13 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1955–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Phillips v. CORPORATE EXPRESS PRODUCTS INC.green2 sentences2017Id The court also expressly disapproved what it characterized as the Fifth District’s substitution of “a novel test of changing corporate identity based on changes in corporate culture and mode of operation for well-established principles of commercial transactions.” Id. (citing Phillips v. Corp. Express Office Prods., Inc., 800 So.2d 618, 620 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)). 2003In eschewing reliance on the form of the commercial transaction in favor of a "culture and mode of operation" analysis, see id., the Fifth District has substituted a novel test of changing corporate identity based on changes in corporate culture and mode of operation for well-established principles of commercial transactions. | 1 | 2 |
Coday v. Stategreen1 sentence2023E.g., Diaz v. State, 132 So. 3d 93, 117 (Fla. 2013) (noting that it is established law that mitigating factors be proven by a greater weight of the evidence); Coday v. State, 946 So. 2d 988, 1000-01 (Fla. 2006) (discussing the evolution of this “basic principle”). | 1 | 1 |
Diaz v. Stategreen1 sentence2023E.g., Diaz v. State, 132 So. 3d 93, 117 (Fla. 2013) (noting that it is established law that mitigating factors be proven by a greater weight of the evidence); Coday v. State, 946 So. 2d 988, 1000-01 (Fla. 2006) (discussing the evolution of this “basic principle”). | 1 | 1 |
James Ernest Hitchcock v. State of Floridagreen1 sentence2017Hitchcock, SC17-445, 226 So.3d at 217, 2017 WL 3431500, at *1 (“We have consistently applied our- decision in Asay V, denying the retroactive application of Hurst v. Florida as interpreted in Hurst v. State to defendants whose death sentences were final when the Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002).”) Because Asay has, not presented a novel claim for this Court’s consideration, we deny Asay’s petitions CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Asay’s third successive motion for postconvietion relief an | 1 | 1 |
MELLON UNITED NATIONAL BANK v. Cochrangreen1 sentence2017The First District also noted that its decision was in express and direct disagreement with the decision of the Third District in Mellon United National Bank v. Cochran, 776 So.2d 964, 964 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), in which the Third District held that a trial court can only enter a stay of execution of a money judgment upon the movant’s posting of a bond in the full amount of the judgment plus the applicable statutory interest as required by the applicable rule. | 1 | 1 |
Waller v. DSA Group, Inc.green1 sentence2017In support of this novel principle of law, the First District relied on two prior decisions from the Second District reaching similar conclusions—Platt v. Russek, 921 So.2d 5, 7-8 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), and Waller v. PSA Group, Inc., 606 So.2d 1234, 1235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). | 1 | 1 |
Scharmen v. Stategreen1 sentence2017In support of this novel principle of law, the First District relied on two prior decisions from the Second District reaching similar conclusions—Platt v. Russek, 921 So.2d 5, 7-8 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), and Waller v. PSA Group, Inc., 606 So.2d 1234, 1235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). | 1 | 1 |
Chesser v. Stategreen1 sentence2016See e.g., Chesser v. State, 30 So. 3d 625, 628 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“Opinion evidence of matters perceived by one of the senses . . . [has] usually been admitted. | 1 | 1 |
Gelsthorpe v. Weinsteingreen1 sentence2007See Gelsthorpe, 897 So.2d at 511 (recognizing that "a typical opinion on medical causation" should not be treated as a "new principle, subject to Frye analysis, simply because some other experts disagree with it and because the challenged expert does not rely on any specific authority to support his particular opinion"); Tursi 729 So.2d at 997 (recognizing that an ophthalmologist's opinion on causation was not based on "novel scientific evidence," as "[i]t was no more novel than an orthopedist testifying that a neck injury, which did not manifest itself with symptoms until four years after a r | 1 | 1 |
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Tursigreen1 sentence2007See Gelsthorpe, 897 So.2d at 511 (recognizing that "a typical opinion on medical causation" should not be treated as a "new principle, subject to Frye analysis, simply because some other experts disagree with it and because the challenged expert does not rely on any specific authority to support his particular opinion"); Tursi 729 So.2d at 997 (recognizing that an ophthalmologist's opinion on causation was not based on "novel scientific evidence," as "[i]t was no more novel than an orthopedist testifying that a neck injury, which did not manifest itself with symptoms until four years after a r | 1 | 1 |
Berry v. CSX Transp., Inc.green1 sentence2007See Gelsthorpe, 897 So.2d at 511 (recognizing that "a typical opinion on medical causation" should not be treated as a "new principle, subject to Frye analysis, simply because some other experts disagree with it and because the challenged expert does not rely on any specific authority to support his particular opinion"); Tursi 729 So.2d at 997 (recognizing that an ophthalmologist's opinion on causation was not based on "novel scientific evidence," as "[i]t was no more novel than an orthopedist testifying that a neck injury, which did not manifest itself with symptoms until four years after a r | 1 | 1 |
