firm rule in District of Columbia

8 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1995–2008 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

Case	Followed	Cited
Davis v. Mooregreen dc · 2001 · cited in 5 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2003–2008 2 sentences 2008See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 , 113 S.Ct. 2510 , 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 , 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987); Davis v. Moore, 772 A.2d 204, 230 (D.C.2001) ("We adopt the firm rule of retro-activity that the Court articulated in Griffith and Harper.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Marquez, supra, 903 A.2d at 817 . 5 . 2007See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 , 113 S.Ct. 2510 , 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 , 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987); Davis v. Moore, 772 A.2d 204 , 230 *786 (D.C.2001) (“We adopt the firm rule of retro-activity that the Court articulated in Griffith and Harper.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Marquez, supra, 903 A.2d at 817 .	4	5
Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxationgreen scotus · 1993 · cited in 3 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2001–2008 2 sentences 2008See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 , 113 S.Ct. 2510 , 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 , 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987); Davis v. Moore, 772 A.2d 204, 230 (D.C.2001) ("We adopt the firm rule of retro-activity that the Court articulated in Griffith and Harper.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Marquez, supra, 903 A.2d at 817 . 5 . 2008See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 , 113 S.Ct. 2510 , 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 , 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987); Davis v. Moore, 772 A.2d 204, 230 (D.C.2001) ("We adopt the firm rule of retro-activity that the Court articulated in Griffith and Harper.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Marquez, supra, 903 A.2d at 817 . 5 .	2	3
Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hydegreen scotus · 1995 · cited in 2 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2007–2008 2 sentences 2008Reynoldsville Casket , which Davis cited, recognized that there are certain limited exceptions to this firm rule of retroactivity, and courts “will find instances where that new rule, for well-established legal reasons, does not determine the outcome of the case.” 514 U.S. at 758-59 , 115 S.Ct. 1745 . 2008Reynoldsville Casket , which Davis cited, recognized that there are certain limited exceptions to this firm rule of retroactivity, and courts “will find instances where that new rule, for well-established legal reasons, does not determine the outcome of the case.” 514 U.S. at 758-59 , 115 S.Ct. 1745 .	1	2
Kirk v. United Statesgreen dc · 1986 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 1 sentence 2001Cf. Kirk v. United States, 510 A.2d 499, 504 (D.C. 1986); Fields v. United States, 466 A.2d 822, 828 (D.C.1983). [25] In her separate opinion, our colleague Judge Ruiz expresses the "fear" that a firm rule of retroactivity may "stunt the growth" of the common law in this jurisdiction.	1	1
Fields v. United Statesgreen dc · 1983 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 1 sentence 2001Cf. Kirk v. United States, 510 A.2d 499, 504 (D.C. 1986); Fields v. United States, 466 A.2d 822, 828 (D.C.1983). [25] In her separate opinion, our colleague Judge Ruiz expresses the "fear" that a firm rule of retroactivity may "stunt the growth" of the common law in this jurisdiction.	1	1
Berg v. Footergreen dc · 1996 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 2 sentences 2001See discussion infra. Although we have refrained from a firm rule, see Berg, 673 A.2d at 1250 , we have trumped the single satisfaction rule, and permitted a plaintiff to recover in excess of a jury award, in order to provide equity as between joint tortfeasors under our law. 2001See id. at 1257 .	1	1
In re an Inquiry into Allegations of Misconduct Against Juveniles Detained at & Committed at Cedar Knoll Institutiongreen dc · 1981 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995 1 sentence 1995Although the concept of mootness is grounded on the firm principle that "parties in a judicial proceeding must have a concrete stake in the outcome[,]" In re An Inquiry into Allegations of Misconduct Against Juveniles Detained at and Committed at Cedar Knoll Inst., Dep't of Human Resources, 430 A.2d 1087, 1092 (D.C.1981) (citations omitted), it is clear that unresolved issues of damages, as are present here, constitute a sufficient "concrete stake" in the litigation.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (5)

