Eleventh Amendment immunity in California

2019(See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) [no Eleventh Amendment immunity for violations of title VI].) But as the Board points out, plaintiffs "confuse sovereign immunity with whether a statute itself creates a cause of action against a state." "[W]hether an entity is a 'person' subject to suit under section 1983 is a matter of federal law and is not affected by whether the entity has sovereign immunity ..." ( Kirchmann , supra , 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1105 , 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 289 [rejecting argument that by enacting the California Tort Claims Act, school districts could be sued under section 1983 ], italic

2019(See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) [no Eleventh Amendment immunity for violations of title VI].) But as the Board points out, plaintiffs "confuse sovereign immunity with whether a statute itself creates a cause of action against a state." "[W]hether an entity is a 'person' subject to suit under section 1983 is a matter of federal law and is not affected by whether the entity has sovereign immunity ..." ( Kirchmann , supra , 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1105 , 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 289 [rejecting argument that by enacting the California Tort Claims Act, school districts could be sued under section 1983 ], italic

2020“An administrative agency must act within the powers conferred upon it by law and may not act in excess of 38 See Lynch v. San Francisco Housing Authority (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 527, 534-535, 537-539 (observing that courts have labeled housing authorities either state agencies, or city or county agencies, depending on context, and discussing cases); see id. at pp. 539- 543 (considering character of housing authorities and concluding that they are not arms of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity). 39 Gov.

2020“An administrative agency must act within the powers conferred upon it by law and may not act in excess of 38 See Lynch v. San Francisco Housing Authority (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 527, 534-535, 537-539 (observing that courts have labeled housing authorities either state agencies, or city or county agencies, depending on context, and discussing cases); see id. at pp. 539- 543 (considering character of housing authorities and concluding that they are not arms of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity). 39 Gov.

2023(See McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill. (2010) 561 U.S. 742, 778 ; District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570 (Heller).) 10 Although his prayer for relief requested an award of damages, Regina now concedes he has no right to damages in an action against the State or its Attorneys General in their official capacities under title 42 United States Code section 1983 (see Howlett v. Rose (1990) 496 U.S. 356, 366 [states and state officers sued in their official capacities are not considered persons under section 1983 and are immune from liability under the statute by virtue of the Eleventh A

2014(See Arizonans, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 69; Howlett, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 376 ; Ngiraingas, supra, 495 U.S. at p. 192, fn. 12 .) While the court in Venegas cited to Will , it did not focus on the United States Supreme Court’s holding in that case that states (including state agencies and state officials sued in their official capacity) are not “persons” as that term is used in section 1983. ( Venegas, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 829-839.) Rather, the California court folded the Eleventh Amendment into its discussion, stating, for example, “states and state officers sued in their official capacity

2014(Kirchmann v. Lake Elsinore Unified School District (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1101 , citing Monell, supra, 436 U.S. at pp. 690-691.) But the Eleventh Amendment makes states and state agents immune from suit under section 1983 in both federal and state court. ( Kirchmann at p. 1101 , citing Will, supra, 491 U.S. at pp. 690-691.) In 6 Parratt was overruled on unrelated ground in Davids v. Williams (1986) 474 U.S. 327, 330-331 . 15 Kirchmann, the court held that California school districts are arms of the state for purposes of section 1983 immunity. ( Kirchmann at p. 1115 .) In addition, state

2004From language, legislative history, and interpretive precedent the high court concluded that "Congress, in passing ง 1983, had no intention to disturb the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity" ( Will, supra, at p. 66 , 109 S.Ct. 2304 ) or to "disregard the well-established [common law] immunity of a State from being sued without its consent" ( id. at p. 67, 109 S.Ct. 2304 ).

2014(Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820, 829 ); Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 359-360 [county district attorney acts on behalf of state in investigating and prosecuting crimes and therefore enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from Section 1983 liability]; Imbler v. Pachtman (1976) 424 U.S. 409, 430-431 [ 47 L.Ed.2d 128, 143-144 ] [prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from Section 1983 suits for their activities in initiating and presenting the state’s case, as well as for conduct “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process”].) The trial

2014(McMillian v. Monroe County (1997) 520 U.S. 781, 786 [ 117 S.Ct. 1734 , 138 L.Ed.2d 1 ]; see Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 352-353 ; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 218 , 233- 234.) A number of California cases have addressed the issue whether a local government official is acting on behalf of the state or a county for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity.

