firm rule in Georgia

2025See Darroch v. Willis, 286 Ga. 566, 570 (3) ( 690 SE2d 410 ) (2010) (reversing trial court’s contempt order because although it could “be seen as creative and reasonable[,]” it violated “the firm rule we 9 have established against modifying the property division provisions of a final divorce decree”); Smith v. Smith, 281 Ga. 204, 206-207 (2) ( 636 SE2d 519 ) (2006) (reversing trial court’s contempt order when court “nullified” wife’s stock awards and supplemental alimony, altered payments of the wife’s shares in husband’s IRA, and significantly reduced wife’s attorney fee award); Stone v. Ston

2025See Darroch v. Willis, 286 Ga. 566, 570 (3) ( 690 SE2d 410 ) (2010) (reversing trial court’s contempt order because although it could “be seen as creative and reasonable[,]” it violated “the firm rule we 9 have established against modifying the property division provisions of a final divorce decree”); Smith v. Smith, 281 Ga. 204, 206-207 (2) ( 636 SE2d 519 ) (2006) (reversing trial court’s contempt order when court “nullified” wife’s stock awards and supplemental alimony, altered payments of the wife’s shares in husband’s IRA, and significantly reduced wife’s attorney fee award); Stone v. Ston

2017See, e.g., Jenkins v. Walker, 287 Ga. 783, 785 ( 700 SE2d 362 ) (2010) (petitioner cannot use mandamus or declaratory judgment to relitigate and overturn a prior judgment); Burgess v. Burgess, 210 Ga. 380, 382-383 (2) ( 80 SE2d 280 ) (1954) (declaratory relief unavailable to petitioner seeking to challenge and set aside divorce decree).

2017See, e.g., Jenkins v. Walker, 287 Ga. 783, 785 ( 700 SE2d 362 ) (2010) (petitioner cannot use mandamus or declaratory judgment to relitigate and overturn a prior judgment); Burgess v. Burgess, 210 Ga. 380, 382-383 (2) ( 80 SE2d 280 ) (1954) (declaratory relief unavailable to petitioner seeking to challenge and set aside divorce decree).

2017See, e.g., Jenkins v. Walker, 287 Ga. 783, 785 ( 700 SE2d 362 ) (2010) (petitioner cannot use mandamus or declaratory judgment to relitigate and overturn a prior judgment); Burgess v. Burgess, 210 Ga. 380, 382-383 (2) ( 80 SE2d 280 ) (1954) (declaratory relief unavailable to petitioner seeking to challenge and set aside divorce decree).

2017See, e.g., Jenkins v. Walker, 287 Ga. 783, 785 ( 700 SE2d 362 ) (2010) (petitioner cannot use mandamus or declaratory judgment to relitigate and overturn a prior judgment); Burgess v. Burgess, 210 Ga. 380, 382-383 (2) ( 80 SE2d 280 ) (1954) (declaratory relief unavailable to petitioner seeking to challenge and set aside divorce decree).

2025See Darroch v. Willis, 286 Ga. 566, 570 (3) ( 690 SE2d 410 ) (2010) (reversing trial court’s contempt order because although it could “be seen as creative and reasonable[,]” it violated “the firm rule we 9 have established against modifying the property division provisions of a final divorce decree”); Smith v. Smith, 281 Ga. 204, 206-207 (2) ( 636 SE2d 519 ) (2006) (reversing trial court’s contempt order when court “nullified” wife’s stock awards and supplemental alimony, altered payments of the wife’s shares in husband’s IRA, and significantly reduced wife’s attorney fee award); Stone v. Ston

2025See Darroch v. Willis, 286 Ga. 566, 570 (3) ( 690 SE2d 410 ) (2010) (reversing trial court’s contempt order because although it could “be seen as creative and reasonable[,]” it violated “the firm rule we 9 have established against modifying the property division provisions of a final divorce decree”); Smith v. Smith, 281 Ga. 204, 206-207 (2) ( 636 SE2d 519 ) (2006) (reversing trial court’s contempt order when court “nullified” wife’s stock awards and supplemental alimony, altered payments of the wife’s shares in husband’s IRA, and significantly reduced wife’s attorney fee award); Stone v. Ston

2023If it was in essence the same asset, the court did not improperly modify the terms of the decree, but merely construed the relevant provision to determine the intent of the decree.” (punctuation omitted)). 8 improperly modify the terms of the agreement, but merely construed the relevant provision to determine the intent of the parties when they entered into the original [decree].”8 But conversely, if the court used the proceeding to “substantially alter the final decree, it amounted to an unauthorized modification.”9 Indeed, our Supreme Court has acknowledged “the firm rule we have established

2023If it was in essence the same asset, the court did not improperly modify the terms of the decree, but merely construed the relevant provision to determine the intent of the decree.” (punctuation omitted)). 8 improperly modify the terms of the agreement, but merely construed the relevant provision to determine the intent of the parties when they entered into the original [decree].”8 But conversely, if the court used the proceeding to “substantially alter the final decree, it amounted to an unauthorized modification.”9 Indeed, our Supreme Court has acknowledged “the firm rule we have established

