Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
13 Iowa opinions name it 1 courts 2015–2024 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Caseyred2 sentences2024The Casey dissenters criticized the “inherently standardless nature” of the undue burden test as permitting judges to inject their own policy preferences when deciding whether a particular restriction creates an undue burden to get- ting an abortion. 505 U.S. at 992 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 2024The undue burden test requires judges to determine whether an abortion regulation will “prevent” or “deter” a “significant number of women from obtaining an abortion.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 893–94. | 8 | 12 |
Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. and Jill Meadows v. Iowa Board of Medicinegreen2 sentences2024The undue burden standard requires us to “weigh the extent of the burden against the strength of the state’s justification in the context of each individual statute or regulation.” PPH 2015, 865 N.W.2d at 264 (quoting Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 914 (9th Cir. 2014), abrogated by Dobbs, 597 U.S. 215 ). 2024The undue burden standard requires us to “weigh the extent of the burden against the strength of the state’s justification in the context of each individual statute or regulation.” PPH 2015, 865 N.W.2d at 264 (quoting Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 914 (9th Cir. 2014), abrogated by Dobbs, 597 U.S. 215 ). | 7 | 9 |
Planned Parenthood of the Heartland and Jill Meadows v. Kimberly K. Reynolds ex rel. State of Iowa and Iowa Board of Medicinegreen2 sentences2022See id. at 254 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (“[S]tates relying on the due process clauses of their state constitutions typically have applied the undue burden test.”). 2022See id. at 254 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (“[S]tates relying on the due process clauses of their state constitutions typically have applied the undue burden test.”). | 5 | 5 |
Planned Parenthood of Arizona v. William Humblegreen2 sentences2024The undue burden standard requires us to “weigh the extent of the burden against the strength of the state’s justification in the context of each individual statute or regulation.” PPH 2015, 865 N.W.2d at 264 (quoting Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 914 (9th Cir. 2014), abrogated by Dobbs, 597 U.S. 215 ). 2024The undue burden standard requires us to “weigh the extent of the burden against the strength of the state’s justification in the context of each individual statute or regulation.” PPH 2015, 865 N.W.2d at 264 (quoting Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 914 (9th Cir. 2014), abrogated by Dobbs, 597 U.S. 215 ). | 5 | 5 |
Pro-Choice Mississippi v. Fordicegreen2 sentences2022Louis Region, Inc. v. Nixon, 185 S.W.3d 685 , 691–92 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (per curiam) (applying the due process clause of the Missouri Constitution as giving the same protection to a pregnant woman recognized by Casey); Pro-Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 716 So. 2d 645, 655 (Miss. 1998) (en banc) (applying the undue burden test under the Mississippi Constitution and noting that “[t]he abortion issue is much more complex than most cases involving privacy rights”); Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570, 584 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (“[W]e find no reason under the circumstances of this case to fi 2022Louis Region, Inc. v. Nixon, 185 S.W.3d 685 , 691–92 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (per curiam) (applying the due process clause of the Missouri Constitution as giving the same protection to a pregnant woman recognized by Casey); Pro-Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 716 So. 2d 645, 655 (Miss. 1998) (en banc) (applying the undue burden test under the Mississippi Constitution and noting that “[t]he abortion issue is much more complex than most cases involving privacy rights”); Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570, 584 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (“[W]e find no reason under the circumstances of this case to fi | 3 | 8 |
Planned Parenthood of Middle Tennessee v. Sundquistred2 sentences2018In Planned Parenthood of Middle Tennessee v. Sundquist , the Tennessee Supreme Court opted to apply strict scrutiny to abortion regulations, concluding the undue burden standard "is essentially no standard at all." 38 S.W.3d 1 , 16 (Tenn. 2000), superseded by constitutional amendment , Tenn. Const. art. 2018We agree with the Tennessee Supreme Court that the undue burden standard "offers ... no real guidance and engenders no expectation among the citizenry that governmental regulation of abortion will be objective, evenhanded, or well-reasoned." Id. at 17 . | 3 | 6 |
