe, supra , at 72-73, 116 S.Ct. 1114 , (`The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction'); College Savings Bank, supra , at 672, 119 S.Ct. 2219 ," Flo

2003See Kimel, supra , at 79, 120 S.Ct. 631 . (`Under our firmly established precedent then, if the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act *Page 400 of 1967] rests solely on Congress' Article I commerce power, the private petitioners in today's cases cannot maintain their suits against their state employers'); Seminole Tribe, supra , at 72-73, 116 S.Ct. 1114 , (`The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction'); College Savings Bank, supra , at 672, 119 S.Ct. 2219 ," Flo

2003Garrett explains that an exception has emerged to the general rule that Congress cannot "base its abrogation of the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity upon the powers enumerated in Article I," Garrett , 531 U.S. at 364 -65 , 121 S.Ct. 955 .

2003Garrett explains that an exception has emerged to the general rule that Congress cannot "base its abrogation of the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity upon the powers enumerated in Article I," Garrett , 531 U.S. at 364 -65 , 121 S.Ct. 955 .

2003The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that "[i]n the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, 100 Stat. 1845 , 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 , Congress abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title IX [of the Education Amendments of 1972, supra ]. . . ." Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools , 503 U.S. at 72 , 112 S.Ct. 1028 . "`Title IX [addressing sex discrimination]' . . . `was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [addressing racial discrimination].'" Alexander v. Sandoval , 532 U.S. 275 , 280 , 121 S.Ct. 1511 , 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001) (quoting Canno

2003The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that "[i]n the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, 100 Stat. 1845 , 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 , Congress abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title IX [of the Education Amendments of 1972, supra ]. . . ." Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools , 503 U.S. at 72 , 112 S.Ct. 1028 . "`Title IX [addressing sex discrimination]' . . . `was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [addressing racial discrimination].'" Alexander v. Sandoval , 532 U.S. 275 , 280 , 121 S.Ct. 1511 , 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001) (quoting Canno

2003The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that "[i]n the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, 100 Stat. 1845 , 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 , Congress abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title IX [of the Education Amendments of 1972, supra ]. . . ." Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools , 503 U.S. at 72 , 112 S.Ct. 1028 . "`Title IX [addressing sex discrimination]' . . . `was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [addressing racial discrimination].'" Alexander v. Sandoval , 532 U.S. 275 , 280 , 121 S.Ct. 1511 , 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001) (quoting Canno

2003The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that "[i]n the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, 100 Stat. 1845 , 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 , Congress abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title IX [of the Education Amendments of 1972, supra ]. . . ." Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools , 503 U.S. at 72 , 112 S.Ct. 1028 . "`Title IX [addressing sex discrimination]' . . . `was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [addressing racial discrimination].'" Alexander v. Sandoval , 532 U.S. 275 , 280 , 121 S.Ct. 1511 , 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001) (quoting Canno

2003Federal Qualified Immunity Wood argues that he is entitled to federal qualified immunity from the Doe plaintiffs' federal § 1983 claim against him. "[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800 , 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

2003Federal Qualified Immunity Wood argues that he is entitled to federal qualified immunity from the Doe plaintiffs' federal § 1983 claim against him. "[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800 , 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).