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23 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. DuBoisgreen2 sentences2026To ensure a defendant's waiver is knowing and intelligent, trial courts must conduct an inquiry to inform defendants seeking to proceed self- represented about: (1) the nature of the charges, statutory defenses, and possible range of punishment; (2) the technical problems associated with self-representation and the risks if the defense is unsuccessful; (3) the necessity that [the] defendant comply with the rules of criminal procedure and the rules of evidence; (4) the fact that the lack of knowledge of the law may impair [the] defendant's ability to defend himself or herself; (5) the impact th 2026The question of whether a defendant made a timely, clear, and unequivocal application to proceed self-represented constitutes a question of law 4 The relevant factors include: (1) the nature of the charges, statutory defenses, and possible range of punishment; (2) the technical problems associated with self-representation and the risks if the defense is unsuccessful; (3) the necessity that defendant comply with the rules of criminal procedure and the rules of evidence; (4) the fact that the lack of knowledge of the law may impair defendant's ability to defend himself or herself; (5) the impact | 5 | 18 |
State v. Crisafigreen2 sentences2026To ensure a defendant's waiver is knowing and intelligent, trial courts must conduct an inquiry to inform defendants seeking to proceed self- represented about: (1) the nature of the charges, statutory defenses, and possible range of punishment; (2) the technical problems associated with self-representation and the risks if the defense is unsuccessful; (3) the necessity that [the] defendant comply with the rules of criminal procedure and the rules of evidence; (4) the fact that the lack of knowledge of the law may impair [the] defendant's ability to defend himself or herself; (5) the impact th 2026The question of whether a defendant made a timely, clear, and unequivocal application to proceed self-represented constitutes a question of law 4 The relevant factors include: (1) the nature of the charges, statutory defenses, and possible range of punishment; (2) the technical problems associated with self-representation and the risks if the defense is unsuccessful; (3) the necessity that defendant comply with the rules of criminal procedure and the rules of evidence; (4) the fact that the lack of knowledge of the law may impair defendant's ability to defend himself or herself; (5) the impact | 4 | 11 |
State v. Kinggreen2 sentences2020In State v. Crisafi, 128 N.J. 499, 509 (1992), the Court explained a defendant may "exercise the right to self-representation only by first knowingly and intelligently waiving the right to counsel." [W]hen determining whether a waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent, trial courts must inform defendant of: (1) the nature of the charges, statutory defenses, and possible range of punishment; (2) the technical problems associated with self-representation and the risks if the defense is unsuccessful; (3) the necessity that defendant comply with the rules of criminal procedure and the rules of 2020In State v. Crisafi, 128 N.J. 499, 509 (1992), the Court explained a defendant may "exercise the right to self-representation only by first knowingly and intelligently waiving the right to counsel." [W]hen determining whether a waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent, trial courts must inform defendant of: (1) the nature of the charges, statutory defenses, and possible range of punishment; (2) the technical problems associated with self-representation and the risks if the defense is unsuccessful; (3) the necessity that defendant comply with the rules of criminal procedure and the rules of | 4 | 4 |
State v. McNeilgreen2 sentences2020In State v. Crisafi, 128 N.J. 499, 509 (1992), the Court explained a defendant may "exercise the right to self-representation only by first knowingly and intelligently waiving the right to counsel." [W]hen determining whether a waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent, trial courts must inform defendant of: (1) the nature of the charges, statutory defenses, and possible range of punishment; (2) the technical problems associated with self-representation and the risks if the defense is unsuccessful; (3) the necessity that defendant comply with the rules of criminal procedure and the rules of 2020In State v. Crisafi, 128 N.J. 499, 509 (1992), the Court explained a defendant may "exercise the right to self-representation only by first knowingly and intelligently waiving the right to counsel." [W]hen determining whether a waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent, trial courts must inform defendant of: (1) the nature of the charges, statutory defenses, and possible range of punishment; (2) the technical problems associated with self-representation and the risks if the defense is unsuccessful; (3) the necessity that defendant comply with the rules of criminal procedure and the rules of | 3 | 3 |