Gonzales v. Carhartgreen2 sentences2022In Stenberg, the Court was divided over the right to abortion, differed on whether to apply an undue burden test, and differed on the application of that test.299 Even among the Stenberg majority, Justices had different views on what would make certain burdens “due.”300 Justice O’Connor, for one, focused on the point that the statute was not narrowly tailored, but signaled that one that had an exception for the health of the mother might well survive constitutional muster.301 Justice Ginsberg 295Id. at 992. 296Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 , 920–22 (2000). 297Id. at 918–19, 922. 298Gonzale 2022In discussing the federal undue burden test, we stated that generally a challenger was required to show the regulation had “the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”42 We also noted that there were different versions of the undue burden test in the federal appellate courts for regulations where the state’s interest was to protect the health of the woman.43 A version of the undue burden test adopted in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth Circuits weighed the strength of the state’s justifica | 3 | 6 |
Planned Parenthood Arizona, Inc. v. American Ass'n of Pro-Life Obstetricians & Gynecologistsgreen2 sentences2018Ass'n of Pro-Life Obstetricians & Gynecologists , 227 Ariz. 262 , 257 P.3d 181 , 189 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (applying the undue burden test after finding that the Arizona Constitution recognizes no more expansive right to an abortion). 2018Ass'n of Pro-Life Obstetricians & Gynecologists , 227 Ariz. 262 , 257 P.3d 181 , 189 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (applying the undue burden test after finding that the Arizona Constitution recognizes no more expansive right to an abortion). | 3 | 6 |
Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organizationgreen2 sentences2024The undue burden standard requires us to “weigh the extent of the burden against the strength of the state’s justification in the context of each individual statute or regulation.” PPH 2015, 865 N.W.2d at 264 (quoting Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 914 (9th Cir. 2014), abrogated by Dobbs, 597 U.S. 215 ). 2024The undue burden standard requires us to “weigh the extent of the burden against the strength of the state’s justification in the context of each individual statute or regulation.” PPH 2015, 865 N.W.2d at 264 (quoting Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 914 (9th Cir. 2014), abrogated by Dobbs, 597 U.S. 215 ). | 3 | 3 |
State Of Iowa Vs. James Maximiliano Ochoagreen2 sentences2022See State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 267 (Iowa 2010) (stating that “a state supreme court cannot delegate to any other court the power to engage in authoritative constitutional interpretation under the state constitution”). 2022See State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 267 (Iowa 2010) (stating that “a state supreme court cannot delegate to any other court the power to engage in authoritative constitutional interpretation under the state constitution”). | 3 | 3 |
Karen McQuistion v. City of Clinton, Iowa Mark Regenwether Jeffrey Farwell And Jeffrey Hornegreen2 sentences2022We next considered the level of scrutiny proper for the 90Id. (quoting McQuistion v. City of Clinton, 872 N.W.2d 817, 832 (Iowa 2015)). 91Id. at 237 (quoting McQuistion, 872 N.W.2d at 832 ). 92Id. at 234. “[T]he familial relationship is a fundamental liberty interest . . . .” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 663 (Iowa 2005), superseded by statute as stated in Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Reynolds, 962 N.W.2d 37 (Iowa 2021)). 2022We next considered the level of scrutiny proper for the 90Id. (quoting McQuistion v. City of Clinton, 872 N.W.2d 817, 832 (Iowa 2015)). 91Id. at 237 (quoting McQuistion, 872 N.W.2d at 832 ). 92Id. at 234. “[T]he familial relationship is a fundamental liberty interest . . . .” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 663 (Iowa 2005), superseded by statute as stated in Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Reynolds, 962 N.W.2d 37 (Iowa 2021)). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Seeringgreen2 sentences2022We next considered the level of scrutiny proper for the 90Id. (quoting McQuistion v. City of Clinton, 872 N.W.2d 817, 832 (Iowa 2015)). 91Id. at 237 (quoting McQuistion, 872 N.W.2d at 832 ). 92Id. at 234. “[T]he familial relationship is a fundamental liberty interest . . . .” