6 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 2006–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Smallgreen2 sentences2010This position derived from former Chief Justice Cappy's concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Gorby, 589 Pa. 364 , 909 A.2d 775 (2006), in which he elaborated that "this [in] no way alters the principle that `the trial court is in the best position to review claims related to trial counsel's error in the first instance as that is the court that observed firsthand counsel's allegedly deficient performance.'" Indeed, the former Chief Justice stressed that he "would continue to accept the factual findings and credibility determinations of the PCRA court that are supported by the record." Commonwe 2010This position derived from former Chief Justice Cappy's concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Gorby, 589 Pa. 364 , 909 A.2d 775 (2006), in which he elaborated that "this [in] no way alters the principle that `the trial court is in the best position to review claims related to trial counsel's error in the first instance as that is the court that observed firsthand counsel's allegedly deficient performance.'" Indeed, the former Chief Justice stressed that he "would continue to accept the factual findings and credibility determinations of the PCRA court that are supported by the record." Commonwe | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Sattazahngreen2 sentences2013This position derived from former Chief Justice Cappy’s concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Gorby, 589 Pa. 364 , 909 A.2d 775 (2006), in which he elaborated that “this [in] no way alters the principle that ‘the trial court is in the best position to review claims related to trial counsel’s error in the first instance as that is the court that observed firsthand counsel’s allegedly deficient performance.’ ” Indeed, the former Chief Justice stressed that he “would continue to accept the factual findings and credibility determinations of the PCRA court that are supported by the record.” Commonw 2013This position derived from former Chief Justice Cappy’s concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Gorby, 589 Pa. 364 , 909 A.2d 775 (2006), in which he elaborated that “this [in] no way alters the principle that ‘the trial court is in the best position to review claims related to trial counsel’s error in the first instance as that is the court that observed firsthand counsel’s allegedly deficient performance.’ ” Indeed, the former Chief Justice stressed that he “would continue to accept the factual findings and credibility determinations of the PCRA court that are supported by the record.” Commonw | 1 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Riosgreen2 sentences2010Along these lines, as Mr. Justice Saylor has recently explained: In Commonwealth v. Rios, 591 Pa. 583 , 920 A.2d 790 (2007), a majority of the Court adopted a de novo review standard for the mixed question of law and fact concerning whether capital counsel's performance fell beneath the constitutionally *897 [sic] floor. 2010Along these lines, as Mr. Justice Saylor has recently explained: In Commonwealth v. Rios, 591 Pa. 583 , 920 A.2d 790 (2007), a majority of the Court adopted a de novo review standard for the mixed question of law and fact concerning whether capital counsel's performance fell beneath the constitutionally *897 [sic] floor. | 1 | 3 |
Robeson v. Schuylkill Navigation Co.green1 sentence2006See Robeson v. Schuylkill Navigation Co., 3 Grant 186, 189 (Pa.1855) (“When a party admits a letter or other document to be evidence, by using it as such, he cannot afterwards deny the authenticity when his opponent desires to use it.”), accord P.L.E.2d Evidence § 233, Foundation Required for Authentication (Bender & Co., 2002). ¶ 37 Inasmuch as we have concluded the Client Agreement was properly admitted into evidence, cross-appellants’ argument that the arbitration dispute was governed by the NASD rules is rendered moot. ¶ 38 Cross-appellants’ final challenge to the de novo review clause in | 1 | 1 |
Zook v. Allstate Insurancegreen1 sentence2006Id. at 27. | 1 | 1 |
The Gms Group, LLC and Joseph Costa v. Nathan Bendersongreen1 sentence2006Trial Court Opinion, Wettick, J., 6/28/05, at 4, quoting GMS Group, LLC v. Benderson, 326 F.3d 75, 77-78 (2d Cir.2003). 8 ¶ 48 In determining whether a federal or state law standard of review is applicable to the question of whether a de novo review clause is enforceable, we must look to judicial application of the doctrine of preemption in the FAA context. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Estate of Blumenthalgreen1 sentence2006In re Estate of Blumenthal, 812 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Pa.Super.2002) (citation omitted). ¶ 28 After careful review of the newsletter cross-appellants argue modified the Client Agreement, we conclude the court below was correct in finding modification had not taken place by the time arbitration commenced such that the de novo review clause was eliminated from the parties’ agreement. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Gorby
green
2 sentences2013This position derived from former Chief Justice Cappy’s concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Gorby, 589 Pa. 364 , 909 A.2d 775 (2006), in which he elaborated that “this [in] no way alters the principle that ‘the trial court is in the best position to review claims related to trial counsel’s error in the first instance as that is the court that observed firsthand counsel’s allegedly deficient performance.’ ” Indeed, the former Chief Justice stressed that he “would continue to accept the factual findings and credibility determinations of the PCRA court that are supported by the record.” Commonw 2013This position derived from former Chief Justice Cappy’s concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Gorby, 589 Pa. 364 , 909 A.2d 775 (2006), in which he elaborated that “this [in] no way alters the principle that ‘the trial court is in the best position to review claims related to trial counsel’s error in the first instance as that is the court that observed firsthand counsel’s allegedly deficient performance.’ ” Indeed, the former Chief Justice stressed that he “would continue to accept the factual findings and credibility determinations of the PCRA court that are supported by the record.” Commonw | 3 | 2010–2013 |
Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. U.
green
1 sentence2006Volt, supra at 476 , 109 S.Ct. 1248 . ¶ 59 With this jurisprudence in mind, we now turn to an analysis of whether the enforceability of the de novo review clause is an issue of federal or state law. ¶ 60 Comparing the results of Volt with other Supreme Court FAA pre-emption cases, a distinct dichotomy emerges. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Hiller v. Allstate Insurance
green
1 sentence2006Id. at 274 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Heintz
green
1 sentence2006Obviously, if we were to find the de novo review clause enforceable, we would need to find the trial court had plenary jurisdiction over the matter. ¶ 76 Appellants next rely on Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Heintz, 804 A.2d 1209 (Pa.Super.2002), and aver parties are free to contract for de novo review by analogy because the Heintz Court determined parties can elect to invoke the standard of review under the 1927 Pennsylvania Arbitration Act, thereby enabling the trial court to consider an arbitration panel’s errors of law. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Claude M. Schoch v. Infousa, Inc. American Business Information Marketing, Inc.
green
1 sentence2006They also point to Schoch v. InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785 (8th Cir.2003), for the proposition that if “parties could contract for heightened judicial review, [over FAA governed arbitration awards] the parties intent to do so must be clearly and unmistakably expressed.” ¶ 39 The question as to whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law subject to plenary review. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Baney v. Eoute
green
1 sentence2006Id. ¶ 40 The de novo review clause in the Client Agreement purports to be effective only under certain and specific circumstances: We agree that both parties will have a right to appeal the decision of the arbitrators if the arbitrators award damages that exceed $100,000; the arbitrators do not award damages and the amount of my loss of principal exceeds $100,000; or the arbitrators award punitive damages. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.