13 California opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasegreen2 sentences2015In such cases, “‘[t]he scope of arbitration is . . . a matter of agreement between the parties’ [citation], and ‘“[t]he powers of an arbitrator are limited and circumscribed by the agreement or stipulation of submission.”’ [Citations.]” ( Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 8-9.) “‘[A]rbitrators, unless specifically required to act in conformity with rules of law, may base their decision upon principles of justice and equity . . .’ [Citations.]” ( Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) “[C]ourts will not review the validity of the arbitrator’s reasoning [citations]” or “the sufficiency of t 2015In such cases, “‘[t]he scope of arbitration is . . . a matter of agreement between the parties’ [citation], and ‘“[t]he powers of an arbitrator are limited and circumscribed by the agreement or stipulation of submission.”’ [Citations.]” ( Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 8-9.) “‘[A]rbitrators, unless specifically required to act in conformity with rules of law, may base their decision upon principles of justice and equity . . .’ [Citations.]” ( Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) “[C]ourts will not review the validity of the arbitrator’s reasoning [citations]” or “the sufficiency of t | 1 | 4 |
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty.green2 sentences2011In sum, this is not a case where “the parent’s interests were at their strongest, the State’s interests were at their weakest, and the risks of error were at their peak . . . .” (Lassiter, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 31 .) L.B.’s interest in appointed counsel to oppose the guardianship petition does not outweigh the presumption that due process guarantees appointed counsel only where loss of liberty is threatened. 1999However, the court noted that the Eldridge factors might overcome the presumption against the right to appointed counsel “[i]f, in a given case, the parent’s interests were at their strongest, the State’s interests were at their weakest, and the risks of error were at their peak.” (Lassiter, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 31 [ 101 S.Ct. at p. 2162 ].) “[S]ince the Eldridge factors will not always be so distributed, and since ‘due process is not so rigid as to require that the significant interests in informality, flexibility and economy must always be sacrificed,’ Gagnon v. Scarpelli [(1973)] 411 U.S. | 1 | 2 |
Truman v. Thomasgreen1 sentence1997(Truman v. Thomas, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 295, fn. 5 .) Thus, the given instruction was proper and Dr. Schecter’s failure to request an additional defense instruction in this regard waived the issue. 10 , 11 *1208 7. | 1 | 1 |
That Way Production Co. v. Directors Guild of America, Inc.green2 sentences1992(See That Way Production Co. v. Directors Guild of America, Inc. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 960, 965 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 475 ] [hereafter That Way].) As one commentator explains, “the parties to an arbitral agreement knowingly take the risks of error of fact or law committed by the arbitrators and that this is a worthy ‘trade-off’ in order to obtain speedy decisions by experts in the field whose practical experience and worldly reasoning will be accepted as correct by other experts.” (Sweeney, Judicial Review of Arbitral Proceedings (1981-1982) 5 Fordham Int’l L.J. 253, 254.) “In other words, it is with 1992(See That Way Production Co. v. Directors Guild of America, Inc. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 960, 965 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 475 ] [hereafter That Way].) As one commentator explains, “the parties to an arbitral agreement knowingly take the risks of error of fact or law committed by the arbitrators and that this is a worthy ‘trade-off’ in order to obtain speedy decisions by experts in the field whose practical experience and worldly reasoning will be accepted as correct by other experts.” (Sweeney, Judicial Review of Arbitral Proceedings (1981-1982) 5 Fordham Int’l L.J. 253, 254.) “In other words, it is with | 1 | 1 |
Addington v. Texasgreen2 sentences1984This is not a civil dispute over money damages where the application of the “preponderance of evidence” standard indicates society’s minimal concern with the result and therefore that the litigants should “share the risks of error in roughly equal fashions.” (Adding-ton v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 425 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 323, 330 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808 ].) Nor is it a criminal dispute where the stringent “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard tells us of the weight and gravity of the private interest involved and society’s interest in avoiding an erroneous conviction. 1984This is not a civil dispute over money damages where the application of the “preponderance of evidence” standard indicates society’s minimal concern with the result and therefore that the litigants should “share the risks of error in roughly equal fashions.” (Adding-ton v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 425 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 323, 330 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808 ].) Nor is it a criminal dispute where the stringent “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard tells us of the weight and gravity of the private interest involved and society’s interest in avoiding an erroneous conviction. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gagnon v. Scarpelli
red
