misdemeanor violation in California

2005Compared to a misdemeanor violation, "[i]f the offense is potentially a felony, society has a much greater interest in its punishment...." ( Necochea v. Superior Court, supra, 23 Cal.App.3d at p. 1016, fn. 4 , 100 Cal.Rptr. 693 .) As we once colorfully explained, the Legislature's differential treatment of misdemeanors and felonies in section 1387 is justified by the fact that felonies include crimes "so heinous in character that to [their] frequent and unchecked commission might be attributed the origin of a possible statewide disaster, or eventually, the downfall of organized society," while

2005Compared to a misdemeanor violation, "[i]f the offense is potentially a felony, society has a much greater interest in its punishment...." ( Necochea v. Superior Court, supra, 23 Cal.App.3d at p. 1016, fn. 4 , 100 Cal.Rptr. 693 .) As we once colorfully explained, the Legislature's differential treatment of misdemeanors and felonies in section 1387 is justified by the fact that felonies include crimes "so heinous in character that to [their] frequent and unchecked commission might be attributed the origin of a possible statewide disaster, or eventually, the downfall of organized society," while

2005Compared to a misdemeanor violation, "[i]f the offense is potentially a felony, society has a much greater interest in its punishment...." ( Necochea v. Superior Court, supra, 23 Cal.App.3d at p. 1016, fn. 4 , 100 Cal.Rptr. 693 .) As we once colorfully explained, the Legislature's differential treatment of misdemeanors and felonies in section 1387 is justified by the fact that felonies include crimes "so heinous in character that to [their] frequent and unchecked commission might be attributed the origin of a possible statewide disaster, or eventually, the downfall of organized society," while

2005Compared to a misdemeanor violation, "[i]f the offense is potentially a felony, society has a much greater interest in its punishment...." ( Necochea v. Superior Court, supra, 23 Cal.App.3d at p. 1016, fn. 4 , 100 Cal.Rptr. 693 .) As we once colorfully explained, the Legislature's differential treatment of misdemeanors and felonies in section 1387 is justified by the fact that felonies include crimes "so heinous in character that to [their] frequent and unchecked commission might be attributed the origin of a possible statewide disaster, or eventually, the downfall of organized society," while

2025(People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110 [“Because the defendant in a Wende appeal has a right to file supplemental contentions, the Court of Appeal must consider these contentions in the course of disposing of the cause. [T]he opinion must reflect the contentions and the reasons that they fail.”].) Accordingly, defendant’s motion is denied. 5 In the initial information, filed on October 16, 2023, the People charged defendant with a felony violation of section 69 (count I) and a misdemeanor violation of section 243, subdivision (b) (count II).

2021(See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124 .) On July 23, 2019, appellant-minor C.V. was made a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 after committing a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 368, subdivision (d)(2) and was placed on probation.

2022(People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 291 (Chatman).) A. Equal Protection On appeal, defendant first argues section 4852.01 violates equal protection because he is “similarly situated” to former prisoners who are eligible for relief under section 4852.01, subdivision (a) and there is no rational basis for the differential treatment. 4 We need not address whether defendant, as a former probationer, is similarly situated to former prisoners because the California Supreme Court has concluded a rational basis exists for disparate treatment of those two groups under section 4852.01.

2022A. Relevant Law Section 4852.01, subdivision (a), provides: “A person convicted of a felony who is committed to a state prison or other institution or agency, including commitment to a county jail . . . may file a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.” Subdivision (b) states: “A person convicted of a felony or a person who is convicted of a misdemeanor violation of any sex offense specified in Section 290, the accusatory pleading of which has been dismissed pursuant to Section 1203.4, may file a petition for certificate of rehabilit

2021(People v. Burton (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 129, 136 ; People v. Rodriguez (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1402 (Rodriguez); see also Donley v. Davi (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 447, 461 [a misdemeanor violation of “section 273.5 is a crime of moral turpitude as a matter of law”].) The Rodriguez court explained: “To violate Penal Code section 273.5 the assailant must, at the very least, have set out, successfully, to injure a person of the opposite sex in a special relationship for which society rationally demands, and the victim may reasonably expect, stability and safety, and in which the victim, for thes

