novel claim in California

2014To find otherwise would require adopting the novel presumption that where Congress provides no remedy under federal law, [traditional] state law [principles] may not afford one in its stead.’ (Wigod, supra, 673 F.3d at p. 581 .)” (Bushell, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 928, fn. 9 ; accord, West, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 788 [Fourth Dist., Div. Three] [noting the Wigod court concluded “HAMP does not preempt or otherwise displace state law causes of action”]; Sutcliffe v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

2014To find otherwise would require adopting the novel presumption that where Congress provides no remedy under federal law, [traditional] state law [principles] may not afford one in its stead.’ (Wigod, supra, 673 F.3d at p. 581 .)” (Bushell, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 928, fn. 9 ; accord, West, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 788 [Fourth Dist., Div. Three] [noting the Wigod court concluded “HAMP does not preempt or otherwise displace state law causes of action”]; Sutcliffe v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

2013Our Supreme Court has explained the "reference [in People v. Buffum, supra, 40 Cal.2d 709, 718 ] to an 'appreciable fragment of the crime' is simply a restatement of the requirement of an overt act directed towards immediate consummation; it does not establish the novel requirement that an actual element of the offense be proved in every case." (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 454 (Dillon).) The fact that A.L. was never within striking distance of Jane, did not actually remove the knife, make an overt threat or deliver his letters is of no moment.

2002The Supreme Court held that the admission of the evidence was nonprejudicial error, but that “in view of the novelty of the proposed evidence and the advantages a[n Evidence Code] section 402 hearing affords for providing the parties an opportunity to make a full record on the issue ... it might have been preferable for the court to have proceeded with such a preliminary hearing out of the jury’s presence . . . .” (Ibid.; see also McCleery v. City of Bakersfield (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 1059 , 1074-1075 & fns. 11 & 12 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 852 ].) Accordingly, we can see a benefit, and no prejudice, in

2002The Supreme Court held that the admission of the evidence was nonprejudicial error, but that “in view of the novelty of the proposed evidence and the advantages a[n Evidence Code] section 402 hearing affords for providing the parties an opportunity to make a full record on the issue ... it might have been preferable for the court to have proceeded with such a preliminary hearing out of the jury’s presence . . . .” (Ibid.; see also McCleery v. City of Bakersfield (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 1059 , 1074-1075 & fns. 11 & 12 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 852 ].) Accordingly, we can see a benefit, and no prejudice, in

1999The period is tolled during the times, inter alia, (i) the client ‘has not sustained actual injury,’ (ii) the negligent attorney continues to represent the client, (iii) the attorney willfully conceals facts constituting the negligence, or (iv) the plaintiff is under a disability that ‘restricts the plaintiff’s ability to commence legal action.’ ” (Laird v. Blacker (1992) 2 Cal.4th 606, 609 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 550 , 828 P.2d 691 ], italics added.) Appellant has cited no authority for the novel claim that a third party (i.e., a nonclient) may invoke Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 to toll the

1999The period is tolled during the times, inter alia, (i) the client ‘has not sustained actual injury,’ (ii) the negligent attorney continues to represent the client, (iii) the attorney willfully conceals facts constituting the negligence, or (iv) the plaintiff is under a disability that ‘restricts the plaintiff’s ability to commence legal action.’ ” (Laird v. Blacker (1992) 2 Cal.4th 606, 609 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 550 , 828 P.2d 691 ], italics added.) Appellant has cited no authority for the novel claim that a third party (i.e., a nonclient) may invoke Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 to toll the

1995(Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 225, 234 [ 282 P.2d 69 ]; Puckett v. Sullivan (1961) 190 Cal.App.2d 489, 496 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 55 , 87 A.L.R.2d 704 ]; Cummings v. Kendall (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 549, 558-559 [ 107 P.2d 282 ].) When the trial court concluded that plaintiff was required to prove that defendants’ conduct was a greater than 50 percent factor in causing his brain damage it confused the issue of damage apportionment, which was not plaintiffs’ burden, with the requirement which plaintiff did successfully satisfy, which was to provide evidence that defendants’ negl