Faretta v. Californiagreen2 sentences2021See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836 (“[The defendant’s] technical legal knowledge . . . was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.”). 2019A-3774-16T3 5 [State v. DuBois, 189 N.J. 454, 468-69 (2007).] The trial court made defendant "aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self- representation, so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.'" Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Reddishgreen2 sentences2026The question of whether a defendant made a timely, clear, and unequivocal application to proceed self-represented constitutes a question of law 4 The relevant factors include: (1) the nature of the charges, statutory defenses, and possible range of punishment; (2) the technical problems associated with self-representation and the risks if the defense is unsuccessful; (3) the necessity that defendant comply with the rules of criminal procedure and the rules of evidence; (4) the fact that the lack of knowledge of the law may impair defendant's ability to defend himself or herself; (5) the impact 2021Rather, it requires that the trial court inform a defendant asserting the right to self- representation of: (1) the nature of the charges, statutory defenses, and possible range of punishment; (2) the technical problems associated with self-representation and the risks if the defense is unsuccessful; (3) the necessity that defendant comply with the rules of criminal procedure and the rules of evidence; (4) the fact that the lack of knowledge of the law may impair defendant's ability to defend himself or herself; (5) the impact that the dual role of counsel and defendant may have; (6) the reali | 1 | 8 |
State v. Kordowergreen1 sentence2020State v. Kordower, 229 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Pennsylvania v. Finleygreen2 sentences2013Rather, the State argues that there is no federal constitutional right to counsel on collateral review, pointing to the 1987 United States Supreme Court case of Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 , 107 S.Ct. 1990, 1993 , 95 L.Ed.2d 539, 545 (1987). 2013Rather, the State argues that there is no federal constitutional right to counsel on collateral review, pointing to the 1987 United States Supreme Court case of Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 , 107 S.Ct. 1990, 1993 , 95 L.Ed.2d 539, 545 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Von Moltke v. Gilliesgreen2 sentences2007A judge can make certain that an accused’s professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under which such a plea is tendered. [Ibid, (quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 , 68 S.Ct. 316, 323 , 92 L.Ed. 309, 321 (1948) (plurality opinion)).] Thus, following Crisafi , when determining whether a waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent, trial courts must inform defendant of: (1) the nature of the charges, statutory defenses, and possible range of punishment; (2) the technical problems a 2007A judge can make certain that an accused’s professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under which such a plea is tendered. [Ibid, (quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 , 68 S.Ct. 316, 323 , 92 L.Ed. 309, 321 (1948) (plurality opinion)).] Thus, following Crisafi , when determining whether a waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent, trial courts must inform defendant of: (1) the nature of the charges, statutory defenses, and possible range of punishment; (2) the technical problems a | 1 | 1 |
McQuillen v. City of Sioux Citygreen2 sentences2004See McQuillen, supra, 306 N.W. 2d at 791-92 (upholding the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's petition as a proper exercise of discretion, as the trial court had found good cause for ordering plaintiff to submit to a coronary arteriography and plaintiff had willfully refused to submit to same, even though the court did not doubt "plaintiff's sincerity in not wishing to assume the risks of the test" and acknowledged that "less drastic alternatives were available"). 2004See McQuillen, supra, 306 N.W. 2d at 791-92 (upholding the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's petition as a proper exercise of discretion, as the trial court had found good cause for ordering plaintiff to submit to a coronary arteriography and plaintiff had willfully refused to submit to same, even though the court did not doubt "plaintiff's sincerity in not wishing to assume the risks of the test" and acknowledged that "less drastic alternatives were available"). | 1 | 1 |
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen2 sentences1993Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 903 , 47 L.Ed. 2d 18, 33 (1976). 1993Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 903 , 47 L.Ed. 2d 18, 33 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Klein v. Yellow Cab Co.
green
2 sentences2004Klein, supra, 7 F.R.D. 169 , reflects the motion judge's view. 2004Klein, supra, 7 F.R.D. 169 , reflects the motion judge's view. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.