courts have implied requirement in New York

1992Although the courts have implied the requirement of notice and hearing where the exercise of a statutory power adversely affects property rights and the statute was silent (see, Matter of Hecht v Monaghan, 307 NY 461 ), the right to bid on a contract is not a property right.

1983“Where the exercise of a statutory power adversely affects property rights — as it does in the present case — the courts have implied the requirement of notice and hearing, where the statute was silent” (Matter of Hecht v Monaghan, 307 NY 461, 468 ; see Matter of White Plains Nursing Home v Whalen, 53 AD2d 926, 927 , affd 42 NY2d 838 , cert den 434 US 1066 ).

1978As enunciated in Matter of Hecht v Monaghan ( 307 NY 461, 468 ): "Where the exercise of a statutory power adversely affects property rights — as it does in the present case — the courts have implied the requirement of notice and hearing, where the statute was silent (see Wong Yang Sung v. Mc-Grath, 339 U. S. 33 ; Clarksburg-Columbus Short Route Bridge Co. v. Woodring, 89 F. 2d 788, 790 ; Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 ; Railroad Comm. v. Pacific Gas Co., 302 U. S. 388 ; Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 ; People ex rel.

1975Where the exercise of a statutory power adversely affects property rights * * * the courts have implied the requirement of notice and hearing, where the statute was silent (see Wong Tang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 ; Clarksburg-Columbus Short Route Bridge Co. v. Woodring, 89 F. 2d 788, 790 ; Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 ; Railroad Comm. v. Pacific Gas Co., 302 U. S. 388 ; Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 ; People ex rel.

1978As enunciated in Matter of Hecht v Monaghan ( 307 NY 461, 468 ): "Where the exercise of a statutory power adversely affects property rights — as it does in the present case — the courts have implied the requirement of notice and hearing, where the statute was silent (see Wong Yang Sung v. Mc-Grath, 339 U. S. 33 ; Clarksburg-Columbus Short Route Bridge Co. v. Woodring, 89 F. 2d 788, 790 ; Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 ; Railroad Comm. v. Pacific Gas Co., 302 U. S. 388 ; Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 ; People ex rel.

1975Where the exercise of a statutory power adversely affects property rights * * * the courts have implied the requirement of notice and hearing, where the statute was silent (see Wong Tang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 ; Clarksburg-Columbus Short Route Bridge Co. v. Woodring, 89 F. 2d 788, 790 ; Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 ; Railroad Comm. v. Pacific Gas Co., 302 U. S. 388 ; Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 ; People ex rel.

1978As enunciated in Matter of Hecht v Monaghan ( 307 NY 461, 468 ): "Where the exercise of a statutory power adversely affects property rights — as it does in the present case — the courts have implied the requirement of notice and hearing, where the statute was silent (see Wong Yang Sung v. Mc-Grath, 339 U. S. 33 ; Clarksburg-Columbus Short Route Bridge Co. v. Woodring, 89 F. 2d 788, 790 ; Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 ; Railroad Comm. v. Pacific Gas Co., 302 U. S. 388 ; Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 ; People ex rel.

1975Where the exercise of a statutory power adversely affects property rights * * * the courts have implied the requirement of notice and hearing, where the statute was silent (see Wong Tang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 ; Clarksburg-Columbus Short Route Bridge Co. v. Woodring, 89 F. 2d 788, 790 ; Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 ; Railroad Comm. v. Pacific Gas Co., 302 U. S. 388 ; Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 ; People ex rel.

1978As enunciated in Matter of Hecht v Monaghan ( 307 NY 461, 468 ): "Where the exercise of a statutory power adversely affects property rights — as it does in the present case — the courts have implied the requirement of notice and hearing, where the statute was silent (see Wong Yang Sung v. Mc-Grath, 339 U. S. 33 ; Clarksburg-Columbus Short Route Bridge Co. v. Woodring, 89 F. 2d 788, 790 ; Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 ; Railroad Comm. v. Pacific Gas Co., 302 U. S. 388 ; Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 ; People ex rel.

