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13 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gordon v. Regiergreen2 sentences2008The key point in the Gordon analysis was the fact that the petitioner was not incarcerated at the time the Act's procedural prerequisites were commenced. "[T]he Legislature intended that ordinarily the review process of potential sexual predators would be concluded while the person was still in prison." Id. at 718 (emphasis added). 2008The key point in the Gordon analysis was the fact that the petitioner was not incarcerated at the time the Act's procedural prerequisites were commenced. "[T]he Legislature intended that ordinarily the review process of potential sexual predators would be concluded while the person was still in prison." Id. at 718 (emphasis added). | 2 | 2 |
Abeid-Saba v. Carnival Corp.green1 sentence2023See Abeid-Saba, 184 So. 3d at 605 . | 1 | 1 |
Fleitas v. Stategreen1 sentence2022Here, Gordon objected that the State’s proffered reasons for its strike—first, James’s “I’m not God” comment, and second, her statement during voir dire that her first cousin had been sentenced to 25 years in prison—were “insufficiently race-neutral.” But the State’s proffered reasons were facially race-neutral, and Gordon’s objection did not put the trial court on notice of the argument he advances here—that the State’s facially race-neutral reasons were pretextual, and why. “[P]roper preservation requires the following three steps from a party: (1) a timely, contemporaneous objection; (2) a | 1 | 1 |
Harrell v. Stategreen1 sentence2022Here, Gordon objected that the State’s proffered reasons for its strike—first, James’s “I’m not God” comment, and second, her statement during voir dire that her first cousin had been sentenced to 25 years in prison—were “insufficiently race-neutral.” But the State’s proffered reasons were facially race-neutral, and Gordon’s objection did not put the trial court on notice of the argument he advances here—that the State’s facially race-neutral reasons were pretextual, and why. “[P]roper preservation requires the following three steps from a party: (1) a timely, contemporaneous objection; (2) a | 1 | 1 |
Wells v. Stategreen1 sentence2007"The denial of a request for a jury trial in a contempt proceeding limits the maximum term of imprisonment to six months on a finding of guilt." Wells v. State, 654 So.2d 146, 147 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Stategreen1 sentence2005Id. at 25 ; see also Mitchell v. State, 830 So.2d 944 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (applying Gordon analysis to conclude that dual convictions for attempted second-degree murder and attempted felony murder violate double jeopardy principles). | 1 | 1 |
Coleman v. Stategreen1 sentence1997In the final analysis, the record does not support Gordon's claim that "the evidence against [him] and Davidson is about the same." See Hannon v. State, 638 So.2d 39, 44 (Fla.1994) ("[A] death sentence is not disproportionate when a less culpable codefendant receives a less severe punishment."); Coleman v. State, 610 So.2d 1283, 1287 (Fla. 1992) (same); Hayes v. State, 581 So.2d 121 *118 (Fla.1991); Downs v. State, 572 So.2d 895 (Fla.1990); see also Steinhorst v. Singletary, 638 So.2d 33, 35 (Fla.1994)("When codefendants are not equally culpable, the death sentence of the more culpable codefen | 1 | 1 |
Steinhorst v. Singletarygreen1 sentence1997In the final analysis, the record does not support Gordon's claim that "the evidence against [him] and Davidson is about the same." See Hannon v. State, 638 So.2d 39, 44 (Fla.1994) ("[A] death sentence is not disproportionate when a less culpable codefendant receives a less severe punishment."); Coleman v. State, 610 So.2d 1283, 1287 (Fla. 1992) (same); Hayes v. State, 581 So.2d 121 *118 (Fla.1991); Downs v. State, 572 So.2d 895 (Fla.1990); see also Steinhorst v. Singletary, 638 So.2d 33, 35 (Fla.1994)("When codefendants are not equally culpable, the death sentence of the more culpable codefen | 1 | 1 |
Hannon v. Stategreen1 sentence1997In the final analysis, the record does not support Gordon's claim that "the evidence against [him] and Davidson is about the same." See Hannon v. State, 638 So.2d 39, 44 (Fla.1994) ("[A] death sentence is not disproportionate when a less culpable codefendant receives a less severe punishment."); Coleman v. State, 610 So.2d 1283, 1287 (Fla. 1992) (same); Hayes v. State, 581 So.2d 121 *118 (Fla.1991); Downs v. State, 572 So.2d 895 (Fla.1990); see also Steinhorst v. Singletary, 638 So.2d 33, 35 (Fla.1994)("When codefendants are not equally culpable, the death sentence of the more culpable codefen | 1 | 1 |
