novel rule in Illinois

2020The Holmes court ultimately found this “effectively anonymous” tip “did not support a finding of reasonable suspicion” and “reverse[d] the trial court’s denial of [defendant’s] motion to suppress.” Holmes, 2019 IL App (1st) 160987, ¶ 18 . ¶ 30 In our view, the Holmes court unnecessarily provided a novel analysis for “effectively anonymous” informant tips that we find flawed and inapplicable to these facts.

2020The Holmes court ultimately found this “effectively anonymous” tip “did not support a finding of reasonable suspicion” and “reverse[d] the trial court’s denial of [defendant’s] motion to suppress.” Holmes, 2019 IL App (1st) 160987, ¶ 18 . ¶ 30 In our view, the Holmes court unnecessarily provided a novel analysis for “effectively anonymous” informant tips that we find flawed and inapplicable to these facts.

2008This novel rule not only runs counter to this court’s long-established principles, as repeatedly reiterated in Mulay v. Mulay, 225 Ill. 2d 601 (2007) (citing the list of cases noted in In re E.H.), People v. Hampton, 225 Ill. 2d 238 (2007), In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172 (2006) (including an extensive list of cases dating back to 1910), and People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476 (2005), but it also reaches this new rule without the benefit of direct argument by the parties, supporting legal precedent, or independent analysis.

2008This novel rule not only runs counter to this court’s long-established principles, as repeatedly reiterated in Mulay v. Mulay, 225 Ill. 2d 601 (2007) (citing the list of cases noted in In re E.H.), People v. Hampton, 225 Ill. 2d 238 (2007), In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172 (2006) (including an extensive list of cases dating back to 1910), and People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476 (2005), but it also reaches this new rule without the benefit of direct argument by the parties, supporting legal precedent, or independent analysis.

2008This novel rule not only runs counter to this court’s long-established principles, as repeatedly reiterated in Mulay v. Mulay, 225 Ill. 2d 601 (2007) (citing the list of cases noted in In re E.H.), People v. Hampton, 225 Ill. 2d 238 (2007), In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172 (2006) (including an extensive list of cases dating back to 1910), and People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476 (2005), but it also reaches this new rule without the benefit of direct argument by the parties, supporting legal precedent, or independent analysis.

2008This novel rule not only runs counter to this court’s long-established principles, as repeatedly reiterated in Mulay v. Mulay, 225 Ill. 2d 601 (2007) (citing the list of cases noted in In re E.H.), People v. Hampton, 225 Ill. 2d 238 (2007), In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172 (2006) (including an extensive list of cases dating back to 1910), and People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476 (2005), but it also reaches this new rule without the benefit of direct argument by the parties, supporting legal precedent, or independent analysis.

2008This novel rule not only runs counter to this court’s long-established principles, as repeatedly reiterated in Mulay v. Mulay, 225 Ill. 2d 601 (2007) (citing the list of cases noted in In re E.H.), People v. Hampton, 225 Ill. 2d 238 (2007), In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172 (2006) (including an extensive list of cases dating back to 1910), and People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476 (2005), but it also reaches this new rule without the benefit of direct argument by the parties, supporting legal precedent, or independent analysis.

2008This novel rule not only runs counter to this court’s long-established principles, as repeatedly reiterated in Mulay v. Mulay, 225 Ill. 2d 601 (2007) (citing the list of cases noted in In re E.H.), People v. Hampton, 225 Ill. 2d 238 (2007), In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172 (2006) (including an extensive list of cases dating back to 1910), and People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476 (2005), but it also reaches this new rule without the benefit of direct argument by the parties, supporting legal precedent, or independent analysis.

2008This novel rule not only runs counter to this court’s long-established principles, as repeatedly reiterated in Mulay v. Mulay, 225 Ill. 2d 601 (2007) (citing the list of cases noted in In re E.H.), People v. Hampton, 225 Ill. 2d 238 (2007), In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172 (2006) (including an extensive list of cases dating back to 1910), and People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476 (2005), but it also reaches this new rule without the benefit of direct argument by the parties, supporting legal precedent, or independent analysis.

2008This novel rule not only runs counter to this court’s long-established principles, as repeatedly reiterated in Mulay v. Mulay, 225 Ill. 2d 601 (2007) (citing the list of cases noted in In re E.H.), People v. Hampton, 225 Ill. 2d 238 (2007), In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172 (2006) (including an extensive list of cases dating back to 1910), and People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476 (2005), but it also reaches this new rule without the benefit of direct argument by the parties, supporting legal precedent, or independent analysis.

2024Davis, 156 Ill. 2d at 164 .

2022Dorsey held “Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule under the - 14 - eighth amendment does not provide cause for a defendant to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause” in a successive postconviction petition because “Illinois courts have long recognized the differences between persons of mature age and those who are minors for purposes of sentencing.” Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74 .

2022I, § 11) and negotiated guilty pleas, respectively. ¶ 36 Pursuant to Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 73 , Daniels’s proportionate penalties clause argument would not have been a novel claim that did not exist when defendant agreed to a natural life sentence.

2008This novel rule not only runs counter to this court's long-established principles, as repeatedly reiterated in Mulay v. Mulay, 225 Ill.2d 601 , 312 Ill.Dec. 263 , 870 N.E.2d 328 (2007) (citing the list of cases noted in In re E.H. ), People v. Hampton, 225 Ill.2d 238 , 310 Ill.Dec. 906 , 867 N.E.2d 957 (2007), In re E.H., 224 Ill.2d 172 , 309 Ill.Dec. 1 , 863 N.E.2d 231 (2006) (including an extensive list of cases dating back to 1910), and People v. Lee, 214 Ill.2d 476 , 293 Ill.Dec. 267 , 828 N.E.2d 237 (2005), but it also reaches this new rule without the benefit of direct argument by the pa

1976(Department of Mental Health v. Warmbir (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 267 , 226 N.E.2d 4 .) As the supreme court stated in Warmbir: “The marriage relation entails many obligations, statutory as well as natural ones, and it would be a novel doctrine indeed that would relieve a spouse from such duties simply because unasserted grounds exists for divorce. 000 # e e The statute in question obligates a person to pay something toward the cost of caring for his or her spouse in a State mental hospital.

1976(Department of Mental Health v. Warmbir (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 267 , 226 N.E.2d 4 .) As the supreme court stated in Warmbir: “The marriage relation entails many obligations, statutory as well as natural ones, and it would be a novel doctrine indeed that would relieve a spouse from such duties simply because unasserted grounds exists for divorce. 000 # e e The statute in question obligates a person to pay something toward the cost of caring for his or her spouse in a State mental hospital.

1970Burgett v. Texas, 389 US 109 (1967); Luck v. United States, 348 F2d 763 (DC Cir 1965); Gordon v. United States, 383 F2d 938 (DC Cir 1967); Evans v. United States, 397 F2d 675 (DC Cir 1968); United States v. Palumbo, 401 F2d 270 (Second Cir 1968); United States v. Hildreth, 387 F2d 328 (4th Cir 1967); United States v. Sternback, 402 F2d 353 (7th Cir 1968).

1969However, as early as Brooks v. People, 88 Ill. 327, 330 , this court held that where an original indictment is dismissed and defendant is re-indicted for the same offense the statutory period continues to run “as if there had been no dismissal of the first indictment”, or as if the indictment under which defendant is tried had been the first indictment returned.