Rejecting defendant in Illinois

2009Rejecting defendant's jurisdictional challenge based on the Taylor rule, the appellate court majority applied the exception to the rule, reviewed the merits of the State's appeal, and reversed the trial court's exclusion of one of defendant's convictions. 383 Ill.App.3d 506, 507 , 322 Ill.Dec. 126 , 890 N.E.2d 1045 .

2009Rejecting defendant’s jurisdictional challenge based on the Taylor rule, the appellate court majority applied the exception to the rule, reviewed the merits of the State’s appeal, and reversed the trial court’s exclusion of one of defendant’s convictions. 383 Ill.

2000Rader , 272 Ill.

2000Rader, 272 Ill.

2017Addressing defendants' as-applied challenge under the first amendment, the court applied intermediate scrutiny, traditionally applicable to content-neutral regulations, and determined that defendants' first amendment rights were not violated. 2015 IL App (1st) 122858-B , ¶¶ 28-48, 399 Ill.Dec. 707 , 46 N.E.3d 1207 . ¶ 22 Turning to defendants' claims under the Illinois Constitution, the appellate court explained that its "review of the 1970 Illinois Constitution debates and convention supports the conclusion that the framers intended for article I, section 5 to extend a broader right of assemb

2015On interlocutory appeal, the appellate court affirmed class certification on two of the counts but reversed certification on the single count that defendant tendered relief. 2014 IL App (1st) 131543, ¶ 64 . ¶3 For the following reasons, we reverse in part and affirm in part the appellate court’s judgment. ¶4 BACKGROUND ¶5 On April 20, 2010, plaintiff, Ballard RN Center, Inc., filed a three-count class action complaint in the circuit court of Cook County, alleging that on March 3, 2010, defendant, Kohll’s Pharmacy & Homecare, Inc., sent plaintiff an unsolicited fax advertisement.

2006Rejecting defendants' contentions regarding duty, the majority states that this case is not about "whether defendants had a duty to install protective poles, or a duty to prevent a car from entering the restaurant, or some such other fact-specific formulation" but, instead, is only about recognizing "a duty of reasonable care" to protect business invitees. 222 Ill.2d at 443 , 305 Ill.Dec. at 910 , 856 N.E.2d at 1061 .

2006Rejecting defendants' contentions regarding duty, the majority states that this case is not about "whether defendants had a duty to install protective poles, or a duty to prevent a car from entering the restaurant, or some such other fact-specific formulation" but, instead, is only about recognizing "a duty of reasonable care" to protect business invitees. 222 Ill.2d at 443 , 305 Ill.Dec. at 910 , 856 N.E.2d at 1061 .

1994App. 3d at 552-53 , 599 N.E.2d at 517 .) Rejecting defendant’s passive-submission argument and finding that defendant’s consent was not inextricably bound up with the illegal search of his vehicle (as was the case in Kelly), the court stated: "[The detective’s] mere display of the photograph, albeit seized illegally from defendant’s van, without more, did not convey an apparent authority such that defendant would have believed his consent to be a passive submission to that authority rather than a voluntary relinquishment of a right.

1991(Oldenburg, 207 Ill.

1981Rejecting defendant’s argument on appeal that he was erroneously denied the right to counsel of his choice, the court said: “[A] defendant who, after having a reasonable opportunity to retain a lawyer, appears 600 without counsel, the victim or victims of the crime present, witnesses and arresting officers ready to testify, and asks for a continuance so he can obtain counsel of his choice, makes a request whose grant is discretionary. 000 Exercise of this discretion must consider, of course, that under our system of criminal justice a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel of his choi

1981App. 3d 763, 767-68 , 332 N.E.2d 493, 496-97 .

1980In People v. Rogers (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 571 , 411 N.E.2d 223 , our supreme court stated that evidence of a prior identification of defendant is admissible “[w]here the declarant is available for cross-examination and the evidence satisfies constitutional and other evidentiary requirements.” ( 81 Ill. 2d 571, 582 , 411 N.E.2d 223, 229 .) Rejecting defendant’s hearsay argument, the court held that a composite sketch and the complaining witness’ description of defendant were properly admitted into evidence as corroboration of the witness’ in-court identification.

1980In People v. Rogers (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 571 , 411 N.E.2d 223 , our supreme court stated that evidence of a prior identification of defendant is admissible “[w]here the declarant is available for cross-examination and the evidence satisfies constitutional and other evidentiary requirements.” ( 81 Ill. 2d 571, 582 , 411 N.E.2d 223, 229 .) Rejecting defendant’s hearsay argument, the court held that a composite sketch and the complaining witness’ description of defendant were properly admitted into evidence as corroboration of the witness’ in-court identification.