highest standard in New Jersey

1981The Court in Steiner went on, however, to recognize that, because “an attorney’s position of trust as an officer of the court obligated him to the highest standard of fair dealing,” New Jersey courts of equity have traditionally exercised jurisdiction “at the behest of the client” to “revisje] or cance[l] contracts for services" and to “determin[e] the just and reasonable sum due the attorney from his client.” Id.

1981The Court in Steiner went on, however, to recognize that, because "an attorney's position of trust as an officer of the court obligated him to the highest standard of fair dealing," New Jersey courts of equity have traditionally exercised jurisdiction "at the behest of the client" to "revis[e] or cance[l] contracts for services" and to "determin[e] the just and reasonable sum due the attorney from his client." Id.

2024They hold this State’s law enforcement officers to the highest standard of conduct, “one of the obligations [that officers] undertake[] upon voluntary entry into the public service.” Phillips, 117 N.J. at 577 (quoting In re Appeal of Emmons, 63 N.J.

2017His one-sided argument has been rejected by the Supreme Court in A.W. and A.S., as discussed infra. 9 The motion court cited Presha for the proposition that the police are required to ensure that the interrogation of a juvenile is conducted in accordance with "the highest standard of fundamental fairness and due process." However, Presha, supra, made clear that heightened requirement is added "when an adult is unavailable or declines to accompany the juvenile," and it has been applied only in that context. 163 N.J. at 317 ; see, e.g., A.W., supra, 212 N.J. at 130, 136 ; State ex rel.

2010"We construe legislation[, however,] to avoid such an absurd result." Miller v. Estate of Sperling, 166 N.J. 370, 383 , 766 A. 2d 738 (2001); State v. Provenzano, 34 N.J. 318, 322 , 169 A. 2d 135 (1961).

2010"We construe legislation[, however,] to avoid such an absurd result." Miller v. Estate of Sperling, 166 N.J. 370, 383 , 766 A. 2d 738 (2001); State v. Provenzano, 34 N.J. 318, 322 , 169 A. 2d 135 (1961).

2010"We construe legislation[, however,] to avoid such an absurd result." Miller v. Estate of Sperling, 166 N.J. 370, 383 , 766 A. 2d 738 (2001); State v. Provenzano, 34 N.J. 318, 322 , 169 A. 2d 135 (1961).

2010"We construe legislation[, however,] to avoid such an absurd result." Miller v. Estate of Sperling, 166 N.J. 370, 383 , 766 A. 2d 738 (2001); State v. Provenzano, 34 N.J. 318, 322 , 169 A. 2d 135 (1961).

2002While not positive on this record, Campbell probably was not a business invitee, requiring the highest standard of care, id. at 433 , 625 A. 2d 1110 , or a trespasser, requiring a lesser standard of care under the common law.

2002While not positive on this record, Campbell probably was not a business invitee, requiring the highest standard of care, id. at 433 , 625 A. 2d 1110 , or a trespasser, requiring a lesser standard of care under the common law.

1994Id. at 260 , 627 A.2d 630 .

1994Id. at 260 , 627 A.2d 630 .

1993See, e.g., People v. *83 Martin, 112 Ill.App.3d 486, 68 Ill.Dec. 151 , 445 N.E.2d 795 (1983); In the Interest of Winslow, 46 Ill.App.3d 962 , 5 Ill.Dec. 299 , 361 N.E.2d 622 (1992); King v. State, 598 N.E.2d 589 (Ind.App.1992); State v. Ryan, 233 Neb. 74, 444 N.W.2d 610 (1989); State v. Middelstadt, 579 P.2d 908 (Utah 1978).

1993See, e.g., People v. *83 Martin, 112 Ill.App.3d 486, 68 Ill.Dec. 151 , 445 N.E.2d 795 (1983); In the Interest of Winslow, 46 Ill.App.3d 962 , 5 Ill.Dec. 299 , 361 N.E.2d 622 (1992); King v. State, 598 N.E.2d 589 (Ind.App.1992); State v. Ryan, 233 Neb. 74, 444 N.W.2d 610 (1989); State v. Middelstadt, 579 P.2d 908 (Utah 1978).

1993See, e.g., People v. *83 Martin, 112 Ill.App.3d 486, 68 Ill.Dec. 151 , 445 N.E.2d 795 (1983); In the Interest of Winslow, 46 Ill.App.3d 962 , 5 Ill.Dec. 299 , 361 N.E.2d 622 (1992); King v. State, 598 N.E.2d 589 (Ind.App.1992); State v. Ryan, 233 Neb. 74, 444 N.W.2d 610 (1989); State v. Middelstadt, 579 P.2d 908 (Utah 1978).

