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13 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Herrongreen2 sentences2022See Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 177 (stating that “plain error, while a nonconstitutional doctrine, has roots in the same soil as due process” and “[f]airness *** is the foundation of our plain-error jurisprudence”). 2022See Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 177 (stating that “plain error, while a nonconstitutional doctrine, has roots in the same soil as due process” and “[f]airness *** is the foundation of our plain-error jurisprudence”). | 2 | 4 |
In Re EHgreen2 sentences2018See In re E.H. , 224 Ill. 2d 172 , 180, 309 Ill.Dec. 1 , 863 N.E.2d 231 (2006). ¶ 111 In its decision to deny relief below, the circuit court identified as "most compelling" two major concerns with defendant's testimony. 2018See In re E.H. , 224 Ill. 2d 172 , 180, 309 Ill.Dec. 1 , 863 N.E.2d 231 (2006). ¶ 111 In its decision to deny relief below, the circuit court identified as "most compelling" two major concerns with defendant's testimony. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Underwoodgreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., People v. Green, 74 Ill. 2d 444, 450 (1979), quoting People v. Hamby, 32 Ill. 2d 291, 294 (1965); see also People v. Underwood, 72 Ill. 2d 124, 130 (1978) (holding that the object of Rule 451(c)’s limited exception “is to insure that a defendant is not denied his right to a fair and impartial jury trial”). 2005See, e.g. , People v. Green , 74 Ill. 2d 444, 450 (1979), quoting People v. Hamby , 32 Ill. 2d 291, 294 (1965); see also People v. Underwood , 72 Ill. 2d 124, 130 (1978) (holding that the object of Rule 451(c)’s limited exception “is to insure that a defendant is not denied his right to a fair and impartial jury trial”). | 2 | 2 |
The PEOPLE v. Hambygreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., People v. Green, 74 Ill. 2d 444, 450 (1979), quoting People v. Hamby, 32 Ill. 2d 291, 294 (1965); see also People v. Underwood, 72 Ill. 2d 124, 130 (1978) (holding that the object of Rule 451(c)’s limited exception “is to insure that a defendant is not denied his right to a fair and impartial jury trial”). 2005See, e.g. , People v. Green , 74 Ill. 2d 444, 450 (1979), quoting People v. Hamby , 32 Ill. 2d 291, 294 (1965); see also People v. Underwood , 72 Ill. 2d 124, 130 (1978) (holding that the object of Rule 451(c)’s limited exception “is to insure that a defendant is not denied his right to a fair and impartial jury trial”). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Greengreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., People v. Green, 74 Ill. 2d 444, 450 (1979), quoting People v. Hamby, 32 Ill. 2d 291, 294 (1965); see also People v. Underwood, 72 Ill. 2d 124, 130 (1978) (holding that the object of Rule 451(c)’s limited exception “is to insure that a defendant is not denied his right to a fair and impartial jury trial”). 2005See, e.g. , People v. Green , 74 Ill. 2d 444, 450 (1979), quoting People v. Hamby , 32 Ill. 2d 291, 294 (1965); see also People v. Underwood , 72 Ill. 2d 124, 130 (1978) (holding that the object of Rule 451(c)’s limited exception “is to insure that a defendant is not denied his right to a fair and impartial jury trial”). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Harrisgreen1 sentence2025The State notes that defendant’s claim that the trial court failed to consider his youth is meritless in light of the record, which reflects that defendant’s youth, lack of family support, gunshot injury, and loss of a friend to firearm violence were discussed at the sentencing hearing. ¶ 43 Our supreme court “has not foreclosed ‘emerging adult’ defendants between 18 and 19 years old from raising as-applied proportionate penalties clause challenges to life sentences based on the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development.” People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 87 ; see also Peopl | 1 | 1 |
People v. Thompsongreen1 sentence2025The State notes that defendant’s claim that the trial court failed to consider his youth is meritless in light of the record, which reflects that defendant’s youth, lack of family support, gunshot injury, and loss of a friend to firearm violence were discussed at the sentencing hearing. ¶ 43 Our supreme court “has not foreclosed ‘emerging adult’ defendants between 18 and 19 years old from raising as-applied proportionate penalties clause challenges to life sentences based on the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development.” People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 87 ; see also Peopl | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Russellgreen2 sentences1981Ed. 2d 366,371 , 93 S. Ct. 1637, 1641 ), distinguished this nonconstitutional defense of entrapment from the constitutional due process defense theory based on outrageous governmental conduct. ( 411 U.S. 423, 427-28, 432-33 , 36 L. 1981Ed. 2d 366,371 , 93 S. Ct. 1637, 1641 ), distinguished this nonconstitutional defense of entrapment from the constitutional due process defense theory based on outrageous governmental conduct. ( 411 U.S. 423, 427-28, 432-33 , 36 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Clark
green
1 sentence2025The State notes that defendant’s claim that the trial court failed to consider his youth is meritless in light of the record, which reflects that defendant’s youth, lack of family support, gunshot injury, and loss of a friend to firearm violence were discussed at the sentencing hearing. ¶ 43 Our supreme court “has not foreclosed ‘emerging adult’ defendants between 18 and 19 years old from raising as-applied proportionate penalties clause challenges to life sentences based on the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development.” People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 87 ; see also Peopl | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Buffer
green
1 sentence2025Thereafter, in Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 41 , our supreme court defined a de facto life sentence for a juvenile as a sentence of more than 40 years’ imprisonment. ¶ 42 The State contends that Miller does not apply to defendant because he was 19 years old at the time of the offense and that this claim is not cognizable in a postconviction petition because it is a nonconstitutional claim of sentencing error. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Suggs
