misdemeanor violation in Maryland

2016The phrase “need not” expresses that an arrest is not mandatory in these circumstances – apparently a restatement of the discretion that an officer has under the general arrest authority granted by CP §2-202.12 The second clause of that sentence qualifies that general statement and appears to restrict the officer’s discretion to forgo an arrest in certain circumstances – i.e., when the alleged 10 Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 131 , 756 A.2d 987 (2000). 11120 West Fayette Street LLLP v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 413 Md. 309, 331 , 992 A.2d 459 (2010). 12Not

2016The phrase “need not” expresses that an arrest is not mandatory in these circumstances – apparently a restatement of the discretion that an officer has under the general arrest authority granted by CP §2-202.12 The second clause of that sentence qualifies that general statement and appears to restrict the officer’s discretion to forgo an arrest in certain circumstances – i.e., when the alleged 10 Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 131 , 756 A.2d 987 (2000). 11120 West Fayette Street LLLP v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 413 Md. 309, 331 , 992 A.2d 459 (2010). 12Not

2016The phrase “need not” expresses that an arrest is not mandatory in these circumstances – apparently a restatement of the discretion that an officer has under the general arrest authority granted by CP §2-202.12 The second clause of that sentence qualifies that general statement and appears to restrict the officer’s discretion to forgo an arrest in certain circumstances – i.e., when the alleged 10 Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 131 , 756 A.2d 987 (2000). 11120 West Fayette Street LLLP v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 413 Md. 309, 331 , 992 A.2d 459 (2010). 12Not

2016The phrase “need not” expresses that an arrest is not mandatory in these circumstances – apparently a restatement of the discretion that an officer has under the general arrest authority granted by CP §2-202.12 The second clause of that sentence qualifies that general statement and appears to restrict the officer’s discretion to forgo an arrest in certain circumstances – i.e., when the alleged 10 Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 131 , 756 A.2d 987 (2000). 11120 West Fayette Street LLLP v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 413 Md. 309, 331 , 992 A.2d 459 (2010). 12Not

2007The question of whether this Court would follow Weeks v. United States, supra, under the Maryland Constitution, arose in Meisinger v. State, 155 Md. 195 , 141 A. 536 , 142 A. 190 (1928), where the defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor violation of the liquor laws, and the prosecution’s evidence introduced at his trial was the product of an illegal search and seizure.

2007The question of whether this Court would follow Weeks v. United States, supra, under the Maryland Constitution, arose in Meisinger v. State, 155 Md. 195 , 141 A. 536 , 142 A. 190 (1928), where the defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor violation of the liquor laws, and the prosecution’s evidence introduced at his trial was the product of an illegal search and seizure.

2007In Commonwealth v. Howe, 405 Mass. 332 , 540 N.E.2d 677 (1989), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered the authority of a deputy sheriff to arrest a person without a warrant for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, a misdemeanor.

2007In Commonwealth v. Howe, 405 Mass. 332 , 540 N.E.2d 677 (1989), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered the authority of a deputy sheriff to arrest a person without a warrant for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, a misdemeanor.

1956Even if we assume that the appellant is entitled to an appeal to this Court, which we do not find in this case, and assume without deciding that lack of jurisdiction in the Criminal Court of Baltimore can be raised on habeas corpus by a defective delinquent, compare Superintendent v. Calman, 203 Md. 414 , 101 A. 2d 207 , we must note that appellant was convicted under the indictment, among other things, for being a “rogue and vagabond”, a misdemeanor in violation of Code, 1951, Article 27,' Section 576.

1956Even if we assume that the appellant is entitled to an appeal to this Court, which we do not find in this case, and assume without deciding that lack of jurisdiction in the Criminal Court of Baltimore can be raised on habeas corpus by a defective delinquent, compare Superintendent v. Calman, 203 Md. 414 , 101 A. 2d 207 , we must note that appellant was convicted under the indictment, among other things, for being a “rogue and vagabond”, a misdemeanor in violation of Code, 1951, Article 27,' Section 576.