1995(Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 225, 234 [ 282 P.2d 69 ]; Puckett v. Sullivan (1961) 190 Cal.App.2d 489, 496 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 55 , 87 A.L.R.2d 704 ]; Cummings v. Kendall (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 549, 558-559 [ 107 P.2d 282 ].) When the trial court concluded that plaintiff was required to prove that defendants’ conduct was a greater than 50 percent factor in causing his brain damage it confused the issue of damage apportionment, which was not plaintiffs’ burden, with the requirement which plaintiff did successfully satisfy, which was to provide evidence that defendants’ negl

1995(Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 225, 234 [ 282 P.2d 69 ]; Puckett v. Sullivan (1961) 190 Cal.App.2d 489, 496 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 55 , 87 A.L.R.2d 704 ]; Cummings v. Kendall (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 549, 558-559 [ 107 P.2d 282 ].) When the trial court concluded that plaintiff was required to prove that defendants’ conduct was a greater than 50 percent factor in causing his brain damage it confused the issue of damage apportionment, which was not plaintiffs’ burden, with the requirement which plaintiff did successfully satisfy, which was to provide evidence that defendants’ negl

1995(Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 225, 234 [ 282 P.2d 69 ]; Puckett v. Sullivan (1961) 190 Cal.App.2d 489, 496 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 55 , 87 A.L.R.2d 704 ]; Cummings v. Kendall (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 549, 558-559 [ 107 P.2d 282 ].) When the trial court concluded that plaintiff was required to prove that defendants’ conduct was a greater than 50 percent factor in causing his brain damage it confused the issue of damage apportionment, which was not plaintiffs’ burden, with the requirement which plaintiff did successfully satisfy, which was to provide evidence that defendants’ negl

1995Co. (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 444, 450 [ 118 P.2d 328 ].) This is not a novel principle of law but rather is one which is well established.

1995Co. (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 444, 450 [ 118 P.2d 328 ].) This is not a novel principle of law but rather is one which is well established.

1995(Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 225, 234 [ 282 P.2d 69 ]; Puckett v. Sullivan (1961) 190 Cal.App.2d 489, 496 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 55 , 87 A.L.R.2d 704 ]; Cummings v. Kendall (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 549, 558-559 [ 107 P.2d 282 ].) When the trial court concluded that plaintiff was required to prove that defendants’ conduct was a greater than 50 percent factor in causing his brain damage it confused the issue of damage apportionment, which was not plaintiffs’ burden, with the requirement which plaintiff did successfully satisfy, which was to provide evidence that defendants’ negl

1995(Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 225, 234 [ 282 P.2d 69 ]; Puckett v. Sullivan (1961) 190 Cal.App.2d 489, 496 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 55 , 87 A.L.R.2d 704 ]; Cummings v. Kendall (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 549, 558-559 [ 107 P.2d 282 ].) When the trial court concluded that plaintiff was required to prove that defendants’ conduct was a greater than 50 percent factor in causing his brain damage it confused the issue of damage apportionment, which was not plaintiffs’ burden, with the requirement which plaintiff did successfully satisfy, which was to provide evidence that defendants’ negl

1994First, to the extent the argument rests upon the asserted unfairness of requiring a consumer to be bound by an arbitration clause thrust upon the consumer in a contract of adhesion, the appropriate remedy would appear to be a direct challenge to the validity of the arbitration proceeding itself (see, e.g., Patterson v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp. (1993) 14 Cal. App.4th 1659, 1663-1667 [ 18 Cal. Rptr.2d 563 ]), rather than the adoption of a novel rule that would subject a witness, who happens to be called upon to participate in such a proceeding, to potential tort liability.