2004Justice Werdegar relies in part on Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (1994) 513 U.S. 30, 48 , 115 S.Ct. 394 , 130 L.Ed.2d 245 , as emphasizing the importance of "the vulnerability of the State's purse" (conc. & dis. opn., post, at 11 Cal.Rptr.3d p. 718, 87 P.3d at p. 23 ), but that case did not involve a section 1983 claim but was an action brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act against a multi-state port authority, which unsuccessfully sought Eleventh Amendment immunity as a state agent.

2004Justice Werdegar relies in part on Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (1994) 513 U.S. 30, 48 , 115 S.Ct. 394 , 130 L.Ed.2d 245 , as emphasizing the importance of "the vulnerability of the State's purse" (conc. & dis. opn., post, at 11 Cal.Rptr.3d p. 718, 87 P.3d at p. 23 ), but that case did not involve a section 1983 claim but was an action brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act against a multi-state port authority, which unsuccessfully sought Eleventh Amendment immunity as a state agent.

2005(Id. at pp. 535-536, citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe (1997) 519 U.S. 425, 429-430 [ 137 L.Ed.2d 55 , 117 S.Ct. 900 ] [fact that university would be indemnified by federal government for litigation costs did not divest university of its Eleventh Amendment immunity].) *859 However, in this case the Mining Board was both a state agency and an arm of the state.

2005(Id. at pp. 535-536, citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe (1997) 519 U.S. 425, 429-430 [ 137 L.Ed.2d 55 , 117 S.Ct. 900 ] [fact that university would be indemnified by federal government for litigation costs did not divest university of its Eleventh Amendment immunity].) *859 However, in this case the Mining Board was both a state agency and an arm of the state.

2015Rather, it is the intentional assertion of an inconsistent position that perverts the judicial machinery.’ ” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 183 , italics added; see Levin v. Ligon (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1459-1460, 1478-1482 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 560 ] [litigant’s prior position in action against attorney estopped him from taking contrary position in action against wife and wife’s employer].) In Pilot Commissioners , we held that the Port Agent was estopped from arguing that he was not a state officer subject to the CPRA because, in defending suit in federal cou

2015Rather, it is the intentional assertion of an inconsistent position that perverts the judicial machinery.’ ” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 183 , italics added; see Levin v. Ligon (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1459-1460, 1478-1482 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 560 ] [litigant’s prior position in action against attorney estopped him from taking contrary position in action against wife and wife’s employer].) In Pilot Commissioners , we held that the Port Agent was estopped from arguing that he was not a state officer subject to the CPRA because, in defending suit in federal cou

2025(Venegas, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 829 [“states and state officers sued in their official capacity are not considered persons under section 1983 and are immune from liability under the statute by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity”].) The County may be held liable under § 1983 only for intentionally misleading the court to detain children.

2023Code, §§ 905, 911.2, 945.4.) Finally, quoting Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820, 829 , that, “[S]tates and state officers sued in their official capacity are not considered persons under section 1983 and are immune from liability under the statute by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity,” the court sustained the demurrer to the five causes of action that purported to assert section 1983 claims.

2018Rather, as the Constitution's structure, its history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today ...." ( Alden v. Maine (1999) 527 U.S. 706 , 713, 119 S.Ct. 2240 , [ 144 L.Ed.2d 636 , 654] ( Alden ).) An important limit on the sovereign immunity principle was established in Ex parte Young (1908) 209 U.S. 123 , 28 S.Ct. 441 , [ 52 L.Ed. 714 ] ( Young ). *783 That case involved a challenge to a Minnesota l

2018Rather, as the Constitution's structure, its history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today ...." ( Alden v. Maine (1999) 527 U.S. 706 , 713, 119 S.Ct. 2240 , [ 144 L.Ed.2d 636 , 654] ( Alden ).) An important limit on the sovereign immunity principle was established in Ex parte Young (1908) 209 U.S. 123 , 28 S.Ct. 441 , [ 52 L.Ed. 714 ] ( Young ). *783 That case involved a challenge to a Minnesota l

2014(McMillian v. Monroe County (1997) 520 U.S. 781, 786 [ 117 S.Ct. 1734 , 138 L.Ed.2d 1 ]; see Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 352-353 ; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 218 , 233- 234.) A number of California cases have addressed the issue whether a local government official is acting on behalf of the state or a county for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity.

