action to enforce claim in New York

1955Where the claimant is an infant, or is mentally or physically incapacitated, and by reason of such disability fails to serve a notice of claim as provided in the foregoing subdivisions of this section within the time limited therefor * * * the court, in its discretion, may grant leave to serve the notice of claim within a reasonable time after the expiration of the time specified in subdivision one, “ Application for such leave must be made within the period of one year after the happening of the event upon which the claim is based, and shall be made prior to the commencement of an action to e

1952Subdivision 5 provided, however, that'1* Where the claimant is an infant, or is mentally or physically incapacitated, and by reason of such disability fails to serve a notice of claim * * * within the time limited therefor * * * the court, in its discretion, may grant leave to serve the notice of claim within a reasonable time after the expiration of the time specified in subdivision one.” (Emphasis supplied.) The next paragraph provided, “ Application for such leave must be made within the period of one year after the happening of the event upon which the claim is based, and shall be made pri

2018Auth. , 97 AD3d 668 , 668 [2012]; Matter of Joy v County of Suffolk , 89 AD3d 1025, 1025 [2011]; Matter of Lewin v County of Suffolk , 239 AD2d 345, 346 [1997]) [FN1] .

2002Claims Against an Estate By letter dated January 10, 2002, the court asked both sides whether the proceeding commenced by the estate should be considered a proceeding to determine the validity of the People’s judgment and whether the Supreme Court should remit this matter to the Surrogate’s Court. 9 Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act § 1809 provides that an estate may ask the court to determine the validity of a claim if the claimant has not commenced an action to enforce the claim (compare, Estate of Balfe, 161 AD2d 1132 , with Matter of Good-son, 231 AD2d 66 ).

1983Center ( 95 AD2d 795, 796 ) this court wrote: “Prior to the 1976 amendment to subdivision five of section 50-e of the General Municipal Law, that section provided that an application for leave to serve a late notice ‘shall be made prior to the commencement of an action to enforce the claim’ (see General Municipal Law, § 50-e, former subd 5).

1968And an action to enforce a claim in regard to a partner’s interest in the real property cannot support a lis pendens (Rosen v. Rosen, 126 Misc. 37 ).

1965Where, as here, “the commencement of an action has been stayed * * * by statutory prohibition, the duration of the stay is not a part of the time within which the action must be commenced.” (CPLR 204, subd. [a]; see, also, Brehm v. Mayor, 104 N. Y. 186 ; Amex Asphalt Corp. v. City of New York, 263 App. Div. 968 , affd. 288 N. Y. 721 ; Israel v. City of New York, 28 Misc 2d 418 ; Gurfein v. City of New York, 28 Misc 2d 252 .) Thus, this action, commenced on March 22, 1965, is not time-barred.

1965Where, as here, “the commencement of an action has been stayed * * * by statutory prohibition, the duration of the stay is not a part of the time within which the action must be commenced.” (CPLR 204, subd. [a]; see, also, Brehm v. Mayor, 104 N. Y. 186 ; Amex Asphalt Corp. v. City of New York, 263 App. Div. 968 , affd. 288 N. Y. 721 ; Israel v. City of New York, 28 Misc 2d 418 ; Gurfein v. City of New York, 28 Misc 2d 252 .) Thus, this action, commenced on March 22, 1965, is not time-barred.

1965Where, as here, “the commencement of an action has been stayed * * * by statutory prohibition, the duration of the stay is not a part of the time within which the action must be commenced.” (CPLR 204, subd. [a]; see, also, Brehm v. Mayor, 104 N. Y. 186 ; Amex Asphalt Corp. v. City of New York, 263 App. Div. 968 , affd. 288 N. Y. 721 ; Israel v. City of New York, 28 Misc 2d 418 ; Gurfein v. City of New York, 28 Misc 2d 252 .) Thus, this action, commenced on March 22, 1965, is not time-barred.

1965Where, as here, “the commencement of an action has been stayed * * * by statutory prohibition, the duration of the stay is not a part of the time within which the action must be commenced.” (CPLR 204, subd. [a]; see, also, Brehm v. Mayor, 104 N. Y. 186 ; Amex Asphalt Corp. v. City of New York, 263 App. Div. 968 , affd. 288 N. Y. 721 ; Israel v. City of New York, 28 Misc 2d 418 ; Gurfein v. City of New York, 28 Misc 2d 252 .) Thus, this action, commenced on March 22, 1965, is not time-barred.

1951XVIII; Public Authorities Law, § 1201; Matter of New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N. Y. 333 .) Subdivision 5 of section 50-e provides that: “ Application for such leave must be made within the period of one year after the happening of the event upon which the claim is based, and shall be made prior to the commencement of an action to enforce the claim (Italics supplied.) In the case at bar it appears that an action was heretofore commenced on behalf of the infant claimant against the New York City Housing Authority to enforce the claim which is the subject of this motion and that

1937(McGregor v. McGregor, 35 N. Y. 218, 222 .) For the reasons stated the court deems the motions of the accountants and the special guardian for a dismissal of the objections to the account to be wholly without merit, and they are, accordingly, denied.

1937(Matter of Leopold, 259 N. Y. 274, 276 ; Scully v. McGrath, 201 id. 61, 64.) On the principle that the greater must include the lesser, it would appear logically inevitable that he must also individually possess the right to institute an action to enforce a claim of the estate, and it has so been held.

1911(Bean v. Flint, 138 App. Div. 846 .) In that case Miller, -J., after reciting the provisions of the statute in question, continues: “It will, be observed that the statute radically différs from those under which it has been held permissible to validate the transfer by subsequently, affixing stamps.

1876(Dunlevy v. Tallmadge, 32 N. Y., 457.) A judgment creditor, even, cannot have an action to enforce his claim against the equitable interests of the debtor, until after the issue and return of an execution against the property of the debtor.