2023If it was in essence the same asset, the court did not improperly modify the terms of the decree, but merely construed the relevant provision to determine the intent of the decree.” (punctuation omitted)). 8 improperly modify the terms of the agreement, but merely construed the relevant provision to determine the intent of the parties when they entered into the original [decree].”8 But conversely, if the court used the proceeding to “substantially alter the final decree, it amounted to an unauthorized modification.”9 Indeed, our Supreme Court has acknowledged “the firm rule we have established

2023If it was in essence the same asset, the court did not improperly modify the terms of the decree, but merely construed the relevant provision to determine the intent of the decree.” (punctuation omitted)). 8 improperly modify the terms of the agreement, but merely construed the relevant provision to determine the intent of the parties when they entered into the original [decree].”8 But conversely, if the court used the proceeding to “substantially alter the final decree, it amounted to an unauthorized modification.”9 Indeed, our Supreme Court has acknowledged “the firm rule we have established

2023If it was in essence the same asset, the court did not improperly modify the terms of the decree, but merely construed the relevant provision to determine the intent of the decree.” (punctuation omitted)). 8 improperly modify the terms of the agreement, but merely construed the relevant provision to determine the intent of the parties when they entered into the original [decree].”8 But conversely, if the court used the proceeding to “substantially alter the final decree, it amounted to an unauthorized modification.”9 Indeed, our Supreme Court has acknowledged “the firm rule we have established

2023If it was in essence the same asset, the court did not improperly modify the terms of the decree, but merely construed the relevant provision to determine the intent of the decree.” (punctuation omitted)). 8 improperly modify the terms of the agreement, but merely construed the relevant provision to determine the intent of the parties when they entered into the original [decree].”8 But conversely, if the court used the proceeding to “substantially alter the final decree, it amounted to an unauthorized modification.”9 Indeed, our Supreme Court has acknowledged “the firm rule we have established

2023If it was in essence the same asset, the court did not improperly modify the terms of the decree, but merely construed the relevant provision to determine the intent of the decree.” (punctuation omitted)). 8 improperly modify the terms of the agreement, but merely construed the relevant provision to determine the intent of the parties when they entered into the original [decree].”8 But conversely, if the court used the proceeding to “substantially alter the final decree, it amounted to an unauthorized modification.”9 Indeed, our Supreme Court has acknowledged “the firm rule we have established

2023If it was in essence the same asset, the court did not improperly modify the terms of the decree, but merely construed the relevant provision to determine the intent of the decree.” (punctuation omitted)). 8 improperly modify the terms of the agreement, but merely construed the relevant provision to determine the intent of the parties when they entered into the original [decree].”8 But conversely, if the court used the proceeding to “substantially alter the final decree, it amounted to an unauthorized modification.”9 Indeed, our Supreme Court has acknowledged “the firm rule we have established

2022Compare Wallace, 279 Ga. at 745-746 (1) (holding that a purchase agreement and subsequent escrow agreement did not merge because the purchase agreement included an obligation that the escrow agreement did not; the escrow agreement did not, however, contain a merger clause); Atlanta Integrity Mtg., 286 Ga. App. at 799 (“Because the contracts at issue did not involve the same parties or subject matter, and because the merger clause by its express terms did not supersede any prior agreements or contracts between [the parties], the trial court erred [by] holding that the [contracts] merged. . . .”

2022Compare Wallace, 279 Ga. at 745-746 (1) (holding that a purchase agreement and subsequent escrow agreement did not merge because the purchase agreement included an obligation that the escrow agreement did not; the escrow agreement did not, however, contain a merger clause); Atlanta Integrity Mtg., 286 Ga. App. at 799 (“Because the contracts at issue did not involve the same parties or subject matter, and because the merger clause by its express terms did not supersede any prior agreements or contracts between [the parties], the trial court erred [by] holding that the [contracts] merged. . . .”

2017See USCR 21.4; see also Long, 258 Ga. at 410-411 (allowing non-party to appeal denial of access under Rule 21); Barham v. City of Atlanta, 292 Ga. 375, 376 (1) ( 738 SE2d 52 ) (2013) (where a judgment is entered against a non-party, that non-party becomes a party with standing to appeal). (c) Rule 21 provides an adequate legal remedy. 10 Given that Rule 21 provides non-party members of the public with the right of access to court records, including in criminal cases, we conclude that the Rule 21 procedures constitute an adequate legal remedy that bars the Firm’s claim for mandamus relief.

2017See USCR 21.4; see also Long, 258 Ga. at 410-411 (allowing non-party to appeal denial of access under Rule 21); Barham v. City of Atlanta, 292 Ga. 375, 376 (1) ( 738 SE2d 52 ) (2013) (where a judgment is entered against a non-party, that non-party becomes a party with standing to appeal). (c) Rule 21 provides an adequate legal remedy. 10 Given that Rule 21 provides non-party members of the public with the right of access to court records, including in criminal cases, we conclude that the Rule 21 procedures constitute an adequate legal remedy that bars the Firm’s claim for mandamus relief.

