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13 Arizona opinions name it 3 courts 1986–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. Michigan Department of the Treasurygreen2 sentences2004Case law after Graves has made plain that the doctrine “barred only those taxes that were imposed directly on one sovereign by the other or that discriminated against a sovereign or those with whom it dealt.” Davis, 489 U.S. at 811 , 109 S.Ct. 1500 . ¶ 25 In its decisions contracting the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, the Supreme Court has “recognized that the area is one over which Congress is the principal superintendent.” Jefferson County, 527 U.S. at 425 , 119 S.Ct. 2069 . 2004Case law after Graves has made plain that the doctrine “barred only those taxes that were imposed directly on one sovereign by the other or that discriminated against a sovereign or those with whom it dealt.” Davis, 489 U.S. at 811 , 109 S.Ct. 1500 . ¶ 25 In its decisions contracting the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, the Supreme Court has “recognized that the area is one over which Congress is the principal superintendent.” Jefferson County, 527 U.S. at 425 , 119 S.Ct. 2069 . | 2 | 7 |
Jefferson County v. Ackerred2 sentences2004Case law after Graves has made plain that the doctrine “barred only those taxes that were imposed directly on one sovereign by the other or that discriminated against a sovereign or those with whom it dealt.” Davis, 489 U.S. at 811 , 109 S.Ct. 1500 . ¶ 25 In its decisions contracting the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, the Supreme Court has “recognized that the area is one over which Congress is the principal superintendent.” Jefferson County, 527 U.S. at 425 , 119 S.Ct. 2069 . 2004Case law after Graves has made plain that the doctrine “barred only those taxes that were imposed directly on one sovereign by the other or that discriminated against a sovereign or those with whom it dealt.” Davis, 489 U.S. at 811 , 109 S.Ct. 1500 . ¶ 25 In its decisions contracting the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, the Supreme Court has “recognized that the area is one over which Congress is the principal superintendent.” Jefferson County, 527 U.S. at 425 , 119 S.Ct. 2069 . | 1 | 2 |
Helvering v. Gerhardtgreen2 sentences1992See Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 , 58 S.Ct. 969 , 82 L.Ed. 1427 (1938) (permitted nondiscriminatory federal tax on state pensions); Graves v. New York ex rel. 1992See Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 , 58 S.Ct. 969 , 82 L.Ed. 1427 (1938) (permitted nondiscriminatory federal tax on state pensions); Graves v. New York ex rel. | 1 | 2 |
Clark Kerr v. M killian/az Dept of Revenuegreen2 sentences2017In Kerr v. Killian, 207 Ariz. 181 , 182 ¶ 1, 84 P.3d 446, 447 (2004), this Court addressed whether Arizona’s income tax scheme violates the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine. 2017In Kerr v. Killian, 207 Ariz. 181 , 182 ¶ 1, 84 P.3d 446, 447 (2004), this Court addressed whether Arizona’s income tax scheme violates the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine. | 1 | 1 |
Cheatham v. Eagertongreen1 sentence2004See Jefferson County, 527 U.S. at 442-43 , 119 S.Ct. 2069 (holding that a facially nondiscrim inatory Alabama occupational tax exempting those who held licenses under other state or county laws did not violate § 111(a), notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff federal judges could never qualify for exemption, because the tax “does not discriminate against federal judges in particular, or federal officeholders in general, based on the federal source of their pay or compensation”); Cheatham v. Eagerton, 703 So.2d 389, 391 (Ala.Civ.App.1997) (holding that exemption of state law enforcement off | 1 | 1 |
Hamilton v. Stategreen2 sentences2003Cf. Hamilton v. State, 186 Ariz. 590, 594-95 , 925 P.2d 731, 735-36 (App.1996) (holding that ADOR’s definition of “adjusted gross income” implicit in ADOR Form 140 PTC sufficiently fulfilled ADOR’s statutory duty to define that term). ¶ 19 In 1989, the United States Supreme Court held that the Michigan Income Tax Act, which similarly discriminated in favor - of state and local government employees by exempting all of their retirement benefits from state taxation while exempting only a portion of retirement benefits paid to former federal employees, violated the doctrine of intergovernmental ta 2003Cf. Hamilton v. State, 186 Ariz. 590, 594-95 , 925 P.2d 731, 735-36 (App.1996) (holding that ADOR’s definition of “adjusted gross income” implicit in ADOR Form 140 PTC sufficiently fulfilled ADOR’s statutory duty to define that term). ¶ 19 In 1989, the United States Supreme Court held that the Michigan Income Tax Act, which similarly discriminated in favor - of state and local government employees by exempting all of their retirement benefits from state taxation while exempting only a portion of retirement benefits paid to former federal employees, violated the doctrine of intergovernmental ta | 1 | 1 |
Kerr v. Killiangreen2 sentences2003Kerr IV, 201 Ariz. at 130, ¶ 18 , 32 P.3d at 413 . 7 Relying on Davis and Jefferson County v. *491 Acker, 527 U.S. 423 , 119 S.Ct. 2069 , 144 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999), Kerr IV determined instead that the differential taxation of federal and state/local employees’ mandatory retirement contributions did not violate the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine codified as 4 U.S.C. § 111 . 2003Kerr IV, 201 Ariz. at 130, ¶ 18 , 32 P.3d at 413 . 7 Relying on Davis and Jefferson County v. *491 Acker, 527 U.S. 423 , 119 S.Ct. 2069 , 144 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999), Kerr IV determined instead that the differential taxation of federal and state/local employees’ mandatory retirement contributions did not violate the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine codified as 4 U.S.C. § 111 . | 1 | 1 |