CHANDRIS, SA v. Yanakakisgreen2 sentences2004The Coopers allege that the contingency fee contract between Kelly and her attorneys violates rule 4.1-5(f) of the Florida Bar's Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides that "a contingency fee agreement shall be in writing" and shall be "signed by the client." The Florida Supreme Court held in Chandris v. Yanakakis, 668 So.2d 180, 185-86 (Fla.1995) "that a contingent fee contract entered into by a member of The Florida Bar must comply with the rule governing contingent fees in order to be enforceable." The Court also stated that "the attorney would still be entitled to the reasonable val 2004The Coopers allege that the contingency fee contract between Kelly and her attorneys violates rule 4.1-5(f) of the Florida Bar's Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides that "a contingency fee agreement shall be in writing" and shall be "signed by the client." The Florida Supreme Court held in Chandris v. Yanakakis, 668 So.2d 180, 185-86 (Fla.1995) "that a contingent fee contract entered into by a member of The Florida Bar must comply with the rule governing contingent fees in order to be enforceable." The Court also stated that "the attorney would still be entitled to the reasonable val | 1 | 1 |
Coppolino v. Stategreen1 sentence1985The same deference to trial court discretion is exemplified by Coppolino v. State, 223 So.2d 68, 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968), appeal dismissed, 234 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 , 90 S.Ct. 2242 , 26 L.Ed.2d 794 (1970), decided before the adoption of the Evidence Code, in which the appellate court affirmed the admission into evidence of a novel test, specifically designed for that case, for the purpose of showing the presence of succinylcholine chloride in the body of the deceased. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ring v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2017Hitchcock, SC17-445, 226 So.3d at 217, 2017 WL 3431500, at *1 (“We have consistently applied our- decision in Asay V, denying the retroactive application of Hurst v. Florida as interpreted in Hurst v. State to defendants whose death sentences were final when the Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002).”) Because Asay has, not presented a novel claim for this Court’s consideration, we deny Asay’s petitions CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Asay’s third successive motion for postconvietion relief an 2017Hitchcock, SC17-445, 226 So.3d at 217, 2017 WL 3431500, at *1 (“We have consistently applied our- decision in Asay V, denying the retroactive application of Hurst v. Florida as interpreted in Hurst v. State to defendants whose death sentences were final when the Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002).”) Because Asay has, not presented a novel claim for this Court’s consideration, we deny Asay’s petitions CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Asay’s third successive motion for postconvietion relief an | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Corporate Exp. Office Products, Inc. v. Phillips
green
1 sentence2017Id The court also expressly disapproved what it characterized as the Fifth District’s substitution of “a novel test of changing corporate identity based on changes in corporate culture and mode of operation for well-established principles of commercial transactions.” Id. (citing Phillips v. Corp. Express Office Prods., Inc., 800 So.2d 618, 620 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
US Sugar Corp. v. Henson
green
2 sentences2005This overly broad application of Frye ignored that under Florida law Frye analysis is concerned with the expert's methodology and reasoning only if it is based on a novel principle or procedure and that the specific "opinion of the testifying expert need not be generally accepted." Henson, 823 So.2d at 110 . 2005This overly broad application of Frye ignored that under Florida law Frye analysis is concerned with the expert's methodology and reasoning only if it is based on a novel principle or procedure and that the specific "opinion of the testifying expert need not be generally accepted." Henson, 823 So.2d at 110 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
People v. Harris
green
2 sentences1988In a novel challenge, appellant does not complain about the jury selection process or the voter registration list from which prospective jurors are drawn, see, e.g., People v. Harris, 36 Cal.3d 36 , 201 Cal. Rptr. 782 , 679 P.2d 433 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 , 105 S.Ct. 365 , 83 L.Ed.2d 301 (1984), but contends rather that moving the case to Bay County resulted in a systematic exclusion of blacks because only eight percent of those eligible for jury duty in Bay County were black compared to twenty-two percent in Jackson County. 1988In a novel challenge, appellant does not complain about the jury selection process or the voter registration list from which prospective jurors are drawn, see, e.g., People v. Harris, 36 Cal.3d 36 , 201 Cal. Rptr. 782 , 679 P.2d 433 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 , 105 S.Ct. 365 , 83 L.Ed.2d 301 (1984), but contends rather that moving the case to Bay County resulted in a systematic exclusion of blacks because only eight percent of those eligible for jury duty in Bay County were black compared to twenty-two percent in Jackson County. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Enright v. Board of School Directors