1994First, to the extent the argument rests upon the asserted unfairness of requiring a consumer to be bound by an arbitration clause thrust upon the consumer in a contract of adhesion, the appropriate remedy would appear to be a direct challenge to the validity of the arbitration proceeding itself (see, e.g., Patterson v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp. (1993) 14 Cal. App.4th 1659, 1663-1667 [ 18 Cal. Rptr.2d 563 ]), rather than the adoption of a novel rule that would subject a witness, who happens to be called upon to participate in such a proceeding, to potential tort liability.

1991(See Poverty Resistance Center v. Hart (1989) 213 Cal. App.3d 295, 302-304 [ 261 Cal. Rptr. 545 ].) The novel principle relied upon by the majority invites counties to define their general assistance responsibilities as they see fit and in this manner avoid a legislative mandate they may find unpalatable.

1991(See Poverty Resistance Center v. Hart (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 295, 302-304 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 545 ].) The novel principle relied upon by the majority invites counties to define their general assistance responsibilities as they see fit and in this manner avoid a legislative mandate they may find unpalatable.

1990The federal age discrimination act provides no exception for national banks (or any other form of federally chartered financial institution) and since it was enacted long after the National Bank Act it may well be that under “familiar statutory interpretation, when there is such a conflict, the most recent and more specific congressional pronouncement will prevail over a prior, more generalized statute.” (National Resources Defense Council v. U.S.E.RA. (1st Cir. 1987) 824 F.2d 1258 , 1278; see also Morton v. Mancari (1974) 417 U.S. 535, 550 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 290, 300 , 94 S.Ct. 2474 ]; Woodard v. S

1990The federal age discrimination act provides no exception for national banks (or any other form of federally chartered financial institution) and since it was enacted long after the National Bank Act it may well be that under “familiar statutory interpretation, when there is such a conflict, the most recent and more specific congressional pronouncement will prevail over a prior, more generalized statute.” (National Resources Defense Council v. U.S.E.RA. (1st Cir. 1987) 824 F.2d 1258 , 1278; see also Morton v. Mancari (1974) 417 U.S. 535, 550 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 290, 300 , 94 S.Ct. 2474 ]; Woodard v. S

1990The federal age discrimination act provides no exception for national banks (or any other form of federally chartered financial institution) and since it was enacted long after the National Bank Act it may well be that under “familiar statutory interpretation, when there is such a conflict, the most recent and more specific congressional pronouncement will prevail over a prior, more generalized statute.” (National Resources Defense Council v. U.S.E.RA. (1st Cir. 1987) 824 F.2d 1258 , 1278; see also Morton v. Mancari (1974) 417 U.S. 535, 550 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 290, 300 , 94 S.Ct. 2474 ]; Woodard v. S

1990The federal age discrimination act provides no exception for national banks (or any other form of federally chartered financial institution) and since it was enacted long after the National Bank Act it may well be that under “familiar statutory interpretation, when there is such a conflict, the most recent and more specific congressional pronouncement will prevail over a prior, more generalized statute.” (National Resources Defense Council v. U.S.E.RA. (1st Cir. 1987) 824 F.2d 1258 , 1278; see also Morton v. Mancari (1974) 417 U.S. 535, 550 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 290, 300 , 94 S.Ct. 2474 ]; Woodard v. S

1989Their argument fails under the second prong of their test because, according to the very cases on which plaintiff interveners rely, the interests at issue here would be deemed "public" rights properly adjudicable by an administrative agency without a jury. (10) (See fn. 54.) The "public" versus "private" rights distinction is drawn not from California jurisprudence, but from the federal cases addressing similar issues under, inter alia, the Seventh Amendment of the federal Constitution. [54] That provision states: "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty doll

1989Their argument fails under the second prong of their test because, according to the very cases on which plaintiff interveners rely, the interests at issue here would be deemed "public" rights properly adjudicable by an administrative agency without a jury. (10) (See fn. 54.) The "public" versus "private" rights distinction is drawn not from California jurisprudence, but from the federal cases addressing similar issues under, inter alia, the Seventh Amendment of the federal Constitution. [54] That provision states: "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty doll