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13 Florida opinions name it 1 courts 1983–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Conner, I, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co.green2 sentences2023See Conner, I, 827 So. 2d at 319 (“Generally, the statute of frauds is an affirmative defense that cannot be raised in a motion to dismiss unless the complaint affirmatively shows the conclusive applicability of such defense to bar the action.”).3 Therefore, the trial court’s dismissal of Counts I, II and IV without affording Appellants the opportunity to amend was error. 3 Even if we were to apply New York law, we would reach the same result. 2011See Conner, I, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 827 So.2d 318 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), review denied, 846 So.2d 1147 (Fla.2003). . | 2 | 2 |
Alexander Hamilton Corp. v. Leesongreen2 sentences2016A trial court’s authority to dismiss a complaint on an affirmative defense of statute of limitations is limited to situations in which “the complaint affirmatively and clearly shows the conclusive applicability of such defense as a bar to the action.” Alexander Hamilton Corp. v. Leeson, 508 So.2d 513, 513 (Fla. 4th DOA 1987). 2016A trial court's authority to dismiss a complaint on an affirmative defense of statute of limitations is limited to situations in which "the complaint affirmatively and clearly shows the conclusive applicability of such defense as a bar to the action." Alexander Hamilton Corp. v. Leeson, 508 So. 2d 513, 513 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). | 1 | 2 |
Vause v. Bay Medical Centergreen2 sentences2012“Even a relatively straightforward affirmative defense, such as one based upon the statute of limitations, is not a basis for dismissal unless the complaint affirmatively and clearly shows the conclusive applicability of the defense.” Vause, 687 So.2d at 261 . 2007Ctr., 687 So.2d 258, 261 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (en banc) ("Even a relatively straightforward affirmative defense, such as one based upon the statute of [repose], is not a basis for dismissal unless the complaint affirmatively and clearly shows the conclusive applicability of the defense."). | 1 | 2 |
Mettler, Inc. v. Ellen Tracy, Inc.green1 sentence2023Or, stated differently, “[a] motion to dismiss should not be granted on the basis of ... defenses unless the ... defenses appear on the face of the pleading.” Mettler, Inc. v. Ellen Tracy, Inc., 648 So. 2d 253, 255 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (alteration added). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Gaffin Industrial Services, Inc.green1 sentence2023Servs., Inc., 88 So. 3d 1027, 1029 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (observing that “‘[e]ven a relatively straightforward affirmative defense, such as one based upon the statute of limitations, is not a basis for dismissal unless the complaint affirmatively and clearly shows the conclusive applicability of the defense’” (citation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Wishnatzki v. Coffman Const., Inc.green2 sentences2016“A motion to dismiss a complaint based on the expiration of the statute of limitations should be granted only in extraordinary circumstances in which the facts pleaded in the complaint conclusively establish that the statute of limitations bars the action as a matter of law.” Wishnatzki v. Coffman Constr., Inc., 884 So.2d 282, 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). 2016"A motion to dismiss a complaint based on the expiration of the statute of limitations should be granted only in extraordinary circumstances in which the facts pleaded in the complaint conclusively establish that the statute of limitations bars the action as a matter of law." Wishnatzki v. Coffman Constr., Inc., 884 So. 2d 282, 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). | 1 | 1 |
Collins v. CITRUS NAT. BANKgreen1 sentence2002Collins v. Citrus Nat'l Bank, 641 So.2d 458, 459-60 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (citing Evans v. Parker, 440 So.2d 640 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)). | 1 | 1 |
McLeod v. Barbergreen1 sentence2002McLeod v. Barber, 764 So.2d 790, 792 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Evans v. Parker
green
2 sentences2002Collins v. Citrus Nat'l Bank, 641 So.2d 458, 459-60 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (citing Evans v. Parker, 440 So.2d 640 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)). 1994At this stage, however, where the allegations of the complaint are tested only for sufficiency, it cannot be determined whether the documents were signed as part of the same transaction. [1] *460 See Evans v. Parker, 440 So.2d 640 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (statute of frauds is affirmative defense which cannot properly be raised on a motion to dismiss unless the complaint affirmatively and clearly shows the conclusive applicability of such defense to bar the action). | 3 | 1987–2002 |
New York State Dept. of Taxation v. Patafio
green
1 sentence2004They cite to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (d) which specifically requires state statutes of limitation to be tolled for the period during which a petitioner's cause of action is pending in federal court as well as 30 days after the claim is dismissed. [4] *831 "The statute of limitations is generally an affirmative defense that cannot be raised in a motion to dismiss unless the complaint affirmatively shows the conclusive applicability of such defense to bar the action." New York State Dept. of Taxation v. Patafio, 829 So.2d 314 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Toledo Park Homes v. Grant
green
1 sentence1987Toledo Park Homes v. Grant, 447 So.2d 343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); and Evans v. Parker, 440 So.2d 640 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Carter Corp. v. Albanese Co.
green
1 sentence1983Rule 1.110(d), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure; e.g., Jackson Grain Co. v. Kemp, 177 So.2d 513 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965); Glass v. Armstrong, 330 So.2d 57 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); 40 Fla.Jur.2d, Pleadings, §§ 171, 172. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Glass v. Armstrong
green
1 sentence1983Rule 1.110(d), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure; e.g., Jackson Grain Co. v. Kemp, 177 So.2d 513 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965); Glass v. Armstrong, 330 So.2d 57 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); 40 Fla.Jur.2d, Pleadings, §§ 171, 172. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.