distraction exception in Illinois

2026Fratto concedes that the deliberate encounter exception does not apply here, so we consider only the distraction exception. ¶ 30 The distraction exception applies “where the possessor [of land] has reason to expect that the invitee’s attention may be distracted, so that he will not discover what is obvious, or will forget what he has discovered, or fail to protect himself against it.” Bruns, 2014 IL 116998, ¶ 20 (quoting Sollami v. Eaton, 201 Ill. 2d 1, 15 (2002)).

2025The distraction exception applies “ ‘where the possessor [of land] has reason to expect that the invitee’s attention may be distracted, so that he will not discover what is obvious, or will forget what he has discovered, or fail to protect himself against it.’ ” Sollami v. Eaton, 201 Ill. 2d 1, 15 (2002) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A cmt. f, at 220 (1965)).

2023Monson v. City of Danville, 2018 IL 122486 ; Ward v. K Mart Corporation, 136 Ill. 2d 132 (1990); Christakes v. SP Plus Corporation, 2018 IL App (1st) 172675-U . 2 Waters v. City of Chicago, 2012 IL App (1st) 100759 , did involve a plaintiff who tripped over a barricade at the entrance to a crosswalk, but it dealt with the applicability of the open and obvious doctrine and the distraction exception, neither of which are at issue in this case.

2022The Distraction Exception ¶ 34 An exception to the general rule of non-liability for open and obvious conditions is what has come to be known as the “distraction exception.” Although a condition may be open and obvious, the owner or possessor may still owe a duty where there is “reason to expect that the invitee’s attention may be distracted, so that he will not discover what is obvious, or will forget what he has discovered, or fail to protect himself against it.” Ward v. K Mart Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 149-50 (1990) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A cmt. f (1965)). ¶ 35 The distra

2020Here, plaintiff argues that the act of watching his young granddaughter climb the stairs satisfied the distraction exception. ¶ 31 A review of the relevant case law cited by the parties reveals that the distraction exception to the open and obvious doctrine applies: (1) where the defendant actually created the foreseeably distracting condition of the premises (see Deibert v. Bauer Brothers Construction Company, 141 Ill. 2d 430, 434-39 (1990)); (2) where the plaintiff was focused elsewhere in order to avoid a potential hazard (see American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. National Advert

2014Although the power line constituted an open and obvious danger (American National Bank, 149 Ill. 2d at 28 ), we held that the distraction exception applied (id. at 29).

2008As with the distraction exception, the focus with the deliberate-encounter analysis is on what the landowner anticipates or should anticipate the entrant will do. "[L]iability stems from the knowledge of the possessor of the premises, and what the possessor `ha[d] reason to expect' the invitee would do in the face of the hazard." LaFever, 185 Ill.2d at 392 , 235 Ill.Dec. 886 , 706 N.E.2d at 448 , quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A, Comment f, at 220 (1965).

2008The distraction exception states that “the possessor of the premises should anticipate harm to an invitee when the possessor ‘has reason to expect that the invitee’s attention may be distracted, so that he will not discover what is obvious, or will forget what he has discovered, or fail to protect himself against it.’ ” LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 391 , quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §343A, Comment f, at 220 (1965).

2026Fratto concedes that the deliberate encounter exception does not apply here, so we consider only the distraction exception. ¶ 30 The distraction exception applies “where the possessor [of land] has reason to expect that the invitee’s attention may be distracted, so that he will not discover what is obvious, or will forget what he has discovered, or fail to protect himself against it.” Bruns, 2014 IL 116998, ¶ 20 (quoting Sollami v. Eaton, 201 Ill. 2d 1, 15 (2002)).

2026See, e.g., Bruns, 2014 IL 116998, ¶ 34 (finding the distraction exception did not apply when a plaintiff tripped over an uneven sidewalk when she was looking towards the door of an eye clinic instead of down at the sidewalk, reasoning that “[i]n the absence of an actual distraction” it was not reasonably foreseeable for the city to expect that a pedestrian, “generally exercising reasonable care for her own safety, would look elsewhere and fail to avoid the risk of injury from an open and obvious sidewalk defect.”).

2011The Sandoval court stated: "[P]rimarily, in those instances where our courts have applied the distraction exception to impose a duty upon a landowner, it is - 7 - clear that the landowner created, contributed to, or was responsible in some way for the distraction which diverted the plaintiff's attention from the open and obvious condition and, thus, was charged with reasonable foreseeability that an injury might occur." Sandoval, 357 Ill.