2014(People v. Rodriguez (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1402 ; see also Donley v. Davi (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 447, 461 [a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 273.5 “is a crime of moral turpitude as a matter of law”]; 3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (5th ed. 2012) 7 Presentation at Trial § 318, p. 447 [a Penal Code section 273.5 conviction involves moral turpitude].) Defense counsel therefore was not deficient in failing to seek exclusion of defendant’s Penal Code section 273.5 domestic violence convictions on the ground that they lacked moral turpitude.3 (See People v. Bradley (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 6

2021(Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 178 [reversal not warranted unless “it appears ‘reasonably probable’ the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the error not occurred”].) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

2012(People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154, fn. 5 ; id. at p. 170, fn. 19; see generally People v. Ortega, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 694- 699, [the traditional crime of theft includes both petty theft and grand theft]; People v. Ryan (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 360, 364 [when the Legislature divided § 470, defining the traditional crime of forgery, into subdivisions, it described “different ways of committing a single offense, i.e., forgery”].) 11 Consequently, a person convicted of a misdemeanor violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1) would be barred from possessing a firearm under sectio

2023McKenzie appeals and contends that the trial court erred by: 1) not reducing his felony conviction to a misdemeanor violation of section 647.6, subdivision (a)(1), pursuant to Williamson, supra, 43 Cal.2d 651 ; 2) not treating his conviction as a wobbler misdemeanor pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b); and 3) imposing a lifetime sex registration requirement.

2023McKenzie appeals and contends that the trial court erred by: 1) not reducing his felony conviction to a misdemeanor violation of section 647.6, subdivision (a)(1), pursuant to Williamson, supra, 43 Cal.2d 651 ; 2) not treating his conviction as a wobbler misdemeanor pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b); and 3) imposing a lifetime sex registration requirement.

2024Even assuming any deficient performance by defense counsel, it did not cause prejudice “in the sense that it ‘so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.’ ” (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1123 , quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 686 .) II Salih next argues that the trial court violated section 654 by imposing a 364-day concurrent sentence for the misdemeanor violation of a protective order in count two.

2024Even assuming any deficient performance by defense counsel, it did not cause prejudice “in the sense that it ‘so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.’ ” (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1123 , quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 686 .) II Salih next argues that the trial court violated section 654 by imposing a 364-day concurrent sentence for the misdemeanor violation of a protective order in count two.

2021(People v. Burton (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 129, 136 ; People v. Rodriguez (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1402 (Rodriguez); see also Donley v. Davi (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 447, 461 [a misdemeanor violation of “section 273.5 is a crime of moral turpitude as a matter of law”].) The Rodriguez court explained: “To violate Penal Code section 273.5 the assailant must, at the very least, have set out, successfully, to injure a person of the opposite sex in a special relationship for which society rationally demands, and the victim may reasonably expect, stability and safety, and in which the victim, for thes

2014(People v. Rodriguez (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1402 ; see also Donley v. Davi (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 447, 461 [a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 273.5 “is a crime of moral turpitude as a matter of law”]; 3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (5th ed. 2012) 7 Presentation at Trial § 318, p. 447 [a Penal Code section 273.5 conviction involves moral turpitude].) Defense counsel therefore was not deficient in failing to seek exclusion of defendant’s Penal Code section 273.5 domestic violence convictions on the ground that they lacked moral turpitude.3 (See People v. Bradley (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 6

2021DISCUSSION “Section 1170.18 ... provides that persons who have completed felony sentences for offenses that would now be misdemeanors under Proposition 47 may file an application with the trial court to have their felony convictions ‘designated as misdemeanors.’ (§ 1170.18, subd. (f); see id., subds. (g)-(h).)” (People v. Rivera, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1093 .) Here, Smith was convicted of a misdemeanor violation of Health and Safety Code section 11550, subdivision (a).