2014(E.g., Catsouras v. Department of California Highway Patrol (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 856, 892 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 352 ] [“Because the CHP [as an instrumentality of the state] is absolutely immune from liability under section 1983, plaintiffs have failed to plead a viable section 1983 cause of action against it.”]; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 218, 234 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 230 ] [district attorney not a person under § 1983 and may not be found liable under that statute “by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity”]; Bougere v. County of

2014(Kirchmann v. Lake Elsinore Unified School District (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1101 , citing Monell, supra, 436 U.S. at pp. 690-691.) But the Eleventh Amendment makes states and state agents immune from suit under section 1983 in both federal and state court. ( Kirchmann at p. 1101 , citing Will, supra, 491 U.S. at pp. 690-691.) In 6 Parratt was overruled on unrelated ground in Davids v. Williams (1986) 474 U.S. 327, 330-331 . 15 Kirchmann, the court held that California school districts are arms of the state for purposes of section 1983 immunity. ( Kirchmann at p. 1115 .) In addition, state

2004Monell v. New York City Dept, of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 690-692 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 611 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 ] (Monell); see Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 348 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823 , 949 P.2d 920 ] (Pitts); County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1171 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 860 ] (Peters).) On the other hand, states and state officers sued in their official capacity are not considered persons under section 1983 and are immune from liability under the statute by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

2006(E.g., Belanger, supra, 963 F.2d 248, 250-251 [civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 ]; Kirchmann v. Lake Elsinore Unified School District (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1100-1102, 1105-1115 , 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 289 [entity with Eleventh Amendment immunity also enjoys immunity from state court suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ]; also cf. U.S. ex rel.

2006(E.g., Belanger, supra, 963 F.2d 248, 250-251 [civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 ]; Kirchmann v. Lake Elsinore Unified School District (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1100-1102, 1105-1115 , 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 289 [entity with Eleventh Amendment immunity also enjoys immunity from state court suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ]; also cf. U.S. ex rel.

1985Indeed, in Maher v. Gagne (1980) 448 U.S. 122 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 653 , 100 S.Ct. 2570 ], decided the same day as Thiboutot , the Supreme Court noted “The Eleventh Amendment issue was not before the Court in Thiboutot because that case involved an award of fees by a state court pursuant to § 1988.

1985Indeed, in Maher v. Gagne (1980) 448 U.S. 122 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 653 , 100 S.Ct. 2570 ], decided the same day as Thiboutot , the Supreme Court noted “The Eleventh Amendment issue was not before the Court in Thiboutot because that case involved an award of fees by a state court pursuant to § 1988.

2014(See Smith v. County of Los Angeles (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 266, 297 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 754 ] [observation unnecessary to Supreme Court’s decision does not constitute binding precedent]; People v. Powell (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 469, 479 [ 225 Cal.Rptr. 703 ] [incidental statements and conclusions not necessary to Supreme Court’s decision are dicta and “not to be regarded as authority”].) But even if the California court’s reference to the Eleventh Amendment were considered a holding of Venegas , it cannot be viewed as binding in the face of contrary United States Supreme Court authority.

2014(See Smith v. County of Los Angeles (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 266, 297 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 754 ] [observation unnecessary to Supreme Court’s decision does not constitute binding precedent]; People v. Powell (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 469, 479 [ 225 Cal.Rptr. 703 ] [incidental statements and conclusions not necessary to Supreme Court’s decision are dicta and “not to be regarded as authority”].) But even if the California court’s reference to the Eleventh Amendment were considered a holding of Venegas , it cannot be viewed as binding in the face of contrary United States Supreme Court authority.

2014The stopper was that § 1983 creates no remedy against a State.”]; Hafer v. Melo (1991) 502 U.S. 21, 30 [ 116 L.Ed.2d 301 , 112 S.Ct. 358 ] (Hafer) [court “considered the Eleventh Amendment in Will only because the fact that Congress did not intend to override state immunity when it enacted § 1983 was relevant to statutory construction”]; Ngiraingas v. Sanchez (1990) 495 U.S. 182, 192, fn. 12 [ 109 L.Ed.2d 163 , 110 S.Ct. 1737 ] (Ngiraingas) [having held the territory was not a “person” under § 1983, it was “unnecessary to consider Guam’s claim of immunity under the Eleventh Amendment”].) *1009

