follow-up inquiry in New York

2024"If a prospective juror makes statements that raise a serious doubt regarding his or her ability to be impartial, the trial court should conduct a follow-up inquiry regarding the preexisting opinion and must excuse the juror unless he or she states unequivocally on the record that he or she can be fair and impartial" ( People v Dirschberger , 185 AD3d 1224, 1226 [3d Dept 2020] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 36 NY3d 1056 [2021]).

2024"If a prospective juror makes statements that raise a serious doubt regarding his or her ability to be impartial, the trial court should conduct a follow-up inquiry regarding the preexisting opinion and must excuse the juror unless he or she states unequivocally on the record that he or she can be fair and impartial" ( People v Dirschberger , 185 AD3d 1224, 1226 [3d Dept 2020] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 36 NY3d 1056 [2021]).

2022Pursuant to CPL 270.20 (1) (b), a party may challenge [*4]a prospective juror for cause if the juror "has a state of mind that is likely to preclude him [or her] from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at the trial." "If a prospective juror makes statements that raise a serious doubt regarding his or her ability to be impartial, the trial court should conduct a follow-up inquiry regarding the preexisting opinion and must excuse the juror unless he or she states unequivocally on the record that he or she can be fair and impartial" ( People v Jackson , 176 AD3d 1312 ,

2022Pursuant to CPL 270.20 (1) (b), a party may challenge [*4]a prospective juror for cause if the juror "has a state of mind that is likely to preclude him [or her] from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at the trial." "If a prospective juror makes statements that raise a serious doubt regarding his or her ability to be impartial, the trial court should conduct a follow-up inquiry regarding the preexisting opinion and must excuse the juror unless he or she states unequivocally on the record that he or she can be fair and impartial" ( People v Jackson , 176 AD3d 1312 ,

2022"If a prospective juror makes statements that raise a serious doubt regarding his or her ability to be impartial, the trial court should conduct a follow-up inquiry regarding the preexisting opinion and must excuse the juror unless he or she states unequivocally on the record that he or she can be fair and impartial" ( People v Rios , 192 AD3d 1336, 1337 [2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Patterson , 34 NY3d 1112 , 1113 [2019]; People v Warrington , 28 NY3d 1116, 1119-1120 [2016]).

2019If a prospective juror makes statements that raise a serious doubt regarding his or her ability to be impartial, the trial court should conduct a follow-up inquiry regarding the preexisting opinion and must excuse the juror unless he or she states unequivocally on the record that he or she can be fair and impartial ( see People v Warrington , 28 NY3d 1116, 1119-1120 [2016]; People v Harris , 19 NY3d 679 at 685-686 ; People v Arnold , 96 NY2d 358, 362-363 [2001]).

2021"If there is any doubt about a prospective juror's impartiality, trial courts should err on the side of excusing the juror, since at worst the court will have 'replaced one impartial juror with another'" ( People v Arnold , 96 NY2d 358, 362 [2001], quoting People v Culhane , 33 NY2d 90 , 108 n 3 [1973]).

2019If a prospective juror makes statements that raise a serious doubt regarding his or her ability to be impartial, the trial court should conduct a follow-up inquiry regarding the preexisting opinion and must excuse the juror unless he or she states unequivocally on the record that he or she can be fair and impartial ( see People v Warrington , 28 NY3d 1116, 1119-1120 [2016]; People v Harris , 19 NY3d 679 at 685-686 ; People v Arnold , 96 NY2d 358, 362-363 [2001]).

