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13 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 2008–2024 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Perezgreen2 sentences2024App. 3d 462, 497 (2008). ¶ 69 “Thus, while undue prejudice can arise in a section 115-7.3 case, ‘the actual limits on the trial court’s decisions on the quantity of propensity evidence to be admitted under section 115-7.3 are relatively modest, especially when combined with the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard that governs review of such trial court decisions.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Perez, 2012 IL App (2d) 100865, ¶ 49 (quoting Walston, 386 Ill. 2022“Thus, while undue prejudice can arise in a section 115-7.3 case, ‘the actual limits on the trial court’s decisions on the quantity of propensity evidence to be admitted under section 115-7.3 are relatively modest, especially when combined with the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard that governs review of such trial court decisions.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Perez, 2012 IL App (2d) 100865, ¶ 49 (quoting Walston, 386 Ill. | 4 | 5 |
People v. Walstongreen2 sentences2024App. 3d 462, 497 (2008). ¶ 69 “Thus, while undue prejudice can arise in a section 115-7.3 case, ‘the actual limits on the trial court’s decisions on the quantity of propensity evidence to be admitted under section 115-7.3 are relatively modest, especially when combined with the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard that governs review of such trial court decisions.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Perez, 2012 IL App (2d) 100865, ¶ 49 (quoting Walston, 386 Ill. 2024“The actual limits on the trial court’s decisions on the quantity of propensity evidence to be admitted under section 115-7.3 are relatively modest, especially when combined with the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard that governs review of such trial court decisions.” People v. Walston, 386 Ill. | 2 | 7 |
In Re DTgreen2 sentences2024In the decision of In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 356-57 , the supreme court reviewed a best-interests determination by the trial court. 2020In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 356 (2004) (“ ‘Abuse of discretion’ is the most deferential standard of review—next to no review at all—and is therefore traditionally reserved for decisions made by a trial judge in overseeing his or her courtroom or in maintaining the -3- progress of a trial.”). | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Donoho
green
2 sentences2008Although our supreme court has warned that trial judges should “be cautious in considering the admissibility of other-crimes evidence to show propensity by engaging in a meaningful assessment of the probative value versus the [undue] prejudicial impact of the evidence” (Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 186 ), it appears from our discussion above that the actual limits on the trial court’s decisions on the quantity of propensity evidence to be admitted under section 115 — 7.3 are relatively modest, especially when combined with the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard that governs review of su 2008Although our supreme court has warned that trial judges should “be cautious in considering the admissibility of other-crimes evidence to show propensity by engaging in a meaningful assessment of the probative value versus the [undue] prejudicial impact of the evidence” (Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 186 ), it appears from our discussion above that the actual limits on the trial court’s decisions on the quantity of propensity evidence to be admitted under section 115 — 7.3 are relatively modest, especially when combined with the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard that governs review of su | 2 | 2008–2008 |
People v. Rivera
green
1 sentence2022An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision can be characterized as “arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would agree with it.” Rivera, 2013 IL 112467, ¶ 37 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.