1993See, e.g., People v. *83 Martin, 112 Ill.App.3d 486, 68 Ill.Dec. 151 , 445 N.E.2d 795 (1983); In the Interest of Winslow, 46 Ill.App.3d 962 , 5 Ill.Dec. 299 , 361 N.E.2d 622 (1992); King v. State, 598 N.E.2d 589 (Ind.App.1992); State v. Ryan, 233 Neb. 74, 444 N.W.2d 610 (1989); State v. Middelstadt, 579 P.2d 908 (Utah 1978).

1993See, e.g., People v. *83 Martin, 112 Ill.App.3d 486, 68 Ill.Dec. 151 , 445 N.E.2d 795 (1983); In the Interest of Winslow, 46 Ill.App.3d 962 , 5 Ill.Dec. 299 , 361 N.E.2d 622 (1992); King v. State, 598 N.E.2d 589 (Ind.App.1992); State v. Ryan, 233 Neb. 74, 444 N.W.2d 610 (1989); State v. Middelstadt, 579 P.2d 908 (Utah 1978).

1993See, e.g., People v. *83 Martin, 112 Ill.App.3d 486, 68 Ill.Dec. 151 , 445 N.E.2d 795 (1983); In the Interest of Winslow, 46 Ill.App.3d 962 , 5 Ill.Dec. 299 , 361 N.E.2d 622 (1992); King v. State, 598 N.E.2d 589 (Ind.App.1992); State v. Ryan, 233 Neb. 74, 444 N.W.2d 610 (1989); State v. Middelstadt, 579 P.2d 908 (Utah 1978).

1992Plaintiff seeks to have this court adopt the reasoning of the Third District Court of Appeals of California in Squaw Valley Ski Corp. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 4th 1499 , 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897 , (1992) that a ski area is a common carrier in the operation of its ski lifts and the highest standard of care applies There are two New Jersey statutes which regulate ski areas, N.J.S.A. 5:13-1 et seq. (hereinafter "Ski Act") and N.J.S.A. 34:4A-1 et seq. (hereinafter "Ski Lift Safety Act").

1992Plaintiff seeks to have this court adopt the reasoning of the Third District Court of Appeals of California in Squaw Valley Ski Corp. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 4th 1499 , 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897 , (1992) that a ski area is a common carrier in the operation of its ski lifts and the highest standard of care applies There are two New Jersey statutes which regulate ski areas, N.J.S.A. 5:13-1 et seq. (hereinafter "Ski Act") and N.J.S.A. 34:4A-1 et seq. (hereinafter "Ski Lift Safety Act").

1974In so doing the Court of Chancery has invoked a variety of remedies ranging from the investigation of the fairness of any agreement between attorney and client to restraining actions at law, threatened or existing, and from revising or cancelling contracts for services to determining the just and reasonable sum due the attorney from his client. [at 372] While contingent fees are permitted in New Jersey ( Hassell v. Van Houten, 39 N.J.

1974The duty and function of the Appellate Divisions to keep the house of the law in order does not hinge upon whether clients, worn down by injuries, delay, financial need and counsel holding the purse strings of settlement, knowing little about law or lawyers, have had the stamina to resist in court by hiring other lawyers to be paid out of the other half of the recovery for defending against the first lawyer. [ 188 N.Y.S. 2d at 501 , 160 N.E. 2d at 51 ] As Chief Justice Vanderbilt said in Steiner v. Stein, 2 N.J. 367 (1949): By reason, however, of the confidential relation of client and attorne

1974The duty and function of the Appellate Divisions to keep the house of the law in order does not hinge upon whether clients, worn down by injuries, delay, financial need and counsel holding the purse strings of settlement, knowing little about law or lawyers, have had the stamina to resist in court by hiring other lawyers to be paid out of the other half of the recovery for defending against the first lawyer. [ 188 N.Y.S. 2d at 501 , 160 N.E. 2d at 51 ] As Chief Justice Vanderbilt said in Steiner v. Stein, 2 N.J. 367 (1949): By reason, however, of the confidential relation of client and attorne

1973The comment of the Supreme Court in Stein has particular significance here: Where there is revelation of a fraud about to be perpetrated upon a Court, of which an attorney is an officer, there is a definite obligation upon and we conceive it to be the duty of that attorney to communicate and make a full disclosure of such to the Court * * * [ 1 N.J. at 236 ] VI CONCLUSION In conclusion, it must be strongly emphasized that the courts and the public are entitled to the highest standard of conduct on the part of members of the bar.