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13 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1875–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gigliotti v. Biancogreen2 sentences2015We conclude, however, that Supreme Court erred in awarding attorneys’ fees to petitioners as a sanction for frivolous conduct without issuing a written decision setting forth the conduct on which the award is based and the reasons why the court found that conduct to be frivolous, as required by 22 NYCRR 130-1.2 (see Matter of Bedworth-Holgado v Holgado, 85 AD3d 1589, 1590 [2011]; Matter of Gigliotti v Bianco, 82 AD3d 1636, 1638 [2011]). 2015We conclude, however, that Supreme Court erred in awarding attorneys’ fees to petitioners as a sanction for frivolous conduct without issuing a written decision setting forth the conduct on which the award is based and the reasons why the court found that conduct to be frivolous, as required by 22 NYCRR 130-1.2 (see Matter of Bedworth-Holgado v Holgado, 85 AD3d 1589, 1590 [2011]; Matter of Gigliotti v Bianco, 82 AD3d 1636, 1638 [2011]). | 2 | 3 |
BEDWORTH-HOLGADO, JODI M. v. HOLGADO, JOSEPH M.green2 sentences2015We conclude, however, that Supreme Court erred in awarding attorneys’ fees to petitioners as a sanction for frivolous conduct without issuing a written decision setting forth the conduct on which the award is based and the reasons why the court found that conduct to be frivolous, as required by 22 NYCRR 130-1.2 (see Matter of Bedworth-Holgado v Holgado, 85 AD3d 1589, 1590 [2011]; Matter of Gigliotti v Bianco, 82 AD3d 1636, 1638 [2011]). 2015We conclude, however, that Supreme Court erred in awarding attorneys’ fees to petitioners as a sanction for frivolous conduct without issuing a written decision setting forth the conduct on which the award is based and the reasons why the court found that conduct to be frivolous, as required by 22 NYCRR 130-1.2 (see Matter of Bedworth-Holgado v Holgado, 85 AD3d 1589, 1590 [2011]; Matter of Gigliotti v Bianco, 82 AD3d 1636, 1638 [2011]). | 2 | 3 |
New Franklin Center for Rehabilitation & Nursing v. Novellogreen1 sentence2016In this regard, the case law makes clear— and the parties again readily acknowledge * —that “a challenge to the methodology is properly considered by way of CPLR article 78 review” (Matter of Amsterdam Nursing Home Corp. [1992] v Daines, 68 AD3d 1591, 1591-1592 [2009]; see generally Matter of New Franklin Ctr. for Rehabilitation & Nursing v Novella, 64 AD3d 1132, 1134 [2009], lvs denied 13 NY3d 715 , 716 [2010]). | 1 | 1 |
Amsterdam Nursing Home Corp. v. Dainesgreen1 sentence2016In this regard, the case law makes clear— and the parties again readily acknowledge * —that “a challenge to the methodology is properly considered by way of CPLR article 78 review” (Matter of Amsterdam Nursing Home Corp. [1992] v Daines, 68 AD3d 1591, 1591-1592 [2009]; see generally Matter of New Franklin Ctr. for Rehabilitation & Nursing v Novella, 64 AD3d 1132, 1134 [2009], lvs denied 13 NY3d 715 , 716 [2010]). | 1 | 1 |
MATTER OF LONG v. Woodruffgreen1 sentence2016In this regard, the case law makes clear— and the parties again readily acknowledge * —that “a challenge to the methodology is properly considered by way of CPLR article 78 review” (Matter of Amsterdam Nursing Home Corp. [1992] v Daines, 68 AD3d 1591, 1591-1592 [2009]; see generally Matter of New Franklin Ctr. for Rehabilitation & Nursing v Novella, 64 AD3d 1132, 1134 [2009], lvs denied 13 NY3d 715 , 716 [2010]). | 1 | 1 |
Wooten v. Stategreen1 sentence2008Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court should have exercised its discretion in granting that branch of Chase’s motion which was for leave to plead the affirmative defense (see CPLR 3025 [b]; Wooten v State of New York, 302 AD2d at 74-75 [permitting posttrial amendment of defendant’s answer to include affirmative defense of CPLR 4545 absent prejudice or surprise to the claimant]). | 1 | 1 |
United Community Insurance v. Mucatelgreen1 sentence2001Co. v Mucatel, supra, at 1046). | 1 | 1 |
