material deviation standard in Kansas

2019The court reversed the defendant's vehicular homicide conviction, holding that insufficient evidence supported his conviction because his action of running the red light, without any aggravating circumstances, was not a material deviation from the standard of care as required by K.S.A. 21-3405. 274 Kan. at 1075 , 58 P.3d 687 .

2019The court reversed the defendant's vehicular homicide conviction, holding that insufficient evidence supported his conviction because his action of running the red light, without any aggravating circumstances, was not a material deviation from the standard of care as required by K.S.A. 21-3405. 274 Kan. at 1075 , 58 P.3d 687 .

2013App. 2d 84 , 884 P.2d 434 (1994), the Court of Appeals held that a professional semi-truck driver travelling 50 to 55 miles per hour in a 45 mile-per-hour zone who failed to see a clearly marked construction vehicle that was visible for a quarter of a mile constituted a material deviation from the standard of care.

2002The conduct of a defendant charged under K.S.A. 21-3405 is to be judged under the totality of the circumstances. *1070 Whether Under the Totality of Circumstances Defendant’s Operation of His Vehicle Constituted “a material deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would observe under the same circumstances. ” Krowidi asserts that the “mere violation of a traffic statute or ordinance through inattention, unless compounded by other operational misconduct, alcohol or drug impairment or other aggravating conditions or circumstances, will not support a conviction of vehicular h

1985The terms ‘gross negligence,’ ‘culpable -negligence,’ ‘wanton negligence’ and ‘recklessness’ are included within the term ‘wantonness’ as used in this code.” In discussing the term in State v. Makin, 223 Kan. at 746 , we said: “Wanton conduct as so defined is not synonymous with operating a motor vehicle in a manner ‘which creates an unreasonable risk of injury to the person or property of another and which constitutes a material deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would observe under the same circumstances.’ [K.S.A. 21-3405 (vehicular homicide).] “In determining whet

1985The terms ‘gross negligence,’ ‘culpable -negligence,’ ‘wanton negligence’ and ‘recklessness’ are included within the term ‘wantonness’ as used in this code.” In discussing the term in State v. Makin, 223 Kan. at 746 , we said: “Wanton conduct as so defined is not synonymous with operating a motor vehicle in a manner ‘which creates an unreasonable risk of injury to the person or property of another and which constitutes a material deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would observe under the same circumstances.’ [K.S.A. 21-3405 (vehicular homicide).] “In determining whet

1981We upheld that statute in the face of a charge that it was unconstitutionally vague and indefinite in State v. Randol, 226 Kan. 347, 351 , 597 P.2d 672 (1979).

1981We upheld that statute in the face of a charge that it was unconstitutionally vague and indefinite in State v. Randol, 226 Kan. 347, 351 , 597 P.2d 672 (1979).

1979A conviction under the present statute requires a finding that the defendant was guilty of conduct “which creates an unreasonable risk of injury to the person or property of another and which constitutes a material deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would observe under the same circumstances. ” In State v. Gordon, 219 Kan. 643 , 549 P.2d 886 (1976), we considered the 1972 amendment while determining the degree of negligence necessary to convict under this statute.

1979A conviction under the present statute requires a finding that the defendant was guilty of conduct “which creates an unreasonable risk of injury to the person or property of another and which constitutes a material deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would observe under the same circumstances. ” In State v. Gordon, 219 Kan. 643 , 549 P.2d 886 (1976), we considered the 1972 amendment while determining the degree of negligence necessary to convict under this statute.

2006During deliberations, the jury in Chastain asked the trial court whether the fault of each driver is to be considered when interpreting die phrase “unintentionally killed” in the court’s instructions. 265 Kan. at 23 .

1978(State v. Miles, 203 Kan. 707 , 457 P.2d 166 ; see State v. Champ, 172 Kan. 737 , 242 P.2d 1070 .) In 1969 the legislature replaced the negligent homicide statute with vehicular homicide, K.S.A. 21-3405, which now reads in part: “(1) Vehicular homicide is the killing of a human being by the operation of an automobile, airplane, motor boat or other motor vehicle in a manner which creates an unreasonable risk of injury to the person or property of another and which constitutes a material deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would observe under the same circumstances.” In

1978(State v. Miles, 203 Kan. 707 , 457 P.2d 166 ; see State v. Champ, 172 Kan. 737 , 242 P.2d 1070 .) In 1969 the legislature replaced the negligent homicide statute with vehicular homicide, K.S.A. 21-3405, which now reads in part: “(1) Vehicular homicide is the killing of a human being by the operation of an automobile, airplane, motor boat or other motor vehicle in a manner which creates an unreasonable risk of injury to the person or property of another and which constitutes a material deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would observe under the same circumstances.” In