Arizona Department of Revenue v. Doughertygreen2 sentences2003Ladewig II held that an administrative refund claim may be filed on behalf of a taxpayer class, and that the filing of such a claim will toll the applicable statute of limitations for all other putative class members. 200 Ariz. at 522, ¶ 25 , 29 P.3d at 869 . ¶ 42 The legal theory on which the plaintiff taxpayers based their claim for refunds for tax years after 1990 was that taxation of *496 their mandatory contributions to federal retirement plans pursuant to A.R.S. § 43-1001(2), without any statutory adjustment to equalize the treatment of federal employees as compared to state and local em 2003Ladewig II held that an administrative refund claim may be filed on behalf of a taxpayer class, and that the filing of such a claim will toll the applicable statute of limitations for all other putative class members. 200 Ariz. at 522, ¶ 25 , 29 P.3d at 869 . ¶ 42 The legal theory on which the plaintiff taxpayers based their claim for refunds for tax years after 1990 was that taxation of *496 their mandatory contributions to federal retirement plans pursuant to A.R.S. § 43-1001(2), without any statutory adjustment to equalize the treatment of federal employees as compared to state and local em | 1 | 1 |
Tucson Mechanical Contracting, Inc. v. Arizona Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences1997In Tucson Mechanical Contracting, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 175 Ariz. 176, 179 , 854 P.2d 1162, 1165 (App.1992), we held that a tax does not violate the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity “unless the tax falls directly on the federal government, falls on an instrumentality indistinguishable from the federal government, or somehow discriminates against the government or a private party with which it does business.” An ad valorem tax on Pima IDA’s apartment complexes does none of those things. 1997In Tucson Mechanical Contracting, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 175 Ariz. 176, 179 , 854 P.2d 1162, 1165 (App.1992), we held that a tax does not violate the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity “unless the tax falls directly on the federal government, falls on an instrumentality indistinguishable from the federal government, or somehow discriminates against the government or a private party with which it does business.” An ad valorem tax on Pima IDA’s apartment complexes does none of those things. | 1 | 1 |
Kerr v. Waddellgreen1 sentence1996Id. at 10, 14, 16 , 899 P.2d at 172, 176, 178 . | 1 | 1 |
Dennis v. Higginsgreen2 sentences1995Davis, 489 U.S. at 814 , 109 S.Ct. at 1507 (citations omitted); see also Higgins, 498 U.S. at 462 , 111 S.Ct. at 879 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's rationale creates a § 1983 cause of action when a State violates the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity"); Hogan v. Musolf, 163 Wis.2d 1 , 471 N.W.2d 216 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1030 , 112 S.Ct. 867 , 116 L.Ed.2d 773 (1992) (violations of 4 U.S.C. section 111 are actionable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 ). 1995Davis, 489 U.S. at 814 , 109 S.Ct. at 1507 (citations omitted); see also Higgins, 498 U.S. at 462 , 111 S.Ct. at 879 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's rationale creates a § 1983 cause of action when a State violates the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity"); Hogan v. Musolf, 163 Wis.2d 1 , 471 N.W.2d 216 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1030 , 112 S.Ct. 867 , 116 L.Ed.2d 773 (1992) (violations of 4 U.S.C. section 111 are actionable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 ). | 1 | 1 |
Bohn v. Waddellgreen2 sentences1991Among other things, the Court decided that "the scheme for taxing state and federal pensions, as existed before the recent amendment to A.R.S. § 43-1022, was in violation of federal law, and further, was in violation of the federal constitutional *345 doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity." Bohn v. Waddell, 164 Ariz. 74, 80 , 790 P.2d 772, 778 (Tax 1990). 1991Among other things, the Court decided that "the scheme for taxing state and federal pensions, as existed before the recent amendment to A.R.S. § 43-1022, was in violation of federal law, and further, was in violation of the federal constitutional *345 doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity." Bohn v. Waddell, 164 Ariz. 74, 80 , 790 P.2d 772, 778 (Tax 1990). | 1 | 1 |
City of Tempe v. Arizona Board of Regentsgreen2 sentences1986See City of Tempe v. Arizona Board of Regents, 11 Ariz.App. 24 , 461 P.2d 503 (1970). 1986See City of Tempe v. Arizona Board of Regents, 11 Ariz.App. 24 , 461 P.2d 503 (1970). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
M'culloch v. State of Maryland
green