Ogden v. Prenticegreen2 sentences1875The judgment purchased by them, having been recovered subsequent to the assignment to the plaintiff, is neither an offset nor defense to his right of recovery (Ogden v. Prentice, 33 Barb. 160 ; Lowell v. Lane, Id. 295, 302 ). 1875The judgment purchased by them, having been recovered subsequent to the assignment to the plaintiff, is neither an offset nor defense to his right of recovery (Ogden v. Prentice, 33 Barb. 160 ; Lowell v. Lane, Id. 295, 302 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re the Arbitration between Nationwide Insurance & Winn
neutral
1 sentence1996Co. [Winn], 215 AD2d 958, 959 .) We find that it does, and hence under Stolarz, the offset clause is enforceable. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Johnson v. Meyer
green
1 sentence1943One, concededly, was properly stricken out; and only the propriety of striking out the second defense is challenged, such defense being that the value of the property may be invoked as an offset or defense. , The record in this posture is a counterpart or twin of the record in Johnson v. Meyer ( 242 App. Div. 798 , affd. 268 N. Y. 701 ). | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Johnson v. Meyer
neutral
1 sentence1943One, concededly, was properly stricken out; and only the propriety of striking out the second defense is challenged, such defense being that the value of the property may be invoked as an offset or defense. , The record in this posture is a counterpart or twin of the record in Johnson v. Meyer ( 242 App. Div. 798 , affd. 268 N. Y. 701 ). | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Campbell v. Mesier
green
1 sentence1914(See Jones v. Duerk, 25 App. Div. 551 ; 2 Reeves Real Prop. § 686; Campbell v. Mesier, 4 Johns. | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Jones v. Duerk
neutral
1 sentence1914(See Jones v. Duerk, 25 App. Div. 551 ; 2 Reeves Real Prop. § 686; Campbell v. Mesier, 4 Johns. | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Harwell v. Steel
green
1 sentence1910(Harwell v. Steel, 17 Ala. 372 .) The defendant had also the! right to resort to the Mackellar judgment for the purpose of preventing a recovery on the Wyckoff judgment under the doctrine of ¡equitable set off of mutual debts. -A-court of equity will compel the assignee of an insolvent to allow as an offset a claim against the Insolvent where injustice; would otherwise result, even though an action at law could not then be maintained. | 1 | 1910–1910 |
In Re the General Assignment of Hatch
green
1 sentence1910(Matter of Hatch, 155 N. Y. 401 .) At the time this action was commenced defendant; had both a legal and equitable right to defeat the plaintiff’s Claim, by using the Maclcellar judgment, and if the action had been tried at anytime before WyckofPs discharge — more than two years thereafter — it would have prevented a recovery by the plaintiff. | 1 | 1910–1910 |
Lindsay v. Jackson & McJimpsey
green
1 sentence1889(Lindsay v. Jackson, 2 Paige, 581, 584 ; Smith v. Felton, supra) In equity the *9 right to a set-off does not depend upon the statute, but upon the equities existing in each particular case, and the fact of the insolvency of one of the parties, so that no satisfaction ■can be obtained by a direct proceeding against the defendant for recovery of the debt, frequently gives rise to the right of set-off aside from any other fact. | 1 | 1889–1889 |
Smith v. . Felton
green
1 sentence1889(Lindsay v. Jackson, 2 Paige, 581, 584 ; Smith v. Felton, supra) In equity the *9 right to a set-off does not depend upon the statute, but upon the equities existing in each particular case, and the fact of the insolvency of one of the parties, so that no satisfaction ■can be obtained by a direct proceeding against the defendant for recovery of the debt, frequently gives rise to the right of set-off aside from any other fact. | 1 | 1889–1889 |
National Bank of Auburn v. . Lewis
neutral
1 sentence1883Can the defendant avail itself of the balance due from McRae on the genéral account as an offset to the claim.for penalties.» In the case of the National Bank of Auburn v. Lewis ( 81 N. Y., 15 ) the court hold, in effect, that the deduction made by way of discount on a note is interest reserved, and that it is not paid until the note is paid, or a payment made thereon which either by agreement of the parties or by'operation of law is applied to the payment of the interest. | 1 | 1883–1883 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.