Hayes v. Stategreen1 sentence1997In the final analysis, the record does not support Gordon's claim that "the evidence against [him] and Davidson is about the same." See Hannon v. State, 638 So.2d 39, 44 (Fla.1994) ("[A] death sentence is not disproportionate when a less culpable codefendant receives a less severe punishment."); Coleman v. State, 610 So.2d 1283, 1287 (Fla. 1992) (same); Hayes v. State, 581 So.2d 121 *118 (Fla.1991); Downs v. State, 572 So.2d 895 (Fla.1990); see also Steinhorst v. Singletary, 638 So.2d 33, 35 (Fla.1994)("When codefendants are not equally culpable, the death sentence of the more culpable codefen | 1 | 1 |
Franklin v. Franklingreen1 sentence1991See generally Franklin v. Franklin, 573 So.2d 401 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). [12] We therefore deny Gordon's motion to enforce the prior mandate in the original appeal, case no. 89-2617. [13] We certify to the Supreme Court that this case involves a question of great public importance as to the constitutionality of § 768.73(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1986). | 1 | 1 |
Sky Lake Gardens Rec. v. Dist. Ct. of App.green1 sentence1987See Sky Lake Gardens Recreation, Inc. v. District Court of Appeal, Third District, 511 So.2d 293 (Fla.1987) (date of rendition of final judgment was not date of original final judgment but date of disposition of timely motion to amend final judgment); Fla.R.App.P. 9.020(g). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hurst v. Florida
green
2 sentences2018Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016), and our, decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 . 2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Gordon’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Gary Czajkowski v. State of Florida
red
2 sentences2018Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016), and our, decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 . 2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Gordon’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
James Ernest Hitchcock v. State of Florida
green
1 sentence2018This Court stayed Gordon’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 513 (2017). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Allen v. United States
green
1 sentence2018This Court stayed Gordon’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 513 (2017). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Florida v. Hurst
red
1 sentence2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Gordon’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Gordon v. State
green
1 sentence2005Id. at 25 ; see also Mitchell v. State, 830 So.2d 944 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (applying Gordon analysis to conclude that dual convictions for attempted second-degree murder and attempted felony murder violate double jeopardy principles). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Atkinson v. State
green
1 sentence2003Atkinson v. State, 791 So.2d 537 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), aff'd, 831 So.2d 172 (Fla.2002). [4] In State v. Atkinson, 831 So.2d 172 (Fla. 2002), our supreme court held that the custody requirement imposed by section 394.925, Florida Statutes (2001), must be read to require that the custody was lawful. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Atkinson
green
2 sentences2003Atkinson v. State, 791 So.2d 537 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), aff'd, 831 So.2d 172 (Fla.2002). [4] In State v. Atkinson, 831 So.2d 172 (Fla. 2002), our supreme court held that the custody requirement imposed by section 394.925, Florida Statutes (2001), must be read to require that the custody was lawful. 2003Atkinson v. State, 791 So.2d 537 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), aff'd, 831 So.2d 172 (Fla.2002). [4] In State v. Atkinson, 831 So.2d 172 (Fla. 2002), our supreme court held that the custody requirement imposed by section 394.925, Florida Statutes (2001), must be read to require that the custody was lawful. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Miller v. State
green
1 sentence1999NOTES [1] Gordon's brief cites Miller v. State, 713 So.2d 1008 (Fla.1998). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Miller v. State
green
1 sentence1999The court issued a revised opinion, Miller v. State, 733 So.2d 955 (Fla.1998). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Duren v. Missouri
green
1 sentence1997Id., at 367, 99 S.Ct. at 670 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Downs v. State
green
1 sentence1997In the final analysis, the record does not support Gordon's claim that "the evidence against [him] and Davidson is about the same." See Hannon v. State, 638 So.2d 39, 44 (Fla.1994) ("[A] death sentence is not disproportionate when a less culpable codefendant receives a less severe punishment."); Coleman v. State, 610 So.2d 1283, 1287 (Fla. 1992) (same); Hayes v. State, 581 So.2d 121 *118 (Fla.1991); Downs v. State, 572 So.2d 895 (Fla.1990); see also Steinhorst v. Singletary, 638 So.2d 33, 35 (Fla.1994)("When codefendants are not equally culpable, the death sentence of the more culpable codefen | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.