2012Although the County Court erred by failing to obtain individual, unequivocal assurances that each of the remaining prospective jurors who had raised their hands would be able to render a verdict based solely on the evidence adduced at trial (see People v Kenner, 8 AD3d 296, 297 [2004]; People v Henriques, 307 AD2d 937 [2003]), reversal is not required because defense counsel declined to exercise his available peremptory challenges against these prospective jurors, and did not exhaust his peremptory challenges prior to the completion of jury selection (see CPL 270.20 [2]; People v Lynch, 95 NY2

2012Although the County Court erred by failing to obtain individual, unequivocal assurances that each of the remaining prospective jurors who had raised their hands would be able to render a verdict based solely on the evidence adduced at trial (see People v Kenner, 8 AD3d 296, 297 [2004]; People v Henriques, 307 AD2d 937 [2003]), reversal is not required because defense counsel declined to exercise his available peremptory challenges against these prospective jurors, and did not exhaust his peremptory challenges prior to the completion of jury selection (see CPL 270.20 [2]; People v Lynch, 95 NY2

2012Although the County Court erred by failing to obtain individual, unequivocal assurances that each of the remaining prospective jurors who had raised their hands would be able to render a verdict based solely on the evidence adduced at trial (see People v Kenner, 8 AD3d 296, 297 [2004]; People v Henriques, 307 AD2d 937 [2003]), reversal is not required because defense counsel declined to exercise his available peremptory challenges against these prospective jurors, and did not exhaust his peremptory challenges prior to the completion of jury selection (see CPL 270.20 [2]; People v Lynch, 95 NY2

2012Although the County Court erred by failing to obtain individual, unequivocal assurances that each of the remaining prospective jurors who had raised their hands would be able to render a verdict based solely on the evidence adduced at trial (see People v Kenner, 8 AD3d 296, 297 [2004]; People v Henriques, 307 AD2d 937 [2003]), reversal is not required because defense counsel declined to exercise his available peremptory challenges against these prospective jurors, and did not exhaust his peremptory challenges prior to the completion of jury selection (see CPL 270.20 [2]; People v Lynch, 95 NY2

2012Although the County Court erred by failing to obtain individual, unequivocal assurances that each of the remaining prospective jurors who had raised their hands would be able to render a verdict based solely on the evidence adduced at trial (see People v Kenner, 8 AD3d 296, 297 [2004]; People v Henriques, 307 AD2d 937 [2003]), reversal is not required because defense counsel declined to exercise his available peremptory challenges against these prospective jurors, and did not exhaust his peremptory challenges prior to the completion of jury selection (see CPL 270.20 [2]; People v Lynch, 95 NY2

2012Although the County Court erred by failing to obtain individual, unequivocal assurances that each of the remaining prospective jurors who had raised their hands would be able to render a verdict based solely on the evidence adduced at trial (see People v Kenner, 8 AD3d 296, 297 [2004]; People v Henriques, 307 AD2d 937 [2003]), reversal is not required because defense counsel declined to exercise his available peremptory challenges against these prospective jurors, and did not exhaust his peremptory challenges prior to the completion of jury selection (see CPL 270.20 [2]; People v Lynch, 95 NY2

2012Although the County Court erred by failing to obtain individual, unequivocal assurances that each of the remaining prospective jurors who had raised their hands would be able to render a verdict based solely on the evidence adduced at trial (see People v Kenner, 8 AD3d 296, 297 [2004]; People v Henriques, 307 AD2d 937 [2003]), reversal is not required because defense counsel declined to exercise his available peremptory challenges against these prospective jurors, and did not exhaust his peremptory challenges prior to the completion of jury selection (see CPL 270.20 [2]; People v Lynch, 95 NY2

2012Although the County Court erred by failing to obtain individual, unequivocal assurances that each of the remaining prospective jurors who had raised their hands would be able to render a verdict based solely on the evidence adduced at trial (see People v Kenner, 8 AD3d 296, 297 [2004]; People v Henriques, 307 AD2d 937 [2003]), reversal is not required because defense counsel declined to exercise his available peremptory challenges against these prospective jurors, and did not exhaust his peremptory challenges prior to the completion of jury selection (see CPL 270.20 [2]; People v Lynch, 95 NY2

2024Accordingly, "[a] statement by a potential juror suggesting a possible bias can be cured, and the juror not excused, if the juror provides unequivocal assurance that he or she can set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence" ( People v Bedard , 132 AD3d 1070, 1070 [3d Dept 2015] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]).