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 663 (Iowa 2005), superseded by statute as stated in Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Reynolds, 962 N.W.2d 37 (Iowa 2021)). 2022We next considered the level of scrutiny proper for the 90Id. (quoting McQuistion v. City of Clinton, 872 N.W.2d 817, 832 (Iowa 2015)). 91Id. at 237 (quoting McQuistion, 872 N.W.2d at 832 ). 92Id. at 234. “[T]he familial relationship is a fundamental liberty interest . . . .” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 663 (Iowa 2005), superseded by statute as stated in Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Reynolds, 962 N.W.2d 37 (Iowa 2021)). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Koomegreen2 sentences2022Ass’n of Pro-Life Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 257 P.3d 181 , 188–90 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (applying the federal undue burden test under the Arizona Constitution even though it contains an express privacy clause); Clinic for Women, Inc. v. Brizzi, 837 N.E.2d 973 , 983–84 (Ind. 2005) (holding that Indiana’s inalienable rights clause provides protection similar to the Casey undue burden test); Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 677 N.E.2d 101 , 103–04 (Mass. 1997) (explaining that Massachusetts does not follow federal abortion precedent under the Massachusetts due process 2022Ass’n of Pro-Life Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 257 P.3d 181 , 188–90 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (applying the federal undue burden test under the Arizona Constitution even though it contains an express privacy clause); Clinic for Women, Inc. v. Brizzi, 837 N.E.2d 973 , 983–84 (Ind. 2005) (holding that Indiana’s inalienable rights clause provides protection similar to the Casey undue burden test); Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 677 N.E.2d 101 , 103–04 (Mass. 1997) (explaining that Massachusetts does not follow federal abortion precedent under the Massachusetts due process | 3 | 3 |
Bowers v. Polk County Board of Supervisorsgreen2 sentences2022Bd. of Supervisors, 638 N.W.2d 682, 694 (Iowa 2002)). 97Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 98Planned Parenthood II, 915 N.W.2d at 238 (alteration in original) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 873 ). 99Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 ). 100Planned Parenthood II, 915 N.W.2d at 239 . 101Id. 102Id. at 239–41. 103Id. at 240. 101 Antonin Scalia, criticizing that the “standardless nature”104 of the undue burden test in Casey was so vague that it “place[s] all constitutional rights at risk.”105 We found the undue burden test provided “no real guidance and engenders no expectation among the citizenry tha 2022Bd. of Supervisors, 638 N.W.2d 682, 694 (Iowa 2002)). 97Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 98Planned Parenthood II, 915 N.W.2d at 238 (alteration in original) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 873 ). 99Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 ). 100Planned Parenthood II, 915 N.W.2d at 239 . 101Id. 102Id. at 239–41. 103Id. at 240. 101 Antonin Scalia, criticizing that the “standardless nature”104 of the undue burden test in Casey was so vague that it “place[s] all constitutional rights at risk.”105 We found the undue burden test provided “no real guidance and engenders no expectation among the citizenry tha | 3 | 3 |
Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovichgreen2 sentences2022Louis Region, Inc. v. Nixon, 185 S.W.3d 685 , 691–92 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (per curiam) (applying the due process clause of the Missouri Constitution as giving the same protection to a pregnant woman recognized by Casey); Pro-Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 716 So. 2d 645, 655 (Miss. 1998) (en banc) (applying the undue burden test under the Mississippi Constitution and noting that “[t]he abortion issue is much more complex than most cases involving privacy rights”); Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570, 584 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (“[W]e find no reason under the circumstances of this case to fi 2022Louis Region, Inc. v. Nixon, 185 S.W.3d 685 , 691–92 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (per curiam) (applying the due process clause of the Missouri Constitution as giving the same protection to a pregnant woman recognized by Casey); Pro-Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 716 So. 2d 645, 655 (Miss. 1998) (en banc) (applying the undue burden test under the Mississippi Constitution and noting that “[t]he abortion issue is much more complex than most cases involving privacy rights”); Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570, 584 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (“[W]e find no reason under the circumstances of this case to fi | 3 | 3 |
