colloquy rule in Iowa

2015The court has a duty to conduct a further inquiry, similar to the colloquy required under rule 2.8(2), prior to sentencing to ensure that the affirmation is voluntary and intelligent. 704 N.W.2d at 692 ; see also State v. Johnson, 770 N.W.2d 814 , 825–26 (Iowa 2009) (finding rule 2.19(9) applicable in both bench and jury trials); State v. Doty, No. 14-0249, 2014 WL 5249761 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2014) (finding appellant not prejudiced by lack of rule 2.19(9) colloquy because appellant admitted to prior convictions in plea agreement); State v. Davenport, No. 09-1699, 2010 WL 3503969 (Iowa Ct.

2015The court has a duty to conduct a further inquiry, similar to the colloquy required under rule 2.8(2), prior to sentencing to ensure that the affirmation is voluntary and intelligent. 704 N.W.2d at 692 ; see also State v. Johnson, 770 N.W.2d 814 , 825–26 (Iowa 2009) (finding rule 2.19(9) applicable in both bench and jury trials); State v. Doty, No. 14-0249, 2014 WL 5249761 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2014) (finding appellant not prejudiced by lack of rule 2.19(9) colloquy because appellant admitted to prior convictions in plea agreement); State v. Davenport, No. 09-1699, 2010 WL 3503969 (Iowa Ct.

2017Instead, “[t]he court has a duty to conduct a further inquiry, similar to the colloquy required under rule 2.8(2), prior to sentencing to ensure that the affirmation is 12 voluntary and intelligent.” Id.

2017Instead, “[t]he court has a duty to conduct a further inquiry, similar to the colloquy required under rule 2.8(2), prior to sentencing to ensure that the affirmation is 12 voluntary and intelligent.” Id.

2016Rather, “[t]he court has a duty 5 to conduct a further inquiry, similar to the colloquy required under rule 2.8(2), prior to sentencing to ensure that the affirmation is voluntary and intelligent.” Id.; see also State v. Brady, 442 N.W.2d 57, 58 (Iowa 1989) (“Rule [2.8(2)(b)] governs guilty pleas and does not expressly apply to a case in which a defendant is asked to admit or deny prior convictions for habitual offender purposes under rule of criminal procedure [2.19(9)]. . . .

2005See State v. Brady, 442 N.W.2d 57, 58 (Iowa 1989) (“Rule [2.8(2)(6) ] governs guilty pleas and does not expressly apply to a case in which a defendant is asked to admit or deny prior convictions for habitual offender purposes under rule of criminal procedure [2.19(9)]....

2008The State’s application asserted for purposes of Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.801(d )(2)(E), conspiracy should be broadly defined to include “a combination or agreement between two or more persons to accomplish a criminal or unlawful act, or to do a lawful act in an unlawful manner.” State v. Ross, 573 N.W.2d 906, 914 (Iowa 1998).

2008The State’s application asserted for purposes of Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.801(d)(2)(E), conspiracy should be broadly defined to include “a combination or agreement between two or more persons to accomplish a criminal or unlawful act, or to do a lawful act in an unlawful manner.” State v. Ross, 573 N.W.2d 906, 914 (Iowa 1998).

2003As we recognized in Stallings , "[s]ome federal cases strongly suggest that the *813 court engage in an in-court colloquy in which the court assesses the extent of the defendant's knowledge and understanding of the waiver." Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 109 (citations omitted); Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1432 ; United States v. Christensen, 18 F.3d 822, 825 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267, 274-75 (6th Cir.1983); see also Cabberiza v. Moore, 217 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir.2000) (discussing colloquy requirements in federal courts).

2003As we recognized in Stallings , “[s]ome federal cases strongly suggest that the court engage in an in-court colloquy in which the court assesses the extent of the defendant’s knowledge and understanding of the waiver.” Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 109 (citations omitted); Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1432 ; United States v. Christensen, 18 F.3d 822, 825 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267, 274-75 (6th Cir.1983); see also Cabberiza v. Moore, 217 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir.2000) (discussing colloquy requirements in federal courts).

2003As we recognized in Stallings , "[s]ome federal cases strongly suggest that the *813 court engage in an in-court colloquy in which the court assesses the extent of the defendant's knowledge and understanding of the waiver." Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 109 (citations omitted); Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1432 ; United States v. Christensen, 18 F.3d 822, 825 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267, 274-75 (6th Cir.1983); see also Cabberiza v. Moore, 217 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir.2000) (discussing colloquy requirements in federal courts).

2003As we recognized in Stallings , “[s]ome federal cases strongly suggest that the court engage in an in-court colloquy in which the court assesses the extent of the defendant’s knowledge and understanding of the waiver.” Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 109 (citations omitted); Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1432 ; United States v. Christensen, 18 F.3d 822, 825 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267, 274-75 (6th Cir.1983); see also Cabberiza v. Moore, 217 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir.2000) (discussing colloquy requirements in federal courts).

2003As we recognized in Stallings , "[s]ome federal cases strongly suggest that the *813 court engage in an in-court colloquy in which the court assesses the extent of the defendant's knowledge and understanding of the waiver." Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 109 (citations omitted); Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1432 ; United States v. Christensen, 18 F.3d 822, 825 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267, 274-75 (6th Cir.1983); see also Cabberiza v. Moore, 217 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir.2000) (discussing colloquy requirements in federal courts).

2003As we recognized in Stallings , “[s]ome federal cases strongly suggest that the court engage in an in-court colloquy in which the court assesses the extent of the defendant’s knowledge and understanding of the waiver.” Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 109 (citations omitted); Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1432 ; United States v. Christensen, 18 F.3d 822, 825 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267, 274-75 (6th Cir.1983); see also Cabberiza v. Moore, 217 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir.2000) (discussing colloquy requirements in federal courts).

2003It should also be noted that we have described literal compliance with the colloquy requirement of rule 2.8(2)( b ), which expressly requires the court to "address the defendant personally in open court," as "personally addressing the defendant on the record." State v. Moore, 638 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Iowa 2002).

2003It should also be noted that we have described literal compliance with the colloquy requirement of rule 2.8(2)(b), which expressly requires the court to “address the defendant personally in open court,” as “personally addressing the defendant on the record.” State v. Moore, 638 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Iowa 2002).

2003As we recognized in Stallings , "[s]ome federal cases strongly suggest that the *813 court engage in an in-court colloquy in which the court assesses the extent of the defendant's knowledge and understanding of the waiver." Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 109 (citations omitted); Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1432 ; United States v. Christensen, 18 F.3d 822, 825 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267, 274-75 (6th Cir.1983); see also Cabberiza v. Moore, 217 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir.2000) (discussing colloquy requirements in federal courts).

2003As we recognized in Stallings , “[s]ome federal cases strongly suggest that the court engage in an in-court colloquy in which the court assesses the extent of the defendant’s knowledge and understanding of the waiver.” Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 109 (citations omitted); Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1432 ; United States v. Christensen, 18 F.3d 822, 825 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267, 274-75 (6th Cir.1983); see also Cabberiza v. Moore, 217 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir.2000) (discussing colloquy requirements in federal courts).