2024Accordingly, "[a] statement by a potential juror suggesting a possible bias can be cured, and the juror not excused, if the juror provides unequivocal assurance that he or she can set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence" ( People v Bedard , 132 AD3d 1070, 1070 [3d Dept 2015] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]).

2022Defendant's contention that the conviction is not supported by legally sufficient evidence because the People failed to establish that she was intoxicated is unpreserved for appellate review, as defendant made only a general motion to dismiss following the People's case ( see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins , 11 NY3d 484, 491-492 [2008]; People v Hines , 97 NY2d 56, 61 [2001]) and failed to renew the motion after presenting her own evidence ( see People v Kolupa , 13 NY3d 786, 787 [2009]; Hines , 97 NY2d at 61 ; cf. People v Finch , 23 NY3d 408, 412, 416 [2014]).

2022"If a prospective juror makes statements that raise a serious doubt regarding his or her ability to be impartial, the trial court should conduct a follow-up inquiry regarding the preexisting opinion and must excuse the juror unless he or she states unequivocally on the record that he or she can be fair and impartial" ( People v Rios , 192 AD3d 1336, 1337 [2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Patterson , 34 NY3d 1112 , 1113 [2019]; People v Warrington , 28 NY3d 1116, 1119-1120 [2016]).

2022The juror's responses, when viewed in context and as a whole ( see Chambers , 97 NY2d at 419 ), did not raise a serious doubt as to her ability to render an impartial verdict, so as to trigger a duty upon the court to conduct a follow-up inquiry ( see People v Dirschberger , 185 AD3d 1224, 1227 [2020]; People v DeFreitas , 116 AD3d 1078, 1079-1080 [2014]; Hall , 2018 NY Slip Op 50566[U] ).

2022Defendant's contention that the conviction is not supported by legally sufficient evidence because the People failed to establish that she was intoxicated is unpreserved for appellate review, as defendant made only a general motion to dismiss following the People's case ( see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins , 11 NY3d 484, 491-492 [2008]; People v Hines , 97 NY2d 56, 61 [2001]) and failed to renew the motion after presenting her own evidence ( see People v Kolupa , 13 NY3d 786, 787 [2009]; Hines , 97 NY2d at 61 ; cf. People v Finch , 23 NY3d 408, 412, 416 [2014]).

2022Defendant's contention that the conviction is not supported by legally sufficient evidence because the People failed to establish that she was intoxicated is unpreserved for appellate review, as defendant made only a general motion to dismiss following the People's case ( see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins , 11 NY3d 484, 491-492 [2008]; People v Hines , 97 NY2d 56, 61 [2001]) and failed to renew the motion after presenting her own evidence ( see People v Kolupa , 13 NY3d 786, 787 [2009]; Hines , 97 NY2d at 61 ; cf. People v Finch , 23 NY3d 408, 412, 416 [2014]).

2022Defendant's contention that the conviction is not supported by legally sufficient evidence because the People failed to establish that she was intoxicated is unpreserved for appellate review, as defendant made only a general motion to dismiss following the People's case ( see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins , 11 NY3d 484, 491-492 [2008]; People v Hines , 97 NY2d 56, 61 [2001]) and failed to renew the motion after presenting her own evidence ( see People v Kolupa , 13 NY3d 786, 787 [2009]; Hines , 97 NY2d at 61 ; cf. People v Finch , 23 NY3d 408, 412, 416 [2014]).

2022Defendant's contention that the conviction is not supported by legally sufficient evidence because the People failed to establish that she was intoxicated is unpreserved for appellate review, as defendant made only a general motion to dismiss following the People's case ( see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins , 11 NY3d 484, 491-492 [2008]; People v Hines , 97 NY2d 56, 61 [2001]) and failed to renew the motion after presenting her own evidence ( see People v Kolupa , 13 NY3d 786, 787 [2009]; Hines , 97 NY2d at 61 ; cf. People v Finch , 23 NY3d 408, 412, 416 [2014]).