2014The stopper was that § 1983 creates no remedy against a State.”]; Hafer v. Melo (1991) 502 U.S. 21, 30 [ 116 L.Ed.2d 301 , 112 S.Ct. 358 ] (Hafer) [court “considered the Eleventh Amendment in Will only because the fact that Congress did not intend to override state immunity when it enacted § 1983 was relevant to statutory construction”]; Ngiraingas v. Sanchez (1990) 495 U.S. 182, 192, fn. 12 [ 109 L.Ed.2d 163 , 110 S.Ct. 1737 ] (Ngiraingas) [having held the territory was not a “person” under § 1983, it was “unnecessary to consider Guam’s claim of immunity under the Eleventh Amendment”].) *1009

2014(See Smith v. County of Los Angeles (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 266, 297 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 754 ] [observation unnecessary to Supreme Court’s decision does not constitute binding precedent]; People v. Powell (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 469, 479 [ 225 Cal.Rptr. 703 ] [incidental statements and conclusions not necessary to Supreme Court’s decision are dicta and “not to be regarded as authority”].) But even if the California court’s reference to the Eleventh Amendment were considered a holding of Venegas , it cannot be viewed as binding in the face of contrary United States Supreme Court authority.

2014(See Smith v. County of Los Angeles (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 266, 297 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 754 ] [observation unnecessary to Supreme Court’s decision does not constitute binding precedent]; People v. Powell (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 469, 479 [ 225 Cal.Rptr. 703 ] [incidental statements and conclusions not necessary to Supreme Court’s decision are dicta and “not to be regarded as authority”].) But even if the California court’s reference to the Eleventh Amendment were considered a holding of Venegas , it cannot be viewed as binding in the face of contrary United States Supreme Court authority.

2014(E.g., Catsouras v. Department of California Highway Patrol (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 856, 892 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 352 ] [“Because the CHP [as an instrumentality of the state] is absolutely immune from liability under section 1983, plaintiffs have failed to plead a viable section 1983 cause of action against it.”]; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 218, 234 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 230 ] [district attorney not a person under § 1983 and may not be found liable under that statute “by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity”]; Bougere v. County of

2014(E.g., Catsouras v. Department of California Highway Patrol (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 856, 892 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 352 ] [“Because the CHP [as an instrumentality of the state] is absolutely immune from liability under section 1983, plaintiffs have failed to plead a viable section 1983 cause of action against it.”]; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 218, 234 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 230 ] [district attorney not a person under § 1983 and may not be found liable under that statute “by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity”]; Bougere v. County of

2014(E.g., Catsouras v. Department of California Highway Patrol (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 856, 892 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 352 ] [“Because the CHP [as an instrumentality of the state] is absolutely immune from liability under section 1983, plaintiffs have failed to plead a viable section 1983 cause of action against it.”]; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 218, 234 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 230 ] [district attorney not a person under § 1983 and may not be found liable under that statute “by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity”]; Bougere v. County of

2014(E.g., Catsouras v. Department of California Highway Patrol (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 856, 892 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 352 ] [“Because the CHP [as an instrumentality of the state] is absolutely immune from liability under section 1983, plaintiffs have failed to plead a viable section 1983 cause of action against it.”]; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 218, 234 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 230 ] [district attorney not a person under § 1983 and may not be found liable under that statute “by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity”]; Bougere v. County of

2014(See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona (1997) 520 U.S. 43, 69 [ 137 L.Ed.2d 170 , 117 S.Ct. 1055 ] (Arizonans) [“The barrier [to a § 1983 claim] was not, as the Ninth Circuit supposed, Eleventh Amendment immunity, which the State could waive.

2014(See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona (1997) 520 U.S. 43, 69 [ 137 L.Ed.2d 170 , 117 S.Ct. 1055 ] (Arizonans) [“The barrier [to a § 1983 claim] was not, as the Ninth Circuit supposed, Eleventh Amendment immunity, which the State could waive.

2014(Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820, 829 ); Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 359-360 [county district attorney acts on behalf of state in investigating and prosecuting crimes and therefore enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from Section 1983 liability]; Imbler v. Pachtman (1976) 424 U.S. 409, 430-431 [ 47 L.Ed.2d 128, 143-144 ] [prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from Section 1983 suits for their activities in initiating and presenting the state’s case, as well as for conduct “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process”].) The trial

2014(Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820, 829 ); Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 359-360 [county district attorney acts on behalf of state in investigating and prosecuting crimes and therefore enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from Section 1983 liability]; Imbler v. Pachtman (1976) 424 U.S. 409, 430-431 [ 47 L.Ed.2d 128, 143-144 ] [prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from Section 1983 suits for their activities in initiating and presenting the state’s case, as well as for conduct “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process”].) The trial