| Valley Hospital Ass'n v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choicegreen | 3 | 3 |
Armstrong v. Stategreen2 sentences2018Armstrong v. State , 296 Mont. 361 , 989 P.2d 364 , 384 (1999). 2018Armstrong v. State , 296 Mont. 361 , 989 P.2d 364 , 384 (1999). | 3 | 3 |
Anne Hensler Vs. City Of Davenportgreen2 sentences2018See, e.g., Hensler v. City of Davenport, 790 N.W.2d 569 , 588–89 (Iowa 2010); State v. Dudley, 766 N.W.2d 606, 617, 622 (Iowa 2009); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 896, 904 (Iowa 2009); Racing Ass’n of Cent. 2018See, e.g. , Hensler v. City of Davenport , 790 N.W.2d 569 , 588-89 (Iowa 2010) ; State v. Dudley , 766 N.W.2d 606 , 617, 622 (Iowa 2009) ; Varnum v. Brien , 763 N.W.2d 862 , 896, 904 (Iowa 2009) ; Racing Ass'n of Cent. | 3 | 3 |
| Varnum v. Briengreen | 3 | 3 |
Planned Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky, Inc. v. Commissioner, Indiana State Department of Healthgreen2 sentences2018See Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm'r, Ind. State Dep't of Health , 273 F.Supp.3d 1013 , 1043 (S.D. 2018Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. , 273 F.Supp.3d at 1043 ; Planned Parenthood of Minn., N.D., S.D. , 799 F.Supp.2d at 1065 -66 . | 3 | 3 |
Doe v. Mahergreen2 sentences2018See Doe v. Maher , 40 Conn.Supp. 394 , 515 A.2d 134 , 156-57 (1986) ; Moe v. Sec'y of Admin. & Fin. , 382 Mass. 629 , 417 N.E.2d 387 , 402-04 (1981) ; Women of State of Minn. ex rel. 2018See Doe v. Maher , 40 Conn.Supp. 394 , 515 A.2d 134 , 156-57 (1986) ; Moe v. Sec'y of Admin. & Fin. , 382 Mass. 629 , 417 N.E.2d 387 , 402-04 (1981) ; Women of State of Minn. ex rel. | 3 | 3 |
Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Schmidtgreen2 sentences2018Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. Flores , 372 Ill.Dec. 255 , 991 N.E.2d 745 , 757, 763 (2013) ; Brizzi , 837 N.E.2d at 983-84 (applying a "material burden" standard under the Indiana Constitution that is "the equivalent of Casey 's undue burden test"); *254 Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt , 52 Kan.App.2d 274 , 368 P.3d 667 , 676 (2016) (en banc), review granted (Apr. 11, 2016); Fordice , 716 So.2d at 655 ; Nixon , 185 S.W.3d at 691-92 ; see also Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Am. 2018Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. Flores , 372 Ill.Dec. 255 , 991 N.E.2d 745 , 757, 763 (2013) ; Brizzi , 837 N.E.2d at 983-84 (applying a "material burden" standard under the Indiana Constitution that is "the equivalent of Casey 's undue burden test"); *254 Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt , 52 Kan.App.2d 274 , 368 P.3d 667 , 676 (2016) (en banc), review granted (Apr. 11, 2016); Fordice , 716 So.2d at 655 ; Nixon , 185 S.W.3d at 691-92 ; see also Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Am. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Dudleygreen2 sentences2018See, e.g., Hensler v. City of Davenport, 790 N.W.2d 569 , 588–89 (Iowa 2010); State v. Dudley, 766 N.W.2d 606, 617, 622 (Iowa 2009); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 896, 904 (Iowa 2009); Racing Ass’n of Cent. 2018See, e.g. , Hensler v. City of Davenport , 790 N.W.2d 569 , 588-89 (Iowa 2010) ; State v. Dudley , 766 N.W.2d 606 , 617, 622 (Iowa 2009) ; Varnum v. Brien , 763 N.W.2d 862 , 896, 904 (Iowa 2009) ; Racing Ass'n of Cent. | 3 | 3 |
Reproductive Health Services of Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region, Inc. v. Nixongreen2 sentences2022Louis Region, Inc. v. Nixon, 185 S.W.3d 685 , 691–92 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (per curiam) (applying the due process clause of the Missouri Constitution as giving the same protection to a pregnant woman recognized by Casey); Pro-Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 716 So. 2d 645, 655 (Miss. 1998) (en banc) (applying the undue burden test under the Mississippi Constitution and noting that “[t]he abortion issue is much more complex than most cases involving privacy rights”); Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570, 584 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (“[W]e find no reason under the circumstances of this case to fi 2022Louis Region, Inc. v. Nixon, 185 S.W.3d 685 , 691–92 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (per curiam) (applying the due process clause of the Missouri Constitution as giving the same protection to a pregnant woman recognized by Casey); Pro-Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 716 So. 2d 645, 655 (Miss. 1998) (en banc) (applying the undue burden test under the Mississippi Constitution and noting that “[t]he abortion issue is much more complex than most cases involving privacy rights”); Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570, 584 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (“[W]e find no reason under the circumstances of this case to fi | 2 | 6 |