2017See USCR 21.4; see also Long, 258 Ga. at 410-411 (allowing non-party to appeal denial of access under Rule 21); Barham v. City of Atlanta, 292 Ga. 375, 376 (1) ( 738 SE2d 52 ) (2013) (where a judgment is entered against a non-party, that non-party becomes a party with standing to appeal). (c) Rule 21 provides an adequate legal remedy. 10 Given that Rule 21 provides non-party members of the public with the right of access to court records, including in criminal cases, we conclude that the Rule 21 procedures constitute an adequate legal remedy that bars the Firm’s claim for mandamus relief.

2012“Although the contempt order may seem reasonable, it violates the firm rule we have established against modifying the property division provisions of a final divorce decree.” Doane v. LeCornu, 289 Ga. 379, 381 (1) ( 711 SE2d 673 ) (2011) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2012“Although the contempt order may seem reasonable, it violates the firm rule we have established against modifying the property division provisions of a final divorce decree.” Doane v. LeCornu, 289 Ga. 379, 381 (1) ( 711 SE2d 673 ) (2011) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2006The evidence established that Charlie entered the trailer that night on several occasions without Tracy’s permission, after he had been drinking and after having been ordered from the trailer both by Tracy and by police. “[Ojnce the victim .. . withdraw(s) the defendant’s authority to enter her house, the fact that the defendant may have once lived at the victim’s house and had left personal property within the house does not, in itself, give the defendant subsequent authority to enter.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Williams v. State, 268 Ga. App. 384, 386-387 (1) (b) ( 601 SE2d 833 ) (

2006The evidence established that Charlie entered the trailer that night on several occasions without Tracy’s permission, after he had been drinking and after having been ordered from the trailer both by Tracy and by police. “[Ojnce the victim .. . withdraw(s) the defendant’s authority to enter her house, the fact that the defendant may have once lived at the victim’s house and had left personal property within the house does not, in itself, give the defendant subsequent authority to enter.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Williams v. State, 268 Ga. App. 384, 386-387 (1) (b) ( 601 SE2d 833 ) (

1979The propounder thereby made out a prima facie case, which the caveator failed to rebut. "' It is a firm rule that "while undue influence may be proved by circumstances, merely to show an opportunity to exert it by one who occupies a confidential relation to the alleged testator, and who receives a substantial benefit under the instrument sought to be propounded, is not sufficient to prove it.” [Cit.]’ ” Waldrep v. Goodwin, 227 Ga. 560, 562 ( 181 SE2d 837 ) (1971). "[T]he choice of one near relative rather than others as the favored beneficiary of the will, standing alone as an isolated fact, i

1979The propounder thereby made out a prima facie case, which the caveator failed to rebut. "' It is a firm rule that "while undue influence may be proved by circumstances, merely to show an opportunity to exert it by one who occupies a confidential relation to the alleged testator, and who receives a substantial benefit under the instrument sought to be propounded, is not sufficient to prove it.” [Cit.]’ ” Waldrep v. Goodwin, 227 Ga. 560, 562 ( 181 SE2d 837 ) (1971). "[T]he choice of one near relative rather than others as the favored beneficiary of the will, standing alone as an isolated fact, i

1979The propounder thereby made out a prima facie case, which the caveator failed to rebut. "' It is a firm rule that "while undue influence may be proved by circumstances, merely to show an opportunity to exert it by one who occupies a confidential relation to the alleged testator, and who receives a substantial benefit under the instrument sought to be propounded, is not sufficient to prove it.” [Cit.]’ ” Waldrep v. Goodwin, 227 Ga. 560, 562 ( 181 SE2d 837 ) (1971). "[T]he choice of one near relative rather than others as the favored beneficiary of the will, standing alone as an isolated fact, i

1979The propounder thereby made out a prima facie case, which the caveator failed to rebut. "' It is a firm rule that "while undue influence may be proved by circumstances, merely to show an opportunity to exert it by one who occupies a confidential relation to the alleged testator, and who receives a substantial benefit under the instrument sought to be propounded, is not sufficient to prove it.” [Cit.]’ ” Waldrep v. Goodwin, 227 Ga. 560, 562 ( 181 SE2d 837 ) (1971). "[T]he choice of one near relative rather than others as the favored beneficiary of the will, standing alone as an isolated fact, i

1971It is a firm rule that 'while undue influence may be proved by circumstances, merely to show an opportunity to exert it by one who occupies a confidential relation to the alleged testator, and who receives a substantial benefit under the instrument sought to be propounded, is not sufficient to prove it.’ Brumbelow v. Hopkins, 197 Ga. 247 (3) ( 29 SE2d 42 ).” Compare Crawford v. Crawford, 218 Ga. 369, 372 ( 128 SE2d 53 ).

1971It is a firm rule that 'while undue influence may be proved by circumstances, merely to show an opportunity to exert it by one who occupies a confidential relation to the alleged testator, and who receives a substantial benefit under the instrument sought to be propounded, is not sufficient to prove it.’ Brumbelow v. Hopkins, 197 Ga. 247 (3) ( 29 SE2d 42 ).” Compare Crawford v. Crawford, 218 Ga. 369, 372 ( 128 SE2d 53 ).