Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
13 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1964–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Schussel v. Ladd Hairdressers, Inc.green2 sentences2005That holding was, at least in part, premised on Schussel v. Ladd Hairdressers, Inc., 736 So.2d 776, 778 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), which construed the provisions of section 768.79 and rule 1.442 to be punitive in nature and, therefore, subject to strict construction. 2002Grip, 788 So.2d at 265 (citing Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So.2d 1036, 1040 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)); see also Schussel, 736 So.2d at 778 (stating that the provisions of section 768.79 and rule 1.442 are punitive and must be strictly construed). | 2 | 2 |
Millar Elevator Service Co. v. McGowangreen1 sentence2023Co. v. McGowan, 819 So. 2d 145, 153 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (observing in the context of a jury trial that the preservation requirement “also promotes judicial economy and prevents ‘a party from rolling the dice with the jury, confident that an unvoiced objection will garner a new trial if the verdict is unfavorable’” (quoting Lowe Inv. | 1 | 1 |
Goodman v. Goodmangreen1 sentence2022See Goodman v. Joffe, 57 So. 3d 1001, 1002 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (“Our holding should not be read to mean that a party may ignore the time requirements imposed by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540, or that we countenance the practice of filing a motion and then allowing it to languish. | 1 | 1 |
Sterling Factors v. US Bank Nat. Ass'ngreen1 sentence2019See Sterling Factors Corp. v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 968 So. 2d 658, 665 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (stating that a voidable judgment “cannot be challenged at any time as void under rule 1.540(b)(4).”). | 1 | 1 |
Hilbert v. Stategreen1 sentence2010P. 3.850(b); Martell v. State, 676 So.2d 1030 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (stating that Rule 3.800 cannot be used to circumvent the strict time requirements of rule 3.850; fact-based challenges that sentences were unlawful must be raised on direct appeal or in rule 3.850 motion and not by way of rule 3.800); Hilbert v. State, 661 So.2d 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (“A motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to rule 3.800 challenging the validity of conviction and not the legality of sentence must be properly treated as a motion pursuant to rule 3.850 and not rule 3.800.”). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen1 sentence2005Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c) allows a court to modify a sentence "within 60 days after the imposition, or within 60 days after receipt ... of a mandate issued by the appellate court." In this case, the circuit court misapprehended the time requirements of rule 3.800(c) and failed to account for the "second opportunity for mitigation during the sixty days after issuance of the mandate that concluded [the] direct appeal." Smith v. State, 895 So.2d 488, 489 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). | 1 | 1 |
Schmidt v. Fortnergreen1 sentence2002Grip, 788 So.2d at 265 (citing Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So.2d 1036, 1040 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)); see also Schussel, 736 So.2d at 778 (stating that the provisions of section 768.79 and rule 1.442 are punitive and must be strictly construed). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Salzerogreen1 sentence2000See, e.g., State v. Salzero, 714 So.2d 445, 447 (Fla.1998) (finding that "strict adherence to [the time requirements of a rule of criminal procedure] would not comport with the clear intent of this section as evident from the committee notes to the 1984 amendment of the rule"). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Martell v. State
green
1 sentence2010P. 3.850(b); Martell v. State, 676 So.2d 1030 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (stating that Rule 3.800 cannot be used to circumvent the strict time requirements of rule 3.850; fact-based challenges that sentences were unlawful must be raised on direct appeal or in rule 3.850 motion and not by way of rule 3.800); Hilbert v. State, 661 So.2d 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (“A motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to rule 3.800 challenging the validity of conviction and not the legality of sentence must be properly treated as a motion pursuant to rule 3.850 and not rule 3.800.”). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Bottcher v. Walsh
green
1 sentence2005It is undisputed that Mills's proposal for settlement was timely served, but prematurely filed with the court, some two years prior to trial. [3] We recognize that Bottcher v. Walsh, 834 So.2d 183 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), holds that because the time requirements of rule 1.442 are to be strictly construed, a prematurely filed offer is void. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Grip Development, Inc. v. Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate, Inc.
green
1 sentence2002Grip, 788 So.2d at 265 (citing Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So.2d 1036, 1040 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)); see also Schussel, 736 So.2d at 778 (stating that the provisions of section 768.79 and rule 1.442 are punitive and must be strictly construed). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
In Re Amendment to Fla. Rules of Crim.
green
1 sentence1999Id. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
In Re Amendment to Rules of Crim. Proced.
green
1 sentence1998P.—Capital Post conviction Public Records Production, 700 So.2d 680 (Fla.1997), we granted that request, tolling the time requirements required by rule 3.852 through January 15, 1998, for the defendants listed in that order. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
In Re Family Law Rules of Procedure
green
1 sentence1995Accordingly, we reaffirm our adoption, effective January 1, 1996, of the amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure (attached to this opinion as appendix A) and the new Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure (attached to this opinion as appendix B), as provided in In re Family Law Rules of Procedure, 663 So.2d 1047 (Fla. 1995), and as modified herein. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Carter v. State
green
1 sentence1988We find several instances in which the appellate courts of this state have refused to give legal significance to a defendant's pro se speedy trial demand under Rule 3.191, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, thereby implicating the time requirements of that rule, when the defendant was otherwise represented by counsel. [1] See, Beverly v. State, 516 So.2d 30 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Carter v. State, 509 So.2d 1126 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); and Dickey v. McNeal, 445 So.2d 692 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Beverly v. State
green
1 sentence1988We find several instances in which the appellate courts of this state have refused to give legal significance to a defendant's pro se speedy trial demand under Rule 3.191, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, thereby implicating the time requirements of that rule, when the defendant was otherwise represented by counsel. [1] See, Beverly v. State, 516 So.2d 30 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Carter v. State, 509 So.2d 1126 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); and Dickey v. McNeal, 445 So.2d 692 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Dickey v. McNeal
green
1 sentence1988We find several instances in which the appellate courts of this state have refused to give legal significance to a defendant's pro se speedy trial demand under Rule 3.191, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, thereby implicating the time requirements of that rule, when the defendant was otherwise represented by counsel. [1] See, Beverly v. State, 516 So.2d 30 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Carter v. State, 509 So.2d 1126 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); and Dickey v. McNeal, 445 So.2d 692 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Black v. Blue Ribbon Laundry
green
1 sentence1964The statement is made: “The 90-day provision is mandatory in the sense that once that period has run, absent application upon good cause shown for extension, the cause must be determined by the deputy on the evidence which has been submitted.” Even though the 90-day period has lapsed without such application, extensions may be granted if the time requirements of the rule are waived either expressly or by “a state of facts upon which the determination of the presence of a waiver could be made.” Black v. Blue Ribbon Laundry, Fla., 161 So.2d 532 , opinion (Thornal, J.) ; Heath v. Thomas Lbr. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Heath v. Thomas Lumber Co.
neutral
1 sentence1964Co., Fla. 1962, 140 So.2d 865, 866 . | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.