Case	Cited	Years
Griffith v. Kentucky green scotus · 1987 2 sentences 2008See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 , 113 S.Ct. 2510 , 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 , 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987); Davis v. Moore, 772 A.2d 204, 230 (D.C.2001) ("We adopt the firm rule of retro-activity that the Court articulated in Griffith and Harper.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Marquez, supra, 903 A.2d at 817 . 5 . 2008See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 , 113 S.Ct. 2510 , 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 , 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987); Davis v. Moore, 772 A.2d 204, 230 (D.C.2001) ("We adopt the firm rule of retro-activity that the Court articulated in Griffith and Harper.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Marquez, supra, 903 A.2d at 817 . 5 .	3	2001–2008
Marquez v. United States green dc · 2006 2 sentences 2008See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 , 113 S.Ct. 2510 , 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 , 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987); Davis v. Moore, 772 A.2d 204, 230 (D.C.2001) ("We adopt the firm rule of retro-activity that the Court articulated in Griffith and Harper.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Marquez, supra, 903 A.2d at 817 . 5 . 2008See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 , 113 S.Ct. 2510 , 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 , 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987); Davis v. Moore, 772 A.2d 204, 230 (D.C.2001) ("We adopt the firm rule of retro-activity that the Court articulated in Griffith and Harper.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Marquez, supra, 903 A.2d at 817 . 5 .	2	2007–2008
Thomas v. United States green dc · 2006 1 sentence 2008The original version of this opinion, Otts v. United States, 936 A.2d 782 (D.C.2007), analyzed the other strongly corroborative circumstantial evidence of the substance’s identity under the third Olano prong (substantial rights) as compared to Thomas, supra, 914 A.2d at 21-22 , which analyzed that evidence under the fourth Olano prong (affecting fairness, integrity and public reputation of the *162 proceedings).	1	2008–2008
Otts v. United States green dc · 2007 1 sentence 2008The original version of this opinion, Otts v. United States, 936 A.2d 782 (D.C.2007), analyzed the other strongly corroborative circumstantial evidence of the substance’s identity under the third Olano prong (substantial rights) as compared to Thomas, supra, 914 A.2d at 21-22 , which analyzed that evidence under the fourth Olano prong (affecting fairness, integrity and public reputation of the *162 proceedings).	1	2008–2008
Landgraf v. USI Film Products green scotus · 1994 2 sentences 2001The Supreme Court has summarized the change that took place by saying that "[w]hile it was accurate in 1974 to say that a new rule announced in a judicial decision was only presumptively applicable to pending cases, we have since established a firm rule of retroactivity." Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 , 278 n. 32, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (1994) (citing Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 , 113 S.Ct. 2510 , 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) and 226 Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 , 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987)). 2001The Supreme Court has summarized the change that took place by saying that "[w]hile it was accurate in 1974 to say that a new rule announced in a judicial decision was only presumptively applicable to pending cases, we have since established a firm rule of retroactivity." Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 , 278 n. 32, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (1994) (citing Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 , 113 S.Ct. 2510 , 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) and 226 Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 , 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987)).	1	2001–2001

Where else courts name it

CT 35 (1995–2021) PA 29 (1865–2025) NY 16 (1857–2011) GA 13 (1965–2025) IL 12 (1980–2024) LA 9 (1974–2018) CA 9 (1997–2016) NJ 8 (1968–2025) DC 8 (1995–2008) MI 7 (1967–2024) TX 7 (1980–2020) FL 6 (1974–2026) MA 6 (1918–2019) NM 6 (1925–2024) AR 5 (1981–2002) MD 5 (1999–2022) MO 5 (1886–2002) OR 5 (1979–2019) MT 4 (1922–2006) WV 4 (1898–1981) OK 3 (1981–2017) KY 3 (1954–2021) AL 3 (1921–1956) IA 3 (1887–1951) ID 3 (1955–1989) ME 3 (1998–2022) MN 2 (1928–1990) WY 2 (2021–2022) AK 2 (1974–1991) IN 2 (1979–1980) VA 2 (1959–2019) VT 2 (1982–2002)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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