constitutional standing requirement in District of Columbia

2026May 16, 2025), and she made it again in her merits brief. 9 We follow “the constitutional standing requirement embodied in Article III.” District of Columbia v. ExxonMobil Oil Corp., 172 A.3d 412, 419 (D.C. 2017) (quoting Grayson v. AT&T Corp., 15 A.3d 219, 224 (D.C. 2011)).

2025“Even though Congress created the District of Columbia court system under Article I of the Constitution, rather than Article III, this court has followed consistently the constitutional standing requirement embodied in Article III.” Moeller v. District of Columbia, 253 A.3d 165 , 168 (D.C. 2021) (quoting Grayson v. AT&T Corp., 15 A.3d 219, 224 (D.C. 2011) (en banc)). “[T]o satisfy the requirements for constitutional standing, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating: (1) an injury in fact, meaning an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) ac

2025See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340-41 (2016); Grayson v. AT&T Corp., 15 A.3d 219, 224 (D.C. 2011) (en banc) (“[A]ppellants must allege ‘some threatened or actual injury resulting from putatively illegal action’” under Article III “in order for this court to assume jurisdiction.” (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973))); see also id. (explaining that this court is not strictly bound by Article III’s requirements, but that it has nonetheless “followed consistently the constitutional standing requirement embodied in Article III”).

2017Grayson, 15 A.3d at 229. “[E]ven though Congress created the District of Columbia court system under Article I of the Constitution, rather than Article III, this court has followed consistently the constitutional standing requirement embodied in Article III.” Id, at 224. “[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing consists of three elements[:] The plaintiff must have (lj suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, — U.S. -, 136 S.C

2026May 16, 2025), and she made it again in her merits brief. 9 We follow “the constitutional standing requirement embodied in Article III.” District of Columbia v. ExxonMobil Oil Corp., 172 A.3d 412, 419 (D.C. 2017) (quoting Grayson v. AT&T Corp., 15 A.3d 219, 224 (D.C. 2011)).

2025See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340-41 (2016); Grayson v. AT&T Corp., 15 A.3d 219, 224 (D.C. 2011) (en banc) (“[A]ppellants must allege ‘some threatened or actual injury resulting from putatively illegal action’” under Article III “in order for this court to assume jurisdiction.” (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973))); see also id. (explaining that this court is not strictly bound by Article III’s requirements, but that it has nonetheless “followed consistently the constitutional standing requirement embodied in Article III”).

2025See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340-41 (2016); Grayson v. AT&T Corp., 15 A.3d 219, 224 (D.C. 2011) (en banc) (“[A]ppellants must allege ‘some threatened or actual injury resulting from putatively illegal action’” under Article III “in order for this court to assume jurisdiction.” (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973))); see also id. (explaining that this court is not strictly bound by Article III’s requirements, but that it has nonetheless “followed consistently the constitutional standing requirement embodied in Article III”).

2021To satisfy Article III’s strictures, petitioners must demonstrate an actual or imminent “injury that is concrete and particularized,” that is “fairly traceable to the challenged conduct,” and that is “likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Little v. SunTrust Bank, 204 A.3d 1272, 1274 (D.C. 2019) (citation omitted).

2017This is not surprising; after all, the whole point of the constitutional standing analysis is "[t]o ensure the proper adversarial presentation,” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 , 127 S.Ct. 1438 , 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007), and "assure[] the court that the issues before it will be concrete and sharply presented.” Sec'y of State of Maryland v. Joseph H.

2017This is not surprising; after all, the whole point of the constitutional standing analysis is "[t]o ensure the proper adversarial presentation,” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 , 127 S.Ct. 1438 , 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007), and "assure[] the court that the issues before it will be concrete and sharply presented.” Sec'y of State of Maryland v. Joseph H.

2017The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”24 The burden is on the plaintiff to establish each of these three elements.25 To establish an “[i]njury in fact,” the plaintiff must show that he has “suffered „an invasion of a legally protected interest‟ that is „concrete and particularized‟ and „actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.‟”26 23 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992); see also, e.g., Valley Forg

2017ALCOA Prescription Drug Plan v. AdvancePCS Inc., 465 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2006)). 20 This is not surprising; after all, the whole point of the constitutional standing analysis is ―[t]o ensure the proper adversarial presentation,‖ Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007), and ―assure[] the court that the issues before it will be concrete and sharply presented.‖ Sec’y of State of Maryland v. Joseph H.

2017Code § 11-705 (b) (2012 Repl.) (providing that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals hears and determines “[c]ases and controversies”). 20 Id., § 11-101 (2). 21 Grayson v. AT&T Corp., 15 A.3d 219, 224 (D.C. 2011) (en banc) (“[E]ven though Congress created the District of Columbia court system under Article I of the Constitution, rather than Article III, this court has followed consistently the constitutional standing requirement embodied in Article III.”); see also, e.g., UMC Dev., LLC v. District of Columbia, 120 A.3d 37, 42 (D.C. 2015) (“[W]e generally adhere to the case and controversy

2017Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 955 , 104 S.Ct. 2839 , 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984). .

2017Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 955 , 104 S.Ct. 2839 , 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984). .

2017Code § 11-705 (b) (2012 Repl.) (providing that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals hears and determines “[c]ases and controversies”). 20 Id., § 11-101 (2). 21 Grayson v. AT&T Corp., 15 A.3d 219, 224 (D.C. 2011) (en banc) (“[E]ven though Congress created the District of Columbia court system under Article I of the Constitution, rather than Article III, this court has followed consistently the constitutional standing requirement embodied in Article III.”); see also, e.g., UMC Dev., LLC v. District of Columbia, 120 A.3d 37, 42 (D.C. 2015) (“[W]e generally adhere to the case and controversy