time limits rule in Arizona

2015See Webb v. Erickson, 134 Ariz. 182, 186 , 655 P.2d 6, 10 (1982) (reason for granting relief under Rule 60(c)(6) “must not be one of the reasons set forth in the five preceding clauses” because “[c]lause 6 and the first five clauses are mutually exclusive”); cf. Amanti Elec., Inc. v. Engineered Structures, Inc., 229 Ariz. 430, 433, ¶ 10 , 276 P.3d 499, 502 (App. 2012) (“[E]ven when relief might have been available under one of the first five clauses [of Rule 60(c)] but for the fact that the time limits of the rule had elapsed, this does not necessarily preclude relief under clause (6) if the m

2015See Webb v. Erickson, 134 Ariz. 182, 186 , 655 P.2d 6, 10 (1982) (reason for granting relief under Rule 60(c)(6) “must not be one of the reasons set forth in the five preceding clauses” because “[c]lause 6 and the first five clauses are mutually exclusive”); cf. Amanti Elec., Inc. v. Engineered Structures, Inc., 229 Ariz. 430, 433, ¶ 10 , 276 P.3d 499, 502 (App. 2012) (“[E]ven when relief might have been available under one of the first five clauses [of Rule 60(c)] but for the fact that the time limits of the rule had elapsed, this does not necessarily preclude relief under clause (6) if the m

2019Gonzalez, 243 Ariz. at 534, ¶ 11; see also Amanti, 229 Ariz. at 433, ¶ 10 (“[E]ven when relief might have been available under one of the first five clauses but for the fact that the time limits of the rule had elapsed, this does not necessarily preclude relief under clause (6) if the motion also raises exceptional additional circumstances that convince the court the movant should be granted relief in the interest of justice.”).

2015In Amanti, Division Two held that “[e]ven when relief might have been available under one of the first five clauses but for the fact that the time limits of the rule had elapsed, this does not necessarily preclude relief under clause (6) if the motion also raises exceptional additional circumstances that convince the court the movant should be granted relief in the interest of justice.” 229 Ariz. at 433 , 276 P.3d at 502 .

2012We acknowledge the general validity of that principle, but clarify that even when relief might have been available under one of the first five clauses but for the fact that the time limits of the rule had elapsed, this does not necessarily preclude relief under clause (6) if the motion also raises exceptional additional circumstances that convince the court the movant should be granted relief in the interest of justice. 4 See Webb, 134 Ariz. at 187 , 655 P.2d at 11 (trial court has discretion to determine whether facts “go beyond the factors enumerated in clauses 1 through 5 of Rule 60(c) and

2012We acknowledge the general validity of that principle, but clarify that even when relief might have been available under one of the first five clauses but for the fact that the time limits of the rule had elapsed, this does not necessarily preclude relief under clause (6) if the motion also raises exceptional additional circumstances that convince the court the movant should be granted relief in the interest of justice. 4 See Webb, 134 Ariz. at 187 , 655 P.2d at 11 (trial court has discretion to determine whether facts “go beyond the factors enumerated in clauses 1 through 5 of Rule 60(c) and

1980The time limits of the rule are specifically applicable to the addition of allegations of prior convictions, rule 13.5(a), State v. Birdsall, 116 Ariz. 112 , 568 P.2d 419 (1977), and if timely motion is made, the filing of an allegation of prior conviction is solely within the discretion of the prosecutor.

1980The time limits of the rule are specifically applicable to the addition of allegations of prior convictions, rule 13.5(a), State v. Birdsall, 116 Ariz. 112 , 568 P.2d 419 (1977), and if timely motion is made, the filing of an allegation of prior conviction is solely within the discretion of the prosecutor.

2015We need not address that issue here, because, even under Rule 60(c)(6), an attorney’s failure to act must still be “legally excusable.” Panzino, 196 Ariz. at 445, ¶ 7 , 999 P.2d at 201 .

2015We need not address that issue here, because, even under Rule 60(c)(6), an attorney’s failure to act must still be “legally excusable.” Panzino, 196 Ariz. at 445, ¶ 7 , 999 P.2d at 201 .

1990See State v. Savage, 117 Ariz. 535 , 573 P.2d 1388 (1978) (applying rule 1.3 to extend the time limits of rule 32.9(c)); Duran v. State, 113 Ariz. 135 , 547 P.2d 1049 (1976) (applying rule 1.3 to extend the time limits of rule 10.2).

1990See State v. Savage, 117 Ariz. 535 , 573 P.2d 1388 (1978) (applying rule 1.3 to extend the time limits of rule 32.9(c)); Duran v. State, 113 Ariz. 135 , 547 P.2d 1049 (1976) (applying rule 1.3 to extend the time limits of rule 10.2).

1981Rule 32.9(a) specifically requires that the petitioner timely move the court for rehearing in order that the trial court have a last chance to correct any errors or omissions.” State v. Gause, 112 Ariz. 296, 297 , 541 P.2d 396, 397 (1975), cert, denied, 425 U.S. 915 , 96 S.Ct. 1515 , 47 L.Ed.2d 766 (1976).

1981Rule 32.9(a) specifically requires that the petitioner timely move the court for rehearing in order that the trial court have a last chance to correct any errors or omissions.” State v. Gause, 112 Ariz. 296, 297 , 541 P.2d 396, 397 (1975), cert, denied, 425 U.S. 915 , 96 S.Ct. 1515 , 47 L.Ed.2d 766 (1976).