English common law rule in New York

2016By the 1970’s, however, American courts began to adopt the English common-law rule” (Apache Nation, 564 US at 170-171 [citations omitted]). 5 Apache Nation identifies as “[t]he leading American case on the fiduciary exception” ( 564 US at 171 ) the Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in Riggs ( 355 A2d 709 [Del Ch 1976], supra), in which a trustee was compelled to produce to the trust’s beneficiaries an attorney’s legal memorandum (the Workman memorandum) that had been prepared for the trustee, at the trust’s expense, in anticipation of potential tax litigation on behalf of the trust ( 355 A2d

2016By the 1970’s, however, American courts began to adopt the English common-law rule” (Apache Nation, 564 US at 170-171 [citations omitted]). 5 Apache Nation identifies as “[t]he leading American case on the fiduciary exception” ( 564 US at 171 ) the Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in Riggs ( 355 A2d 709 [Del Ch 1976], supra), in which a trustee was compelled to produce to the trust’s beneficiaries an attorney’s legal memorandum (the Workman memorandum) that had been prepared for the trustee, at the trust’s expense, in anticipation of potential tax litigation on behalf of the trust ( 355 A2d

1998Necessity of use by the public was essential to the Morgan Court when it crafted this definition from its English ancestor. *602 Inasmuch as the English common-law rule was "but an outgrowth or product of the peculiar circumstances and necessities of the people with whom it originated," the New York rule found its basis in New York necessities ( id. , at 459).

1995And if, after he had pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried: for how can he make his defence?” (4 Blackstone, Commentaries, at 24-25.) The Supreme Court has referred to the long history of this prohibition, and noted that some believe it may have resulted from the common-law ban on trials in absentia (Drope v Missouri, 420 US 162, 171 ).

1990New York had little statutory law on the subject (e.g., L 1788, ch XII; L 1801, ch 30; L 1847, ch 280; 1 Rev Laws of 1813, ch XXX, at 147; 2 Rev Stat, part II, ch V, tit II [1st ed]), but generally followed early English common-law procedures (see, Matter of Clapp, 20 How Prac 385 [1861]; Hughes v Jones, supra; Matter of McGuinness, 290 NY 117, 128 ; Matter of Klein, 34 Misc 2d 621 ; In re Stern, 114 NYS2d 17 , 18).

1990New York had little statutory law on the subject (e.g., L 1788, ch XII; L 1801, ch 30; L 1847, ch 280; 1 Rev Laws of 1813, ch XXX, at 147; 2 Rev Stat, part II, ch V, tit II [1st ed]), but generally followed early English common-law procedures (see, Matter of Clapp, 20 How Prac 385 [1861]; Hughes v Jones, supra; Matter of McGuinness, 290 NY 117, 128 ; Matter of Klein, 34 Misc 2d 621 ; In re Stern, 114 NYS2d 17 , 18).

1990New York had little statutory law on the subject (e.g., L 1788, ch XII; L 1801, ch 30; L 1847, ch 280; 1 Rev Laws of 1813, ch XXX, at 147; 2 Rev Stat, part II, ch V, tit II [1st ed]), but generally followed early English common-law procedures (see, Matter of Clapp, 20 How Prac 385 [1861]; Hughes v Jones, supra; Matter of McGuinness, 290 NY 117, 128 ; Matter of Klein, 34 Misc 2d 621 ; In re Stern, 114 NYS2d 17 , 18).

1946This was followed shortly by the act of the Legislature earlier mentioned which provided “ No gift, grant, bequest or devise to religious, educational, charitable, or benevolent uses, which shall, in other respects be valid under the laws of this state, shall or be deemed invalid by reason of the indefiniteness or uncertainty of the persons designated as the beneficiaries thereunder in the instrument creating the same.” It was determined in Allen v. Stevens {supra) that the Legislature also intended to reinstate the English common-law rule as to perpetuities which had been disapproved by the d

1940Again, in Doyle v. Lord ( 64 N. Y. 432 ) the court, although sustaining an implied easement of light and air under the special circumstances of that case, stated the general rule as follows (p. 439): “ This conclusion is reached without any departure from what may be called the American doctrine as to light and air, as distinguished from the English common law doctrine, and the law as laid down in the following authorities is fully recognized: Parker v. Foote ( 19 Wend. 315 ); Palmer v. Wetmore (2 Sandf.

1938(Snyder v. Warren, 2 Cow. 518 ; Phelan v. Douglass, 11 How.

1938(Snyder v. Warren, 2 Cow. 518 ; Phelan v. Douglass, 11 How.

1932The common-law rule in England, however, has been stated without such a limitation by Chief Justice Kent in Yates v. Lansing ( 5 Johns. 282 ).

1924Loomis v. Canal Appraisers, 33 N. Y. 461 , held that the English common-law rule, which limited navigable and public rivers to those in which the tide ebbed and flowed, was unsuited and inapplicable to our country; and that where a river, such as the Mohawk, was actually navigable, it was subservient to the public use and a conveyance bounded by it carried only to its bank.

1893In People v. Rossiter, 4 Cow. 143 , the English rule was again followed, and it was held that the state was not bound by an insolvent or bankrupt law unless named in it.

1893When we examine the decisions of our own state upon the subject, we find that the question arose in the case of People v. Gilbert, 18 Johns. 227 , and that it was held that the English common-law rule that the king is not bound by a statute of limitations was, by the adoption of the constitution, made the law of this state, and that the state was not included in the general expressions of a statute.