13 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 2001–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stephens v. Stategreen2 sentences2004See Stephens v. State, 748 So.2d 1028, 1034 (Fla.1999). 2003See Stephens v. State, 748 So.2d 1028, 1034 (Fla.1999). | 4 | 4 |
Sochor v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Because the trial court denied these claims after an evidentiary hearing, this Court "review[s] the deficiency and prejudice prongs as `mixed questions of law and fact subject to a de novo review standard but . . . the trial court's factual findings are to be given deference.'" Arbelaez v. State, 898 So.2d 25, 32 (Fla.2005) (quoting Sochor, 883 So.2d at 781 ). 2006Because the trial court denied these claims after an evidentiary hearing, this Court "review[s] the deficiency and prejudice prongs as `mixed questions of law and fact subject to a de novo review standard but . . . the trial court's factual findings are to be given deference.'" Arbelaez, 898 So.2d at 32 (quoting Sochor, 883 So.2d at 781 ). 3. | 3 | 4 |
Arbelaez v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See Arbelaez v. State, 898 So. 2d 25, 32 (Fla. 2005) (“After an evidentiary hearing on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we review the deficiency and prejudice prongs as ‘mixed questions of law and fact subject to a de novo review standard but . . . the trial court's factual findings are to be given deference. 2023See Arbelaez v. State, 898 So. 2d 25, 32 (Fla. 2005) (“After an evidentiary hearing on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we review the deficiency and prejudice prongs as ‘mixed questions of law and fact subject to a de novo review standard but . . . the trial court’s factual findings are to be given deference. | 3 | 3 |
Smithers v. Stategreen1 sentence2023So long as the [trial court’s] decisions are supported by competent, substantial evidence, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact and, likewise, on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence.’”) (quoting Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 781 (Fla. 2004)); Smithers v. State, 18 So. 3d 460, 464 (Fla. 2009) (“Without a showing of such actual bias of the juror, the defendant cannot establish the prejudice required by Strickland.”); Owen v. State, 986 So. 2d 534, 546 (Fla. 2008) (“Trial counsel cannot be deemed in | 1 | 1 |
Owen v. Stategreen1 sentence2023So long as the [trial court’s] decisions are supported by competent, substantial evidence, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact and, likewise, on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence.’”) (quoting Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 781 (Fla. 2004)); Smithers v. State, 18 So. 3d 460, 464 (Fla. 2009) (“Without a showing of such actual bias of the juror, the defendant cannot establish the prejudice required by Strickland.”); Owen v. State, 986 So. 2d 534, 546 (Fla. 2008) (“Trial counsel cannot be deemed in | 1 | 1 |
Darling v. Stategreen1 sentence2023So long as the [trial court’s] decisions are supported by competent, substantial evidence, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact and, likewise, on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence.’”) (quoting Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 781 (Fla. 2004)); Smithers v. State, 18 So. 3d 460, 464 (Fla. 2009) (“Without a showing of such actual bias of the juror, the defendant cannot establish the prejudice required by Strickland.”); Owen v. State, 986 So. 2d 534, 546 (Fla. 2008) (“Trial counsel cannot be deemed in | 1 | 1 |
Nelson v. Stategreen1 sentence2023So long as the [trial court’s] decisions are supported by competent, substantial evidence, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact and, likewise, on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence.’”) (quoting Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 781 (Fla. 2004)); Smithers v. State, 18 So. 3d 460, 464 (Fla. 2009) (“Without a showing of such actual bias of the juror, the defendant cannot establish the prejudice required by Strickland.”); Owen v. State, 986 So. 2d 534, 546 (Fla. 2008) (“Trial counsel cannot be deemed in | 1 | 1 |
Irvin v. Irvingreen1 sentence2016Irvin v. Irvin, 76 So.3d 1021, 1023 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). | 1 | 1 |
Ponticelli v. Stategreen1 sentence2014Ponticelli v. State, 941 So.2d 1073, 1090 (Fla.2006). | 1 | 1 |
Porter v. Stategreen1 sentence2005So long as the [trial court's] decisions are supported by competent, substantial evidence, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact and, likewise, on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence." Sochor v. State, 883 So.2d 766, 781 (Fla.2004) (quoting Porter v. State, 788 So.2d 917, 923 (Fla.2001)) (emphasis omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Parlato v. Secret Oaks Owners Ass'ngreen1 sentence2004See Parlato v. Secret Oaks Owners Ass'n, 793 So.2d 1158, 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dusseau v. METRO. DADE CO. BD. OF COM'RS
green
2 sentences2017Although the circuit court based its order on its finding that the report and the testimony which were contrary to the real-time video evidence did not amount to competent, substantial evidence, the First District concluded that the circuit court essentially reweighed the evidence and conducted a de novo review in violation of this Court’s opinion in Dusseau v. Metropolitan Dade County Board of County Commissioners, 794 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 2001). 2017Although the circuit court based its order on its finding that the report and the testimony which were contrary to the real-time video evidence did not amount to competent, substantial evidence, the First District concluded that the circuit court essentially reweighed the evidence f and conducted a de novo review in violation of this Court’s opinion in Dusseau v. Metropolitan Dade County Board of County Commissioners, 794 So.2d 1270 (Fla. 2001). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State, Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Wiggins
green
2 sentences2017Wiggins, 151 So. 3d at 462 - 63. 2017Wiggins, 151 So.3d at 462-63 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Langley v. UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COM'N
green
1 sentence2004Co., 758 So.2d 649 (Fla. 2000); Langley v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 444 So.2d 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). *1258 The determination of whether an employee's absence from work constitutes a voluntary separation from employment, thereby disqualifying him or her from UC benefits, turns as much on the de novo review standard as it does on that of competent, substantial evidence; it is a mixed question of both law and fact. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Mason v. Load King Mfg. Co.
green
1 sentence2004Co., 758 So.2d 649 (Fla. 2000); Langley v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 444 So.2d 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). *1258 The determination of whether an employee's absence from work constitutes a voluntary separation from employment, thereby disqualifying him or her from UC benefits, turns as much on the de novo review standard as it does on that of competent, substantial evidence; it is a mixed question of both law and fact. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Goodman v. Engle Homes, Inc.
green
1 sentence2004For example, in Goodman, 621 So.2d at 524 , the court made the following pertinent observation: "We disagree with the UAC's conclusion that a bona fide leave of absence for purposes of unemployment compensation law requires that the employer and employee agree upon a specific term for the leave." (Emphasis added.) In Arby's, the court applied the rule adopted in Keays , stating that a duty is initially placed on the employer to inform the employee of acceptable terms of leave, and if no such communication is conveyed, the worker's absence cannot support a finding that the employee voluntarily | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.