McDonald analysis in Florida

1979We elect to utilize the McDonald test which states in pertinent part: In determining whether substantial evidence supports the agency's substituted findings of fact, a reviewing court will naturally accord greater probative force to the hearing officer's contrary findings when the question is simply the weight or credibility of testimony by witnesses, or when the factual issues are otherwise susceptible of ordinary methods of proof, or when concerning those facts the agency may not rightfully claim special insight. * * * * * * At the other end of the scale, where the ultimate facts are increas

1979We elect to utilize the McDonald test which states in pertinent part: In determining whether substantial evidence supports the agency's substituted findings of fact, a reviewing court will naturally accord greater probative force to the hearing officer's contrary findings when the question is simply the weight or credibility of testimony by witnesses, or when the factual issues are otherwise susceptible of ordinary methods of proof, or when concerning those facts the agency may not rightfully claim special insight. * * * * * * At the other end of the scale, where the ultimate facts are increas

2016McDonald argued that his sentence of life with the possibility of parole for a first-degree murder he committed when he was sixteen years of age was unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 , 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). 1 He contended that he was entitled to a new sentencing hearing in conformance with chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida.

2016McDonald argued that his sentence of life with the possibility of parole for a first-degree murder he committed when he was sixteen years of age was unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 , 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). 1 He contended that he was entitled to a new sentencing hearing in conformance with chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida.

2013We caution McDonald and others that the holding in Deras v. State, 54 So.3d 1023 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011), is limited to its facts and does not, in our view, create a manifest injustice exception to the rule 3.850 time bar.

2007Second, the Fourth District considered McDonald's claim "that he was improperly given mandatory life sentences for his convictions for robbery with a firearm" because, according to Frazier v. State, 877 So.2d 838 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), "under the PRR statute the mandatory sentence for robbery is thirty years in prison." McDonald, 912 So.2d at 77 (citing §§ 812.13(2)(a), 775.082(9)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. (2000)).

2007It determined that under this Court's precedent in Knight v. State, 808 So.2d 210, 212 (Fla.2002), "the PRR statute requires a mandatory life sentence be imposed for any felony punishable by life, including first degree felonies punishable by life." 912 So.2d at 77 .

2007Second, the Fourth District considered McDonald's claim "that he was improperly given mandatory life sentences for his convictions for robbery with a firearm" because, according to Frazier v. State, 877 So.2d 838 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), "under the PRR statute the mandatory sentence for robbery is thirty years in prison." McDonald, 912 So.2d at 77 (citing §§ 812.13(2)(a), 775.082(9)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. (2000)).

1989NOTES [1] Hall also raises the following issues: (1) violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); (2) failure of the judge and jury to consider that Hall was brain damaged; (3) violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 , 105 S.Ct. 2633 , 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985); (4) the aggravating circumstance of heinous, atrocious, or cruel is unconstitutional under Maynard v. Cartwright, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1853 , 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988); (5) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that seven votes were needed to recommend life imprisonment; and (6)

1989NOTES [1] Hall also raises the following issues: (1) violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); (2) failure of the judge and jury to consider that Hall was brain damaged; (3) violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 , 105 S.Ct. 2633 , 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985); (4) the aggravating circumstance of heinous, atrocious, or cruel is unconstitutional under Maynard v. Cartwright, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1853 , 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988); (5) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that seven votes were needed to recommend life imprisonment; and (6)

1989NOTES [1] Hall also raises the following issues: (1) violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); (2) failure of the judge and jury to consider that Hall was brain damaged; (3) violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 , 105 S.Ct. 2633 , 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985); (4) the aggravating circumstance of heinous, atrocious, or cruel is unconstitutional under Maynard v. Cartwright, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1853 , 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988); (5) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that seven votes were needed to recommend life imprisonment; and (6)

1989NOTES [1] Hall also raises the following issues: (1) violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); (2) failure of the judge and jury to consider that Hall was brain damaged; (3) violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 , 105 S.Ct. 2633 , 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985); (4) the aggravating circumstance of heinous, atrocious, or cruel is unconstitutional under Maynard v. Cartwright, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1853 , 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988); (5) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that seven votes were needed to recommend life imprisonment; and (6)

1989NOTES [1] Hall also raises the following issues: (1) violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); (2) failure of the judge and jury to consider that Hall was brain damaged; (3) violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 , 105 S.Ct. 2633 , 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985); (4) the aggravating circumstance of heinous, atrocious, or cruel is unconstitutional under Maynard v. Cartwright, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1853 , 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988); (5) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that seven votes were needed to recommend life imprisonment; and (6)

1989NOTES [1] Hall also raises the following issues: (1) violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); (2) failure of the judge and jury to consider that Hall was brain damaged; (3) violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 , 105 S.Ct. 2633 , 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985); (4) the aggravating circumstance of heinous, atrocious, or cruel is unconstitutional under Maynard v. Cartwright, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1853 , 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988); (5) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that seven votes were needed to recommend life imprisonment; and (6)

1989I agree with Justice McDonald's analysis that on the facts of this case any violation of the rule of Hitchcock v. Dugger, 107 S.Ct. 1821 (1987), was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

1989NOTES [1] Hall also raises the following issues: (1) violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); (2) failure of the judge and jury to consider that Hall was brain damaged; (3) violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 , 105 S.Ct. 2633 , 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985); (4) the aggravating circumstance of heinous, atrocious, or cruel is unconstitutional under Maynard v. Cartwright, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1853 , 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988); (5) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that seven votes were needed to recommend life imprisonment; and (6)

1989NOTES [1] Hall also raises the following issues: (1) violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); (2) failure of the judge and jury to consider that Hall was brain damaged; (3) violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 , 105 S.Ct. 2633 , 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985); (4) the aggravating circumstance of heinous, atrocious, or cruel is unconstitutional under Maynard v. Cartwright, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1853 , 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988); (5) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that seven votes were needed to recommend life imprisonment; and (6)

1983There we were asked to determine the validity of an agency's order which sought, without benefit of a rule, to interpret a statute which imposed licensee discipline "for violation of rather general, morally neutral, and somewhat technical statutory standards...." Id. 393 So.2d at 1181 .

1983There we were asked to determine the validity of an agency's order which sought, without benefit of a rule, to interpret a statute which imposed licensee discipline "for violation of rather general, morally neutral, and somewhat technical statutory standards...." Id. 393 So.2d at 1181 .

1982McDonald adopts the standard of judicial review found in Universal Camera v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 , 71 S.Ct. 456 , 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951), without commenting on the obvious differences between the federal statute [4] and section 120.57(1)(b)9, the statute dealing with the scope of agency review of a hearing examiner's report.

1982McDonald adopts the standard of judicial review found in Universal Camera v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 , 71 S.Ct. 456 , 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951), without commenting on the obvious differences between the federal statute [4] and section 120.57(1)(b)9, the statute dealing with the scope of agency review of a hearing examiner's report.