2 sentences2004II. ¶ 23 The intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine has its genesis in M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 , 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), which held that Maryland could not impose a tax on the Bank of the United States. 2004II. ¶ 23 The intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine has its genesis in M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 , 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), which held that Maryland could not impose a tax on the Bank of the United States. | 2 | 1990–2004 |
Witte v. Director of Revenue
neutral
2 sentences2004Cf. Witte v. Dir. of Rev., 829 S.W.2d 436 (Mo.1992) (upholding Missouri tax scheme which imposed current taxation on employee contributions to federal Civil Service Retirement System, while deferring taxation to other retirement plans, because of plaintiffs' failure to show a lack of significant differences between the two classes). 17 . 2003It thereby violated the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine as codified in 4 U.S.C. § 111 and interpreted by Davis and the cases following it. ¶ 32 Our reliance on Cooper v. Commissioner of Revenue, 421 Mass. 557 , 658 N.E.2d 963 (1995), and Witte v. Director of Revenue, 829 S.W.2d 436 (Mo.1992), in Kerr IV in support of the contrary conclusion was misplaced. | 2 | 2003–2004 |
Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner
green
2 sentences2001The Court found that the state system violated the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine because it discriminated between holders of state and federal obligations “by including in the tax base income from federal obligations while excluding income from otherwise comparable state and local obligations.” 459 U.S. at 398 , 103 S.Ct. 692 . ¶28 The beneficiaries of the state taxing scheme challenged in Memphis Bank & Trust were defined by no broader principle or characteristic than them status as holders of state and local obligations. 2001The Court found that the state system violated the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine because it discriminated between holders of state and federal obligations “by including in the tax base income from federal obligations while excluding income from otherwise comparable state and local obligations.” 459 U.S. at 398 , 103 S.Ct. 692 . ¶28 The beneficiaries of the state taxing scheme challenged in Memphis Bank & Trust were defined by no broader principle or characteristic than them status as holders of state and local obligations. | 2 | 2001–2004 |
Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School District
green
2 sentences2003The Davis *490 court summarized the required mode of analysis as follows: Under our precedents, “[t]he imposition of a heavier tax burden on [those who deal with one sovereign] than is imposed on [those who deal with the other] must be justified by significant differences between' the two classes.” Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School Dist., 361 U.S. [376], at 383 [ 80 S.Ct. 474 , 4 L.Ed.2d 384 ] [1960]. 2003The Davis *490 court summarized the required mode of analysis as follows: Under our precedents, “[t]he imposition of a heavier tax burden on [those who deal with one sovereign] than is imposed on [those who deal with the other] must be justified by significant differences between' the two classes.” Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School Dist., 361 U.S. [376], at 383 [ 80 S.Ct. 474 , 4 L.Ed.2d 384 ] [1960]. | 2 | 1990–2003 |
Kerr v. Killian
green
2 sentences2004Id. at 496-97 ¶ 46, 65 P.3d at 445-46 . ¶22 ADOR petitioned for review only on the intergovernmental tax immunity issue. 2004Id. at 496-97 ¶ 46, 65 P.3d at 445-46 . ¶22 ADOR petitioned for review only on the intergovernmental tax immunity issue. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Cooper v. Commissioner of Revenue
green
1 sentence2003It thereby violated the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine as codified in 4 U.S.C. § 111 and interpreted by Davis and the cases following it. ¶ 32 Our reliance on Cooper v. Commissioner of Revenue, 421 Mass. 557 , 658 N.E.2d 963 (1995), and Witte v. Director of Revenue, 829 S.W.2d 436 (Mo.1992), in Kerr IV in support of the contrary conclusion was misplaced. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Department of Revenue & Finance
green
2 sentences2003Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Rev., 505 U.S. 71, 82 , 112 S.Ct. 2365 , 120 L.Ed.2d 59 (1992) (adoption of federal tax system in whole or in part does not shield statute from constitutional scrutiny). ¶ 27 More fundamentally, ADOR’s analysis fails to recognize that under Davis, the purpose of the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine is to protect the interests of the United States Government, and the government’s interests must therefore be “weighed in the balance.” Davis, 489 U.S. at 816 , 109 S.Ct. 1500 . 2003Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Rev., 505 U.S. 71, 82 , 112 S.Ct. 2365 , 120 L.Ed.2d 59 (1992) (adoption of federal tax system in whole or in part does not shield statute from constitutional scrutiny). ¶ 27 More fundamentally, ADOR’s analysis fails to recognize that under Davis, the purpose of the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine is to protect the interests of the United States Government, and the government’s interests must therefore be “weighed in the balance.” Davis, 489 U.S. at 816 , 109 S.Ct. 1500 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico
green
1 sentence1998Id. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson
red