2011The Sandoval court stated: “[P]rimarily, in those instances where our courts have applied the distraction exception to impose a duty upon a landowner, it is clear that the landowner created, contributed to, or was responsible in some way for the distraction which diverted the plaintiff’s attention from the open and obvious condition and, thus, was charged with reasonable foreseeability that an injury might occur.” Sandoval, 357 Ill.

2020Here, plaintiff argues that the act of watching his young granddaughter climb the stairs satisfied the distraction exception. ¶ 31 A review of the relevant case law cited by the parties reveals that the distraction exception to the open and obvious doctrine applies: (1) where the defendant actually created the foreseeably distracting condition of the premises (see Deibert v. Bauer Brothers Construction Company, 141 Ill. 2d 430, 434-39 (1990)); (2) where the plaintiff was focused elsewhere in order to avoid a potential hazard (see American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. National Advert

2013Rexroad v. City of Springfield, 207 Ill. 2d 33 , 796 N.E.2d 1040 (2003). ¶ 11 In this instance, the trial court concluded that in order to apply the distraction exception to impose a duty upon the City, the City had to have created, contributed to, or was responsible in some way for the distraction which diverted plaintiff's attention from the open and obvious condition, thereby charging the City with the reasonable foreseeability that an injury might occur.

2026See Diebert, 141 Ill. 2d at 439-40 (concluding that the distraction exception applied after a plaintiff was injured at a construction site when he fell in a tire rut after exiting a portable bathroom while he was looking up to see if construction materials were being thrown down because defendant created the distraction by allowing debris to be thrown off the balcony, making it impossible for plaintiff to both look up to check for debris and down to protect himself from tripping); Bulduk, 2015 IL App (1st) 150166-B , ¶¶ 22-26 (finding that the distraction exception applied where plaintiff was

2020Here, plaintiff argues that the act of watching his young granddaughter climb the stairs satisfied the distraction exception. ¶ 31 A review of the relevant case law cited by the parties reveals that the distraction exception to the open and obvious doctrine applies: (1) where the defendant actually created the foreseeably distracting condition of the premises (see Deibert v. Bauer Brothers Construction Company, 141 Ill. 2d 430, 434-39 (1990)); (2) where the plaintiff was focused elsewhere in order to avoid a potential hazard (see American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. National Advert

2004App. 3d 830, 835 (2003)); where a trucker was distracted from a lowered dockplate because he was unloading his truck ( Courtney v. Allied Filter Engineering, Inc. , 181 Ill.

2004App. 3d 830, 835 (2003)); where a trucker was distracted from a lowered dockplate because he was unloading his truck (Courtney v. Allied Filter Engineering, Inc., 181 Ill.

2016Id. at 260 (citing True v. Greenwood Manor West, Inc., 316 Ill.

2015Id. at 260 (citing True v. Greenwood Manor West, Inc., 316 Ill.

2016Prostran v. City of Chicago, 349 Ill.

2012Prostran, 349 Ill.App.3d at 88-89 , 285 Ill.Dec. 123 , 811 N.E.2d 364 .

2020Kleiber v. Freeport Farm & Fleet, Inc., 406 Ill.

2020Kleiber v. Freeport Farm & Fleet, Inc., 406 Ill.

2012The court ruled that the condition of the barricades was open and obvious and that the distraction exception did not apply to impose a duty of care on the City. ¶ 6 ANALYSIS ¶ 7 Summary judgment is only appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2004); Sollami v. Eaton, 201 Ill.2d 1, 6 , 265 Ill.Dec. 177 , 772 N.E.2d 215 (2002); Clifford v. The Wharton Busine

2012The court ruled that the condition of the barricades was open and obvious and that the distraction exception did not apply to impose a duty of care on the City. ¶ 6 ANALYSIS ¶ 7 Summary judgment is only appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2004); Sollami v. Eaton, 201 Ill.2d 1, 6 , 265 Ill.Dec. 177 , 772 N.E.2d 215 (2002); Clifford v. The Wharton Busine

2008Blue v. Environmental Engineering, Inc., 215 Ill. 2d 78, 106 (2005); LaFever v. Kemlite Co., 185 Ill. 2d 380, 391 (1998).

2008Blue v. Environmental Engineering, Inc., 215 Ill. 2d 78, 106 (2005); LaFever v. Kemlite Co., 185 Ill. 2d 380, 391 (1998).