Clinic for Women, Inc. v. Brizzigreen2 sentences2022Ass’n of Pro-Life Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 257 P.3d 181 , 188–90 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (applying the federal undue burden test under the Arizona Constitution even though it contains an express privacy clause); Clinic for Women, Inc. v. Brizzi, 837 N.E.2d 973 , 983–84 (Ind. 2005) (holding that Indiana’s inalienable rights clause provides protection similar to the Casey undue burden test); Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 677 N.E.2d 101 , 103–04 (Mass. 1997) (explaining that Massachusetts does not follow federal abortion precedent under the Massachusetts due process 2022Ass’n of Pro-Life Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 257 P.3d 181 , 188–90 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (applying the federal undue burden test under the Arizona Constitution even though it contains an express privacy clause); Clinic for Women, Inc. v. Brizzi, 837 N.E.2d 973 , 983–84 (Ind. 2005) (holding that Indiana’s inalienable rights clause provides protection similar to the Casey undue burden test); Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 677 N.E.2d 101 , 103–04 (Mass. 1997) (explaining that Massachusetts does not follow federal abortion precedent under the Massachusetts due process | 1 | 6 |
| Watts v. Securities & Exchange Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Va. Dep't of Corr. v. Jordangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Caseyred2 sentences2024The Casey dissenters criticized the “inherently standardless nature” of the undue burden test as permitting judges to inject their own policy preferences when deciding whether a particular restriction creates an undue burden to get- ting an abortion. 505 U.S. at 992 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 2024The undue burden test requires judges to determine whether an abortion regulation will “prevent” or “deter” a “significant number of women from obtaining an abortion.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 893–94. | 1 | 12 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stenberg v. Carhart
green
2 sentences2022In Stenberg, the Court was divided over the right to abortion, differed on whether to apply an undue burden test, and differed on the application of that test.299 Even among the Stenberg majority, Justices had different views on what would make certain burdens “due.”300 Justice O’Connor, for one, focused on the point that the statute was not narrowly tailored, but signaled that one that had an exception for the health of the mother might well survive constitutional muster.301 Justice Ginsberg 295Id. at 992. 296Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 , 920–22 (2000). 297Id. at 918–19, 922. 298Gonzale 2022In Stenberg, the Court was divided over the right to abortion, differed on whether to apply an undue burden test, and differed on the application of that test.299 Even among the Stenberg majority, Justices had different views on what would make certain burdens “due.”300 Justice O’Connor, for one, focused on the point that the statute was not narrowly tailored, but signaled that one that had an exception for the health of the mother might well survive constitutional muster.301 Justice Ginsberg 295Id. at 992. 296Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 , 920–22 (2000). 297Id. at 918–19, 922. 298Gonzale | 3 | 2022–2022 |
Roe v. Wade
red
2 sentences2022Bd. of Supervisors, 638 N.W.2d 682, 694 (Iowa 2002)). 97Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 98Planned Parenthood II, 915 N.W.2d at 238 (alteration in original) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 873 ). 99Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 ). 100Planned Parenthood II, 915 N.W.2d at 239 . 101Id. 102Id. at 239–41. 103Id. at 240. 101 Antonin Scalia, criticizing that the “standardless nature”104 of the undue burden test in Casey was so vague that it “place[s] all constitutional rights at risk.”105 We found the undue burden test provided “no real guidance and engenders no expectation among the citizenry tha 2022Bd. of Supervisors, 638 N.W.2d 682, 694 (Iowa 2002)). 97Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 98Planned Parenthood II, 915 N.W.2d at 238 (alteration in original) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 873 ). 99Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 ). 100Planned Parenthood II, 915 N.W.2d at 239 . 101Id. 102Id. at 239–41. 103Id. at 240. 101 Antonin Scalia, criticizing that the “standardless nature”104 of the undue burden test in Casey was so vague that it “place[s] all constitutional rights at risk.”105 We found the undue burden test provided “no real guidance and engenders no expectation among the citizenry tha | 3 | 2022–2022 |