2 sentences1996The tax court also determined that, pursuant to Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 , 92 S.Ct. 349 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), the legal principle established by Davis would not be retrospectively applied. 1996The tax court also determined that, pursuant to Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 , 92 S.Ct. 349 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), the legal principle established by Davis would not be retrospectively applied. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation
green
2 sentences1995And, in Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 , 113 S.Ct. 2510 , 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993), the United States Supreme Court recently held, as a matter of federal law, that Davis is to be applied retroactively. [2] The taxpayers' action sought: (1) a declaration that the Arizona income taxation scheme under which state and local employees' mandatory contributions to state and local retirement systems were exempted from Arizona taxable income, while federal employees' mandatory contributions to federal retirement systems were not, violated 4 U.S.C. section 111 and the doctrine of intergo 1995And, in Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 , 113 S.Ct. 2510 , 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993), the United States Supreme Court recently held, as a matter of federal law, that Davis is to be applied retroactively. [2] The taxpayers' action sought: (1) a declaration that the Arizona income taxation scheme under which state and local employees' mandatory contributions to state and local retirement systems were exempted from Arizona taxable income, while federal employees' mandatory contributions to federal retirement systems were not, violated 4 U.S.C. section 111 and the doctrine of intergo | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Estate of Bohn v. Waddell
green
2 sentences1995Id. 1995Id. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Hogan v. Musolf
green
2 sentences1995Davis, 489 U.S. at 814 , 109 S.Ct. at 1507 (citations omitted); see also Higgins, 498 U.S. at 462 , 111 S.Ct. at 879 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's rationale creates a § 1983 cause of action when a State violates the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity"); Hogan v. Musolf, 163 Wis.2d 1 , 471 N.W.2d 216 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1030 , 112 S.Ct. 867 , 116 L.Ed.2d 773 (1992) (violations of 4 U.S.C. section 111 are actionable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 ). 1995Davis, 489 U.S. at 814 , 109 S.Ct. at 1507 (citations omitted); see also Higgins, 498 U.S. at 462 , 111 S.Ct. at 879 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's rationale creates a § 1983 cause of action when a State violates the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity"); Hogan v. Musolf, 163 Wis.2d 1 , 471 N.W.2d 216 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1030 , 112 S.Ct. 867 , 116 L.Ed.2d 773 (1992) (violations of 4 U.S.C. section 111 are actionable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 ). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Hogan v. Musolf
green
2 sentences1995Davis, 489 U.S. at 814 , 109 S.Ct. at 1507 (citations omitted); see also Higgins, 498 U.S. at 462 , 111 S.Ct. at 879 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's rationale creates a § 1983 cause of action when a State violates the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity"); Hogan v. Musolf, 163 Wis.2d 1 , 471 N.W.2d 216 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1030 , 112 S.Ct. 867 , 116 L.Ed.2d 773 (1992) (violations of 4 U.S.C. section 111 are actionable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 ). 1995Davis, 489 U.S. at 814 , 109 S.Ct. at 1507 (citations omitted); see also Higgins, 498 U.S. at 462 , 111 S.Ct. at 879 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s rationale creates a § 1983 cause of action when a State violates the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity”); Hogan v. Musolf, 163 Wis.2d 1 , 471 N.W.2d 216 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1030 , 112 S.Ct. 867 , 116 L.Ed.2d 773 (1992) (violations of 4 U.S.C. section 111 are actionable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 ). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Nutbrown v. Munn
green
2 sentences1995Davis, 489 U.S. at 814 , 109 S.Ct. at 1507 (citations omitted); see also Higgins, 498 U.S. at 462 , 111 S.Ct. at 879 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's rationale creates a § 1983 cause of action when a State violates the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity"); Hogan v. Musolf, 163 Wis.2d 1 , 471 N.W.2d 216 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1030 , 112 S.Ct. 867 , 116 L.Ed.2d 773 (1992) (violations of 4 U.S.C. section 111 are actionable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 ). 1995Davis, 489 U.S. at 814 , 109 S.Ct. at 1507 (citations omitted); see also Higgins, 498 U.S. at 462 , 111 S.Ct. at 879 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s rationale creates a § 1983 cause of action when a State violates the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity”); Hogan v. Musolf, 163 Wis.2d 1 , 471 N.W.2d 216 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1030 , 112 S.Ct. 867 , 116 L.Ed.2d 773 (1992) (violations of 4 U.S.C. section 111 are actionable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 ). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.