iepc motion in Illinois

2017Absent a clear abuse of this authority, the court will not inquire into the need or propriety of its exercise. [Citations.] Accordingly, where plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, it becomes the burden of defendant to show that there was an abuse of discretion by the governing board. [Citations.]” Lake County Forest Preserve District v. First National Bank of Waukegan, 154 Ill.

2017Absent a clear abuse of this authority, the court will not inquire into the need or propriety of its exercise. [Citations.] Accordingly, where plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, it becomes the burden of defendant to show that there was an abuse of discretion by the governing board. [Citations.]’ ” Enbridge Energy (Illinois), L.L.C. v. Kuerth, 2016 IL App (4th) 150519, ¶ 51 , 69 N.E.3d 287 (quoting Lake County Forest Preserve District v. First National Bank of Waukegan, 154 Ill.

2017The following chronological discussion is confined to matters pertinent to those two issues. ¶7 A. Procedural History ¶8 In Enbridge Energy (Illinois), L.L.C. v. Kuerth, 2016 IL App (4th) 150519 , ¶¶ 6- 23, 69 N.E.3d 287 , and Enbridge Pipeline (Illinois), LLC v. Hoke, 2016 IL App (4th) 150544 , ¶¶ 6-23, this court chronicled the extensive procedural history regarding IEPC’s intent to (1) construct, operate, and maintain the SAX project under section 15-401 of the Common Carrier by Pipeline Law (Pipeline Law) (220 ILCS 5/15-401 (West 2006)) and (2) acquire, when necessary, private property und

2017Prior to addressing the merits of those claims, we first explain the unusual procedural posture of this appeal. ¶ 56 A. The Procedural Posture ¶ 57 While the parties’ appeal in the instant case was pending before this court, we decided Kuerth, 2016 IL App (4th) 150519 , 69 N.E.3d 287 .

2017Energy, LLC v. Pollution Control Board, 2015 IL App (4th) 130443, ¶ 97 , 29 N.E.3d 691 (quoting Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. Korzen, 2013 IL App (1st) 130380 , ¶ 49, 2 N.E.3d 1052 ).

2017Energy, LLC v. Pollution Control Board, 2015 IL App (4th) 130443, ¶ 97 , 29 N.E.3d 691 (quoting Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. Korzen, 2013 IL App (1st) 130380 , ¶ 49, 2 N.E.3d 1052 ).

2017Energy, LLC v. Pollution Control Board, 2015 IL App (4th) 130443, ¶ 97 , 29 N.E.3d 691 (quoting Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. Korzen, 2013 IL App (1st) 130380 , ¶ 49, 2 N.E.3d 1052 ).

2017Energy, LLC v. Pollution Control Board, 2015 IL App (4th) 130443, ¶ 97 , 29 N.E.3d 691 (quoting Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. Korzen, 2013 IL App (1st) 130380 , ¶ 49, 2 N.E.3d 1052 ).

2017As we noted in Essig, 2015 IL App (4th) 140546, ¶ 51 , 33 N.E.3d 288 , however, “the contents of Rule 213(f) disclosures are not evidence for purposes of summary judgment because Rule 213(f) disclosures are not pleadings, depositions, admissions, or affidavits.” (Emphasis in original.) “Notably, Rule 213(f) requires the party—not the expert himself—to disclose the substance of the expert’s anticipated testimony.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 52. ¶ 85 While our analysis indicates approval of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in IEPC’s favor, we are not at this point affirming the tri

2017As we noted in Essig, 2015 IL App (4th) 140546, ¶ 51 , 33 N.E.3d 288 , however, “the contents of Rule 213(f) disclosures are not evidence for purposes of summary judgment because Rule 213(f) disclosures are not pleadings, depositions, admissions, or affidavits.” (Emphasis in original.) “Notably, Rule 213(f) requires the party—not the expert himself—to disclose the substance of the expert’s anticipated testimony.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 52. ¶ 85 While our analysis indicates approval of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in IEPC’s favor, we are not at this point affirming the tri

2019People v. Ross , 2017 IL App (4th) 170121 , ¶ 32, 419 Ill.Dec. 290 , 92 N.E.3d 999 ; Vantage Hospitality Group, Inc. v. Q Ill Development, LLC , 2016 IL App (4th) 160271 , ¶¶ 46-47, 410 Ill.Dec. 738 , 71 N.E.3d 1 . ¶ 39 After IEPC filed its motion for sanctions, Pliura filed a 17-page response, but in that response, Pliura never argued that IEPC's motion failed to comply with the Code.