1975Where the exercise of a statutory power adversely affects property rights * * * the courts have implied the requirement of notice and hearing, where the statute was silent (see Wong Tang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 ; Clarksburg-Columbus Short Route Bridge Co. v. Woodring, 89 F. 2d 788, 790 ; Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 ; Railroad Comm. v. Pacific Gas Co., 302 U. S. 388 ; Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 ; People ex rel.

1978As enunciated in Matter of Hecht v Monaghan ( 307 NY 461, 468 ): "Where the exercise of a statutory power adversely affects property rights — as it does in the present case — the courts have implied the requirement of notice and hearing, where the statute was silent (see Wong Yang Sung v. Mc-Grath, 339 U. S. 33 ; Clarksburg-Columbus Short Route Bridge Co. v. Woodring, 89 F. 2d 788, 790 ; Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 ; Railroad Comm. v. Pacific Gas Co., 302 U. S. 388 ; Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 ; People ex rel.

1975Where the exercise of a statutory power adversely affects property rights * * * the courts have implied the requirement of notice and hearing, where the statute was silent (see Wong Tang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 ; Clarksburg-Columbus Short Route Bridge Co. v. Woodring, 89 F. 2d 788, 790 ; Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 ; Railroad Comm. v. Pacific Gas Co., 302 U. S. 388 ; Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 ; People ex rel.

1978Copcutt v. Board of Health of City of Yonkers, 140 N. Y. 1, 6-7 ).” The court does not believe, however, that a hearing need be implied or otherwise afforded plaintiff on the review of its application for the issuance of licenses for coin-controlled amusement devices.

1967Copcutt v. Board of Health of City of Yonkers, 140 N. Y. 1, 6-7 ).” (Matter of Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N. Y. 461, 468 .) And in Matter of Moore v. Macduff ( 309 N. Y. 35, 38-39 ) the court says: “ The possession of a license to drive is a vested property right.

1976The petitioner herein is entitled to a due process hearing on the challenges brought by appellant to its right to keep moneys already paid (Matter of Birnbaum v Whalen, 85 Misc 2d 512 ; see, also, Coral Gables Convalescent Home v Richardson, 340 F Supp 646 ).

1975Copcutt v. Board of Health of City of Yonkers, 140 N, Y. 1, 6-7).” As heretofore noted, the question of whether the petitioner had attained a “ property right ” was answered in the negative by the Special Term on the authority of Board of Regents v. Roth ( 408 U. S. 564 , supra).

1972That is not, however, the case when it is alleged that due process of law has been denied; for, as was said in Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works ( 237 U. S. 413, 424 ): ‘ To one who protests against the taking of his property without due process of law, it is no answer to say that in his particular case due process of law would have led to the same result because he had no adequate defense upon the merits’.” Where the exercise of a statutory power adversely affects property rights, as section 219 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law does here, the courts have implied the requirement of notice and he

1967Copcutt v. Board of Health of City of Yonkers, 140 N. Y. 1, 6-7 ).” (Matter of Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N. Y. 461, 468 .) And in Matter of Moore v. Macduff ( 309 N. Y. 35, 38-39 ) the court says: “ The possession of a license to drive is a vested property right.

1966Copcutt v. Board of Health of City of Yonkers, 140 N. Y. 1, 6-7 ).” In Matter of Brown v. Murphy ( 34 Misc 2d 151 ) the court held that since the opportunity to work as a tow truck driver is a right and not a privilege, the application for such a license cannot be rejected without affording the applicant an opportunity to be heard.

1961The statute (Village Law, § 89, subds. 48, 52) does not empower the Board of Trustees to prohibit peddling by a particular individual or by peddlers generally (Good Humor Corp. v. City of New York, 290 N. Y. 312 , supra) and insofar as Ordinance No. 1 attempts to enlarge upon the authority conferred upon the Board of Trustees by the Village Law by providing that they need not issue a license until “ they shall within their own judgment and discretion be satisfied that any issuance of a license would be in every way proper and not detrimental to the best interest of the village, the public, or