2 sentences1999However, the court noted that the Eldridge factors might overcome the presumption against the right to appointed counsel “[i]f, in a given case, the parent’s interests were at their strongest, the State’s interests were at their weakest, and the risks of error were at their peak.” (Lassiter, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 31 [ 101 S.Ct. at p. 2162 ].) “[S]ince the Eldridge factors will not always be so distributed, and since ‘due process is not so rigid as to require that the significant interests in informality, flexibility and economy must always be sacrificed,’ Gagnon v. Scarpelli [(1973)] 411 U.S. 1999However, the court noted that the Eldridge factors might overcome the presumption against the right to appointed counsel “[i]f, in a given case, the parent’s interests were at their strongest, the State’s interests were at their weakest, and the risks of error were at their peak.” (Lassiter, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 31 [ 101 S.Ct. at p. 2162 ].) “[S]ince the Eldridge factors will not always be so distributed, and since ‘due process is not so rigid as to require that the significant interests in informality, flexibility and economy must always be sacrificed,’ Gagnon v. Scarpelli [(1973)] 411 U.S. | 3 | 1995–1999 |
In Re Marriage of Peters
green
1 sentence2020(In re Marriage of Peters, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1490 .) ‘ “Any other standard expresses a preference for one side’s interests” ’ (Weiner v. Fleischman, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 488 .…” (Ettefagh, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 1589 .) Generally, imposing a burden of proof higher than a preponderance of the evidence “occurs only when interests ‘ “more substantial than mere loss of money’ ” are at stake.” (Id. at p. 1590.) The fourth and final part of the analysis weighs the interests of the litigants that are at stake, the risks of error, and the consequences of an erroneous determination of | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Ettefagh v. Ettefagh
green
2 sentences2020(In re Marriage of Peters, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1490 .) ‘ “Any other standard expresses a preference for one side’s interests” ’ (Weiner v. Fleischman, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 488 .…” (Ettefagh, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 1589 .) Generally, imposing a burden of proof higher than a preponderance of the evidence “occurs only when interests ‘ “more substantial than mere loss of money’ ” are at stake.” (Id. at p. 1590.) The fourth and final part of the analysis weighs the interests of the litigants that are at stake, the risks of error, and the consequences of an erroneous determination of 2020(See Ettefagh, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1590–1591.) After weighing these factors, the court reaches a conclusion as to the appropriate burden of proof. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Weiner v. Fleischman
green
1 sentence2020(In re Marriage of Peters, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1490 .) ‘ “Any other standard expresses a preference for one side’s interests” ’ (Weiner v. Fleischman, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 488 .…” (Ettefagh, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 1589 .) Generally, imposing a burden of proof higher than a preponderance of the evidence “occurs only when interests ‘ “more substantial than mere loss of money’ ” are at stake.” (Id. at p. 1590.) The fourth and final part of the analysis weighs the interests of the litigants that are at stake, the risks of error, and the consequences of an erroneous determination of | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Cable Connection, Inc. v. DirecTV, Inc.
green
2 sentences2010When parties opt for the forum of arbitration they agree to be bound by the decision of that forum knowing that arbitrators, like judges, are fallible.’ ... [][].. . [f] “A second reason why we tolerate the risk of an erroneous decision is because the Legislature has reduced the risk to the parties of such a decision by providing for judicial review in circumstances involving serious problems with the award itself, or with the fairness of the arbitration process. . . . [][] . . . [f] The Legislature has . . . substantially reduced the possibility of certain forms of error infecting the arbitra 2010When parties opt for the forum of arbitration they agree to be bound by the decision of that forum knowing that arbitrators, like judges, are fallible.’ ... [][].. . [f] “A second reason why we tolerate the risk of an erroneous decision is because the Legislature has reduced the risk to the parties of such a decision by providing for judicial review in circumstances involving serious problems with the award itself, or with the fairness of the arbitration process. . . . [][] . . . [f] The Legislature has . . . substantially reduced the possibility of certain forms of error infecting the arbitra | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals
green
1 sentence1997“The speed and economy of arbitration, in contrast to the expense and delay of a jury trial, could prove helpful to all parties . . . .” (Madden, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 711 .) The explicit and implicit representations contained in Kaiser’s arbitration agreement serve to confirm to the reasonable potential subscriber that Kaiser has an efficient system of arbitration, in which what is lost in terms of jury trial rights would be gained in part by a swifter resolution of the dispute. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Griffith Co. v. San Diego College for Women
green
2 sentences1992When parties opt for the forum of arbitration they agree to be bound by the decision of that forum knowing that arbitrators, like judges, are fallible." ( That Way, supra, at p. 965 .) Griffith Co. v. San Diego Col. for Women, supra, 45 Cal.2d 501 , is illustrative. 1992When parties opt for the forum of arbitration they agree to be bound by the decision of that forum knowing that arbitrators, like judges, are fallible.” (That Way, supra, at p. 965 .) Griffith Co. v. San Diego Col. for Women, supra, 45 Cal.2d 501 , is illustrative. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.