green
1 sentence2021Id. ¶¶ 38-42. ¶ 37 In People v. Suggs, 2020 IL App (2d) 170632, ¶ 35 , we declined to apply Miller to a defendant who was 23 when he committed his crimes. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Rochin v. California
green
2 sentences1981Ed. 2d 366, 371, 374 , 93 S. Ct. 1637, 1640-41, 1643 .) The court concluded in Russell by acknowledging the potential validity of the due process theory, stating: “While we may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction, cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the instant case is distinctly not of that breed ° The law enforcement conduct here stops far short of violating that ‘fundamental fairness, shocking to 1981In United States v. Russell (1973), 411 U.S. 423 , 36 L.Ed.2d 366 , 93 S.Ct. 1637 , the court, while reaffirming the principle that the entrapment defense "focus[es] on the intent or predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime" ( 411 U.S. 423, 429 , 36 L.Ed.2d 366, 371 , 93 S.Ct. 1637, 1641 ), distinguished this nonconstitutional defense of entrapment from the constitutional due process defense theory based on outrageous governmental conduct. ( 411 U.S. 423, 427-28, 432-33 , 36 L.Ed.2d 366, 371, 374 , 93 S.Ct. 1637, 1640-41, 1643 .) The court concluded in Russell by acknowledging the p | 1 | 1981–1981 |
People v. Weathers
green
2 sentences1978People v. Sullivan (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 36, 44 ; People v. Weathers (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 114, 120-21 . 1978People v. Sullivan (1978), 72 Ill.2d 36, 44 ; People v. Weathers (1975), 62 Ill.2d 114, 120-21 . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
People v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences1978People v. Sullivan (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 36, 44 ; People v. Weathers (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 114, 120-21 . 1978People v. Sullivan (1978), 72 Ill.2d 36, 44 ; People v. Weathers (1975), 62 Ill.2d 114, 120-21 . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
People v. Gill
green
2 sentences1975Criminal Law § 932 (1968); cf. People v. Gill (1973), 54 Ill.2d 357, 367 , 297 N.E.2d 135 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1144 , 39 L.Ed.2d 100 , 94 S.Ct. 897 .) In People v. Perez (1975), 36 N.Y.2d 848 , 331 N.E.2d 691, 691-92 , it was held that a nonconstitutional error is reversible only if, “* * * upon the People’s evidence viewed by the fact finders as credible, there is a significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had it not been for the error which occurred.” Here two eyewitnesses testified defendant was the person who beat Young on the night in question; two othe 1975Criminal Law § 932 (1968); cf. People v. Gill (1973), 54 Ill.2d 357, 367 , 297 N.E.2d 135 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1144 , 39 L.Ed.2d 100 , 94 S.Ct. 897 .) In People v. Perez (1975), 36 N.Y.2d 848 , 331 N.E.2d 691, 691-92 , it was held that a nonconstitutional error is reversible only if, “* * * upon the People’s evidence viewed by the fact finders as credible, there is a significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had it not been for the error which occurred.” Here two eyewitnesses testified defendant was the person who beat Young on the night in question; two othe | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein
green
1 sentence1975Criminal Law § 932 (1968); cf. People v. Gill (1973), 54 Ill.2d 357, 367 , 297 N.E.2d 135 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1144 , 39 L.Ed.2d 100 , 94 S.Ct. 897 .) In People v. Perez (1975), 36 N.Y.2d 848 , 331 N.E.2d 691, 691-92 , it was held that a nonconstitutional error is reversible only if, “* * * upon the People’s evidence viewed by the fact finders as credible, there is a significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had it not been for the error which occurred.” Here two eyewitnesses testified defendant was the person who beat Young on the night in question; two othe | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Rodriguez v. Wainwright
neutral
1 sentence1975Criminal Law § 932 (1968); cf. People v. Gill (1973), 54 Ill.2d 357, 367 , 297 N.E.2d 135 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1144 , 39 L.Ed.2d 100 , 94 S.Ct. 897 .) In People v. Perez (1975), 36 N.Y.2d 848 , 331 N.E.2d 691, 691-92 , it was held that a nonconstitutional error is reversible only if, “* * * upon the People’s evidence viewed by the fact finders as credible, there is a significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had it not been for the error which occurred.” Here two eyewitnesses testified defendant was the person who beat Young on the night in question; two othe | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Williams v. Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence1975Criminal Law § 932 (1968); cf. People v. Gill (1973), 54 Ill.2d 357, 367 , 297 N.E.2d 135 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1144 , 39 L.Ed.2d 100 , 94 S.Ct. 897 .) In People v. Perez (1975), 36 N.Y.2d 848 , 331 N.E.2d 691, 691-92 , it was held that a nonconstitutional error is reversible only if, “* * * upon the People’s evidence viewed by the fact finders as credible, there is a significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had it not been for the error which occurred.” Here two eyewitnesses testified defendant was the person who beat Young on the night in question; two othe | 1 | 1975–1975 |
People v. Perez
neutral
1 sentence1975Criminal Law § 932 (1968); cf. People v. Gill (1973), 54 Ill.2d 357, 367 , 297 N.E.2d 135 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1144 , 39 L.Ed.2d 100 , 94 S.Ct. 897 .) In People v. Perez (1975), 36 N.Y.2d 848 , 331 N.E.2d 691, 691-92 , it was held that a nonconstitutional error is reversible only if, “* * * upon the People’s evidence viewed by the fact finders as credible, there is a significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had it not been for the error which occurred.” Here two eyewitnesses testified defendant was the person who beat Young on the night in question; two othe | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.