2016DISCUSSION Standard of Review When interpreting a voter initiative, "we apply the same principles that govern statutory construction." ( People v. Rizo (2000) 22 Cal.4th 681 , 685, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 375 , 996 P.2d 27 .) We first look " 'to the language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning.' " ( Ibid. ) We construe the statutory language "in the context of the statute as a whole and the overall statutory scheme." ( Ibid. ) If the language is ambiguous, we look to " 'other indicia of the voters' intent, particularly the analyses and arguments contained in the official ballot pamp

1999Instead, it provides that in the event of a conflict, subdivision (a) prevails: " Except as provided in subdivision (a) ... any person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor violation of Section 71 ... [or] Section ... 246 ... and who, within 10 year of the conviction, owns, or has in his or her possession or under his or her custody or control, any firearm is guilty of a public offense...." [4] (Italics added.) In Rash v. Lungren (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1233 , 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 700 , the Court of Appeal construed the same statute but in the context of a misdemeanor conviction under section 245, s

1999Instead, it provides that in the event of a conflict, subdivision (a) prevails: " Except as provided in subdivision (a) ... any person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor violation of Section 71 ... [or] Section ... 246 ... and who, within 10 year of the conviction, owns, or has in his or her possession or under his or her custody or control, any firearm is guilty of a public offense...." [4] (Italics added.) In Rash v. Lungren (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1233 , 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 700 , the Court of Appeal construed the same statute but in the context of a misdemeanor conviction under section 245, s

2005(See Stats.1975, ch. 1069, § 1, p. 2615 [amending § 1387 to add felony dismissal limit]; People v. Williams (1969) 71 Cal.2d 614, 623 , 79 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 456 P.2d 633 .) Section 1387 reflects a legislative judgment that because of the heightened threat to society posed by serious crimes, more filings should be permitted for serious crimes than for minor ones. [6] In turn, the best measure of the seriousness of a crime — and the corresponding societal interest in its prosecution and punishment — is not how the crime was originally charged, based on possibly limited evidence, but how the prosecu

2005(See Stats.1975, ch. 1069, § 1, p. 2615 [amending § 1387 to add felony dismissal limit]; People v. Williams (1969) 71 Cal.2d 614, 623 , 79 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 456 P.2d 633 .) Section 1387 reflects a legislative judgment that because of the heightened threat to society posed by serious crimes, more filings should be permitted for serious crimes than for minor ones. [6] In turn, the best measure of the seriousness of a crime — and the corresponding societal interest in its prosecution and punishment — is not how the crime was originally charged, based on possibly limited evidence, but how the prosecu

2005Compared to a misdemeanor violation, "[i]f the offense is potentially a felony, society has a much greater interest in its punishment...." ( Necochea v. Superior Court, supra, 23 Cal.App.3d at p. 1016, fn. 4 , 100 Cal.Rptr. 693 .) As we once colorfully explained, the Legislature's differential treatment of misdemeanors and felonies in section 1387 is justified by the fact that felonies include crimes "so heinous in character that to [their] frequent and unchecked commission might be attributed the origin of a possible statewide disaster, or eventually, the downfall of organized society," while

2005Compared to a misdemeanor violation, "[i]f the offense is potentially a felony, society has a much greater interest in its punishment...." ( Necochea v. Superior Court, supra, 23 Cal.App.3d at p. 1016, fn. 4 , 100 Cal.Rptr. 693 .) As we once colorfully explained, the Legislature's differential treatment of misdemeanors and felonies in section 1387 is justified by the fact that felonies include crimes "so heinous in character that to [their] frequent and unchecked commission might be attributed the origin of a possible statewide disaster, or eventually, the downfall of organized society," while

2000“As the moving party in a criminal action, it is the People’s obligation ... to tender adequate instructions ... so that a lawful determination can be made and sustained on appeal.” (People v. Winslow (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 680, 683 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 901 ].) That did not occur here.