2019People v. Ross , 2017 IL App (4th) 170121 , ¶ 32, 419 Ill.Dec. 290 , 92 N.E.3d 999 ; Vantage Hospitality Group, Inc. v. Q Ill Development, LLC , 2016 IL App (4th) 160271 , ¶¶ 46-47, 410 Ill.Dec. 738 , 71 N.E.3d 1 . ¶ 39 After IEPC filed its motion for sanctions, Pliura filed a 17-page response, but in that response, Pliura never argued that IEPC's motion failed to comply with the Code.

2019People v. Ross , 2017 IL App (4th) 170121 , ¶ 32, 419 Ill.Dec. 290 , 92 N.E.3d 999 ; Vantage Hospitality Group, Inc. v. Q Ill Development, LLC , 2016 IL App (4th) 160271 , ¶¶ 46-47, 410 Ill.Dec. 738 , 71 N.E.3d 1 . ¶ 39 After IEPC filed its motion for sanctions, Pliura filed a 17-page response, but in that response, Pliura never argued that IEPC's motion failed to comply with the Code.

2019People v. Ross, 2017 IL App (4th) 170121, ¶ 32 , 92 N.E.3d 999 ; Vantage Hospitality Group, Inc. v. Q Ill Development, LLC, 2016 IL App (4th) 160271, ¶¶ 46-47 , 71 N.E.3d 1 . ¶ 39 After IEPC filed its motion for sanctions, Pliura filed a 17-page response, but in that response, Pliura never argued that IEPC’s motion failed to comply with the Code.

2017IEPC also argued that this court’s decision in City of Springfield v. West Koke Mill Development Corp., 312 Ill.

2017IEPC -5- also argued that this court’s decision in City of Springfield v. West Koke Mill Development Corp., 312 Ill.

2017“However, the introduction into evidence of a valid ordinance reciting the necessity for taking private property for a public purpose establishes a prima facie case authorizing the acquisition of the property in question, making it the burden of the party challenging the condemnation to come forward with evidence that the condemnor abused its discretion with respect to its decision concerning the necessity of the taking.” Id. ¶ 146 Application of the plain language of section 5-5-5(c) of the Act to the facts of this case shows that in July 2014—when IEPC filed its complaint for condemnation of

2016“However, the introduction into evidence of a valid ordinance reciting the neces- sity for taking private property for a public purpose establishes a prima facie case authorizing the acquisition of the property in question, making it the burden of the party challenging the con- demnation to come forward with evidence that the condemnor abused its discretion with respect to its decision concerning the necessity of the taking.” Id. ¶ 146 Application of the plain language of section 5-5-5(c) of the Act to the facts of this case shows that in July 2014—when IEPC filed its complaint for condemnatio

2017Given their failure, we reiterate the following: “A reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and cohesive arguments presented *** and it is not a repository - 29 - into which an appellant may foist the burden of argument and research [citation]; it is neither the function nor the obligation of this court to act as an advocate or search the record for error [citation].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Styck’s Body Shop, Inc., 396 Ill.

2017Given their failure, we reiterate the following: “A reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and cohesive arguments presented *** and it is not a repository into which an appellant may foist the burden of argument and research [citation]; it is neither the function nor the obligation of this court to act as an advocate or search the record for error [citation].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Styck’s Body Shop, Inc., 396 Ill.

2020We begin by summarizing the legal principles applicable to the motions and issues raised on appeal. ¶ 64 “Condemnation, or eminent domain, is the process by which the government takes private property for public purposes subject to payment of just compensation.” City of Chicago v. Eychaner, 2015 IL App (1st) 131833, ¶ 51 (citing Village of Bellwood v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 2011 IL App (1st) 093115, ¶ 18 ).

2017The following chronological discussion is confined to matters pertinent to those two issues. ¶7 A. Procedural History ¶8 In Enbridge Energy (Illinois), L.L.C. v. Kuerth, 2016 IL App (4th) 150519, ¶¶ 6-23 , 69 N.E.3d 287 , and Enbridge Pipeline (Illinois), LLC v. Hoke, 2017 IL App (4th) 150544 , ¶¶ 6-23, this court chronicled the extensive procedural history regarding IEPC’s intent to (1) construct, operate, and maintain the SAX project under section 15-401 of the Common Carrier by Pipeline Law (Pipeline Law) (220 ILCS 5/15-401 (West 2006)) and (2) acquire, when necessary, private property unde