firm hearing in California

2016A service upon one not named in a complaint does not confer jurisdiction to proceed upon the complaint against him, and a motion to quash is proper.” (Maier Brewing Co. v. Flora Crane Service, Inc. (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 873, 875 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 219 ]; but see A.N. v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1063-1065 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 293 ] [motion to quash under § 418.10 challenges personal jurisdiction and may not be the proper procedure to challenge Doe amendment, but court should look to substance of motion, not its label, in assessing whether § 474 was satisfied].) The effect of t

2016A service upon one not named in a complaint does not confer jurisdiction to proceed upon the complaint against him, and a motion to quash is proper.” (Maier Brewing Co. v. Flora Crane Service, Inc. (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 873, 875 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 219 ]; but see A.N. v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1063-1065 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 293 ] [motion to quash under § 418.10 challenges personal jurisdiction and may not be the proper procedure to challenge Doe amendment, but court should look to substance of motion, not its label, in assessing whether § 474 was satisfied].) The effect of t

2015We rejected that view, concluding that any purported contractual assignment had been ineffective because the matter had not matured into a “chose in action.” (Ibid.) We began our analysis by citing cases upholding assignment of a chose in action, and we highlighted a statement in one of those cases: “ ‘[A] provision in a contract . . . against assignment does not preclude the assignment of money due or to become due under the contract ....’” (Henkel, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 944 , italics added, quoting Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning Co. (1947) 30 Cal.2d 335, 339-340 [ 182 P.2d 182 ].) From th

2015We rejected that view, concluding that any purported contractual assignment had been ineffective because the matter had not matured into a “chose in action.” (Ibid.) We began our analysis by citing cases upholding assignment of a chose in action, and we highlighted a statement in one of those cases: “ ‘[A] provision in a contract . . . against assignment does not preclude the assignment of money due or to become due under the contract ....’” (Henkel, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 944 , italics added, quoting Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning Co. (1947) 30 Cal.2d 335, 339-340 [ 182 P.2d 182 ].) From th

2014(San Diego Watercrafts, Inc., supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 316 .) " 'The due process aspect of the separate statement requirement is self-evident ─ to inform the opposing party of the evidence to be disputed to defeat the motion.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.) Courts generally have held that "consideration of such additional evidence is not an abuse of discretion so long as the party opposing the motion for summary judgment has notice and an opportunity to respond to the new material." (See, e.g., Plenger v. Alza Corp. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 349, 362, fn. 8 .) Contrary to Services' apparent contention,

2011(Crocker National Bank v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 888.) But we nonetheless “review independently the trial court’s conclusions as to the legal significance of the facts.” (Dorel Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1273 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 742 ]; see also Crocker National Bank v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 888.) The trial court and the Firm’s analysis is unsound because, accepting (as we must) the correctness of the trial court’s factual findings, as a matter of law the Goffs’ rejection of the arbitrators’ o

2011(Crocker National Bank v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 888.) But we nonetheless “review independently the trial court’s conclusions as to the legal significance of the facts.” (Dorel Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1273 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 742 ]; see also Crocker National Bank v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 888.) The trial court and the Firm’s analysis is unsound because, accepting (as we must) the correctness of the trial court’s factual findings, as a matter of law the Goffs’ rejection of the arbitrators’ o

2010Proc., § 906.) Thus, the ruling that Wallace lacks standing to serve as a class representative is also within the scope of our review, as that ruling impacted the trial court’s decision to strike the class allegations. 6 Further, there is some significance to the fact that on April 10, 2009, just seven days before the ruling on the motion to strike class allegations, the trial court ruled on the parties’ discovery disputes and explained that “[i]n the event the court denies the motion to strike the class allegations, the court will set a firm hearing date for a motion to certify the case as a

2010Proc., § 906.) Thus, the ruling that Wallace lacks standing to serve as a class representative is also within the scope of our review, as that ruling impacted the trial court’s decision to strike the class allegations. 6 Further, there is some significance to the fact that on April 10, 2009, just seven days before the ruling on the motion to strike class allegations, the trial court ruled on the parties’ discovery disputes and explained that “[i]n the event the court denies the motion to strike the class allegations, the court will set a firm hearing date for a motion to certify the case as a

2010Such claims did not have to be brought as a class action, and a plaintiff had standing to sue even without having personally suffered any injury.” (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 977 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 209 P.3d 923 ].) As relevant here, in addition to amending section 17204 to add the injury-in-fact requirement, Proposition 64 also amended section 17203 to provide that “[a]ny person may pursue representative claims or relief on behalf of others only if the claimant meets the standing requirements of Section 17204 and complies with Section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

2010Such claims did not have to be brought as a class action, and a plaintiff had standing to sue even without having personally suffered any injury.” (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 977 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 209 P.3d 923 ].) As relevant here, in addition to amending section 17204 to add the injury-in-fact requirement, Proposition 64 also amended section 17203 to provide that “[a]ny person may pursue representative claims or relief on behalf of others only if the claimant meets the standing requirements of Section 17204 and complies with Section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

2010Proc., § 906.) Thus, the ruling that Wallace lacks standing to serve as a class representative is also within the scope of our review, as that ruling impacted the trial court’s decision to strike the class allegations. 6 Further, there is some significance to the fact that on April 10, 2009, just seven days before the ruling on the motion to strike class allegations, the trial court ruled on the parties’ discovery disputes and explained that “[i]n the event the court denies the motion to strike the class allegations, the court will set a firm hearing date for a motion to certify the case as a

2010Proc., § 906.) Thus, the ruling that Wallace lacks standing to serve as a class representative is also within the scope of our review, as that ruling impacted the trial court’s decision to strike the class allegations. 6 Further, there is some significance to the fact that on April 10, 2009, just seven days before the ruling on the motion to strike class allegations, the trial court ruled on the parties’ discovery disputes and explained that “[i]n the event the court denies the motion to strike the class allegations, the court will set a firm hearing date for a motion to certify the case as a