2000“As the moving party in a criminal action, it is the People’s obligation ... to tender adequate instructions ... so that a lawful determination can be made and sustained on appeal.” (People v. Winslow (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 680, 683 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 901 ].) That did not occur here.

1993(People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 479 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 ]; People v. Ladanio (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1114, 1120 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 12 ]; People v. Hernandez, supra, at pp. 288-289 .) Relying on In re Reed, supra, 33 Cal.3d 914 (hereafter Reed) and In re King (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 554 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 39 ] (hereafter King), appellant maintains that imposition of a registration requirement for a misdemeanor violation of section 314, subdivision 1 is inherently cruel and unusual punishment, even without consideration given to the specific facts of the case or particular nature of

1987(In re Reed, supra, at p. 917.) King committed a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 314, subdivision 1 (indecent exposure).

2025If Davis had admitted a felony violation of former section 245, subdivision (a)(1), which was later reduced to a misdemeanor violation at his disposition hearing or at some point thereafter, the assault charge would have become a misdemeanor “for all purposes” from the moment of the reduction onwards. (§ 17, subd. (b); see In re C.H. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1146 [“ ‘[W]hen a wobbler is reduced to a misdemeanor [under section 17], the offense thereafter is deemed a “misdemeanor for all purposes ….” ’ [Citations.] Put differently, redesignation under section 17 makes the wobbler ‘a misdemeano

2025If Davis had admitted a felony violation of former section 245, subdivision (a)(1), which was later reduced to a misdemeanor violation at his disposition hearing or at some point thereafter, the assault charge would have become a misdemeanor “for all purposes” from the moment of the reduction onwards. (§ 17, subd. (b); see In re C.H. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1146 [“ ‘[W]hen a wobbler is reduced to a misdemeanor [under section 17], the offense thereafter is deemed a “misdemeanor for all purposes ….” ’ [Citations.] Put differently, redesignation under section 17 makes the wobbler ‘a misdemeano

2025If Davis had admitted a felony violation of former section 245, subdivision (a)(1), which was later reduced to a misdemeanor violation at his disposition hearing or at some point thereafter, the assault charge would have become a misdemeanor “for all purposes” from the moment of the reduction onwards. (§ 17, subd. (b); see In re C.H. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1146 [“ ‘[W]hen a wobbler is reduced to a misdemeanor [under section 17], the offense thereafter is deemed a “misdemeanor for all purposes ….” ’ [Citations.] Put differently, redesignation under section 17 makes the wobbler ‘a misdemeano

2025That conviction is not included within the scope of this appeal. 6 963, 977.) On the other hand, section 148(a)(1) requires that the defendant “knew or reasonably should have known the person they resisted was a police officer.” (People v. Serna (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 563 , 567; see also People v. Rasmussen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1421 .) Mercurio claims a “jury could have reasonably concluded that the evidence failed to demonstrate [Mercurio] actually knew he was resisting an executive officer, given that he was unconscious and then positioned face down on the ground.” But the evidence b

2025(Park, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 794 ; see, e.g., § 17, subd. (e) [section 17 “does not authorize a judge to relieve a defendant of the duty to register as a sex offender” if the defendant is found guilty of a crime requiring sex offender registration]; People v. Feyrer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 426, 442, fn. 8 [under the Three Strikes Law, a wobbler reduced to a misdemeanor under section 17, subd. (b)(3) after a court suspends the imposition of a sentence can serve as a strike if the defendant suffers a subsequent felony conviction].) We discern no legislative intent to override section 17, subdivision

2025If Davis had admitted a felony violation of former section 245, subdivision (a)(1), which was later reduced to a misdemeanor violation at his disposition hearing or at some point thereafter, the assault charge would have become a misdemeanor “for all purposes” from the moment of the reduction onwards. (§ 17, subd. (b); see In re C.H. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1146 [“ ‘[W]hen a wobbler is reduced to a misdemeanor [under section 17], the offense thereafter is deemed a “misdemeanor for all purposes ….” ’ [Citations.] Put differently, redesignation under section 17 makes the wobbler ‘a misdemeano