green
1 sentence1988In a novel challenge, appellant does not complain about the jury selection process or the voter registration list from which prospective jurors are drawn, see, e.g., People v. Harris, 36 Cal.3d 36 , 201 Cal. Rptr. 782 , 679 P.2d 433 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 , 105 S.Ct. 365 , 83 L.Ed.2d 301 (1984), but contends rather that moving the case to Bay County resulted in a systematic exclusion of blacks because only eight percent of those eligible for jury duty in Bay County were black compared to twenty-two percent in Jackson County. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Kennedy v. United States
green
2 sentences1988In a novel challenge, appellant does not complain about the jury selection process or the voter registration list from which prospective jurors are drawn, see, e.g., People v. Harris, 36 Cal.3d 36 , 201 Cal. Rptr. 782 , 679 P.2d 433 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 , 105 S.Ct. 365 , 83 L.Ed.2d 301 (1984), but contends rather that moving the case to Bay County resulted in a systematic exclusion of blacks because only eight percent of those eligible for jury duty in Bay County were black compared to twenty-two percent in Jackson County. 1988In a novel challenge, appellant does not complain about the jury selection process or the voter registration list from which prospective jurors are drawn, see, e.g., People v. Harris, 36 Cal.3d 36 , 201 Cal. Rptr. 782 , 679 P.2d 433 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 , 105 S.Ct. 365 , 83 L.Ed.2d 301 (1984), but contends rather that moving the case to Bay County resulted in a systematic exclusion of blacks because only eight percent of those eligible for jury duty in Bay County were black compared to twenty-two percent in Jackson County. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Pantone v. Demos
green
1 sentence1985Finally, in Pantone v. Demos, 59 Ill. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Drago v. Buonagurio
neutral
1 sentence1985The court noted that "[s]ubjection to civil litigation improperly instituted or maintained through the negligence of a suitor is part of the price citizens pay for a free society... ." The court also opined that recognition of the plaintiff's novel claim would "unduly inhibit the recourse to the courts for the resolution of honest disputes." 439 N.Y.S.2d at 820 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Coppolino v. State
green
1 sentence1985The same deference to trial court discretion is exemplified by Coppolino v. State, 223 So.2d 68, 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968), appeal dismissed, 234 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 , 90 S.Ct. 2242 , 26 L.Ed.2d 794 (1970), decided before the adoption of the Evidence Code, in which the appellate court affirmed the admission into evidence of a novel test, specifically designed for that case, for the purpose of showing the presence of succinylcholine chloride in the body of the deceased. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Bankers Mortgage Co. v. United States
green
1 sentence1985The same deference to trial court discretion is exemplified by Coppolino v. State, 223 So.2d 68, 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968), appeal dismissed, 234 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 , 90 S.Ct. 2242 , 26 L.Ed.2d 794 (1970), decided before the adoption of the Evidence Code, in which the appellate court affirmed the admission into evidence of a novel test, specifically designed for that case, for the purpose of showing the presence of succinylcholine chloride in the body of the deceased. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Messinger v. United States
green
1 sentence1985The same deference to trial court discretion is exemplified by Coppolino v. State, 223 So.2d 68, 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968), appeal dismissed, 234 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 , 90 S.Ct. 2242 , 26 L.Ed.2d 794 (1970), decided before the adoption of the Evidence Code, in which the appellate court affirmed the admission into evidence of a novel test, specifically designed for that case, for the purpose of showing the presence of succinylcholine chloride in the body of the deceased. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Commissioners of Cleveland County v. Bank of Gastonia
neutral
2 sentences1955Bank of Gastonia, 1911, 157 N.C. 191 , 72 S.E. 996 .” As for the contention of appellant that the fund from which payment is to be made is “special” or “limited” because current school operating expenses have a claim against it paramount to debt service, it would be a novel principle indeed if we were to hold that an instrument is not negotiable, although on its face it pledges the maker’s general credit, because some obligee other than the bondholder may exert a prior claim upon the funds of the maker. 1955Bank of Gastonia, 1911, 157 N.C. 191 , 72 S.E. 996 .” As for the contention of appellant that the fund from which payment is to be made is “special” or “limited” because current school operating expenses have a claim against it paramount to debt service, it would be a novel principle indeed if we were to hold that an instrument is not negotiable, although on its face it pledges the maker’s general credit, because some obligee other than the bondholder may exert a prior claim upon the funds of the maker. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.