Racing Ass'n of Central Iowa v. Fitzgerald
green
2 sentences2022If the primary purpose is to advance a legitimate state interest, the analysis proceeds to the “effect” prong of the undue burden test.473 Under the effect prong, the court then examines whether the law presents a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion.474 The effect element breaks down into several elements: The first task is to identify “the relevant group of women to which the law applies.”475 The second question, in my view, is whether the benefits conferred by the law significantly outweigh the burdens imposed on reproductive freedom.476 In engaging in this inquiry, 2022If the primary purpose is to advance a legitimate state interest, the analysis proceeds to the “effect” prong of the undue burden test.473 Under the effect prong, the court then examines whether the law presents a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion.474 The effect element breaks down into several elements: The first task is to identify “the relevant group of women to which the law applies.”475 The second question, in my view, is whether the benefits conferred by the law significantly outweigh the burdens imposed on reproductive freedom.476 In engaging in this inquiry, | 3 | 2022–2022 |
Hodes & Nauser, MDS, P.A. v. Schmidt
green
2 sentences2022I, § 1. 364Hodes & Nauser, 440 P.3d at 492 . 365Id. at 494. 366Id. at 495. 367Id. (citing Planned Parenthood II, 915 N.W.2d at 239 ). 368Id. at 496. 149 E. 2022I, § 1. 364Hodes & Nauser, 440 P.3d at 492 . 365Id. at 494. 366Id. at 495. 367Id. (citing Planned Parenthood II, 915 N.W.2d at 239 ). 368Id. at 496. 149 E. | 3 | 2022–2022 |
Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt
green
2 sentences2022If the primary purpose is to advance a legitimate state interest, the analysis proceeds to the “effect” prong of the undue burden test.473 Under the effect prong, the court then examines whether the law presents a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion.474 The effect element breaks down into several elements: The first task is to identify “the relevant group of women to which the law applies.”475 The second question, in my view, is whether the benefits conferred by the law significantly outweigh the burdens imposed on reproductive freedom.476 In engaging in this inquiry, 2022The United State Supreme Court continued to grapple with the burden of the undue burden test in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt309 and June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo.310 In these cases, the states of Louisiana and Texas imposed a requirement that (1) every doctor performing an abortion have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of where the abortions were performed, and (2) that an abortion facility must meet the minimum standards adopted for ambulatory surgical centers under state law.311 The Whole Woman’s Health Court credited the district court’s finding that abo | 3 | 2022–2022 |
PLANNED PARENTHOOD MN, ND, SD v. Daugaard
green
2 sentences2018Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 273 F. Supp. 3d at 1043 ; Planned Parenthood of Minn., N.D., S.D., 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1065–66. 2018Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. , 273 F.Supp.3d at 1043 ; Planned Parenthood of Minn., N.D., S.D. , 799 F.Supp.2d at 1065 -66 . | 3 | 2018–2018 |
Gainesville Woman Care, LLC v. State of Florida
green
2 sentences2018Gainesville Woman Care, LLC v. State, 80 210 So. 3d 1243, 1254 , 1263–64 (Fla. 2017) (enjoining a 24-hour waiting period under Florida Constitution); Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 16, 24 (Tenn. 2000) (invalidating Tennessee’s 48-hour waiting period). 2018Gainesville Woman Care, LLC v. State , 210 So.3d 1243 , 1254, 1263-64 (Fla. 2017) (enjoining a 24-hour waiting period under Florida Constitution); Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist , 38 S.W.3d 1 , 16, 24 (Tenn. 2000) (invalidating Tennessee's 48-hour waiting period). | 3 | 2018–2018 |
| Moe v. Secretary of Administration & Finance green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.