2003They include: (1) the distraction exception -- where the possessor of the property has reason to expect that an invitee's attention may be distracted and therefore he will not notice the danger; and (2) the deliberate encounter exception -- where "the possessor has reason to expect that the invitee will proceed to encounter the known or obvious danger because to a reasonable man in his position the advantages of doing so would outweigh the apparent risk." Restatement (Second) of Torts §343A, Comment f (1965); Sollami , 201 Ill. 2d at 15 , 772 N.E. 2d at 223 ; Wreglesworth v. Arctco, Inc. , 317

2003They include: (1) the distraction exception — where the possessor of the property has reason to expect that an invitee’s attention may be distracted and therefore he will not notice the danger; and (2) the deliberate encounter exception — where “the possessor has reason to expect that the invitee will proceed to encounter the known or obvious danger because to a reasonable man in his position the advantages of doing so would outweigh the apparent risk.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A, Comment/(1965); Sollami, 201 Ill. 2d at 15 , 772 N.E.2d at 223 ; Wreglesworth v. Arctco, Inc., 317 Ill.

2015The distraction exception is an exception to the “general rule of no liability for open and obvious conditions.” Bucheleres, 171 Ill. 2d at 451 . ¶ 23 The court then turned to the facts of the cases before it.

2015Like the lake in Dowen, Lake Michigan, with its uncertain water levels and bottom composition, “present[ed] open and obvious risks to lakefront patrons who dive from concrete seawalls into the lake.” Id. at 455-56 . ¶ 24 Although the court rejected the application of the distraction exception to the open-and-obvious risk, it did not conclude that the District had thereby been freed from any duty.

2002Plaintiff cites several cases to argue that the distraction exception must be applied, including: Ward, 136 Ill. 2d at 152 (foreseeable that the plaintiffs view would be impaired and his attention distracted as he carried bulky merchandise from a store); Shaffer v. Mays, 140 Ill.

2002Plaintiff cites several cases to argue that the distraction exception must be applied including: Ward , 136 Ill. 2d at 152 (foreseeable that the plaintiff's view would be impaired and his attention distracted as he carried bulky merchandise from a store); Shaffer v. Mays , 140 Ill.

2010See Fan v. Auster Co., 389 Ill.

2010See Fan v. Auster Co., 389 Ill.

2004A duty has been imposed pursuant to the distraction exception in cases where a student was distracted from a hole in a parking lot because he was focused on carrying a football helmet to a player who needed it ( Rexroad v. City of Springfield , 207 Ill. 2d 33, 46 (2003)); where a painter was distracted from power lines because he had to watch where he placed his feet on a billboard walk-rail ( American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. National Advertising Co. , 149 Ill. 2d 14, 29 (1992)); where an electrician was distracted from a tire rut when he looked up to see whether construction m

2004A duty has been imposed pursuant to the distraction exception in cases where a student was distracted from a hole in a parking lot because he was focused on carrying a football helmet to a player who needed it (Rexroad v. City of Springfield, 207 Ill. 2d 33, 46 (2003)); where a painter was distracted from power lines because he had to watch where he placed his feet on a billboard walk-rail (American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. National Advertising Co., 149 Ill. 2d 14, 29 (1992)); where an electrician was distracted from a tire rut when he looked up to see whether construction mater

1995App. 3d 857, 862 , 642 N.E.2d 825, 829 (disagreeing with the implication in Oropeza that Ward does not apply in willful and wanton cases and reasoning that the legal analysis of whether or not a duty exists is "necessarily independent of and preliminary to that of causation”).) Although the parties in the case at bar discuss Ward and the doctrine of distraction, we decline to reach the issue of whether that doctrine applies in willful and wanton cases.

1995(Bialek, 267 Ill.

2023Monson v. City of Danville, 2018 IL 122486 ; Ward v. K Mart Corporation, 136 Ill. 2d 132 (1990); Christakes v. SP Plus Corporation, 2018 IL App (1st) 172675-U . 2 Waters v. City of Chicago, 2012 IL App (1st) 100759 , did involve a plaintiff who tripped over a barricade at the entrance to a crosswalk, but it dealt with the applicability of the open and obvious doctrine and the distraction exception, neither of which are at issue in this case.

2023See Waters, 2012 IL App (1st) 100759, ¶¶ 1-5 .

2020Hope v. Hope, 398 Ill.