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13 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1984–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ciesinski v. Town of Auroragreen2 sentences2012That contention is not properly before us because it was not raised before the trial court (see Ciesinski v Town of Aurora, 202 AD2d 984, 985 [1994]), and in any event it is without merit. 2012That contention is not properly before us because it was not raised before the trial court (see Ciesinski v Town of Aurora, 202 AD2d 984, 985 ), and in any event it is without merit. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Stachnikgreen1 sentence2016Moreover, the County Court erred in imposing a surcharge in excess of five percent of the entire amount of restitution, as the record contains no affidavit from the official or organization responsible for collecting the surcharge demonstrating that the actual cost of collection and administration will exceed five percent (see Penal Law § 60.27 [8]; People v Perez, 130 AD3d 1496, 1497 [2015]; People v Stachnik, 101 AD3d 1590, 1592 [2012]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ayersgreen1 sentence2016Accordingly, so much of the judgment as directed the defendant to make restitution must be vacated and the matter remitted to the sentencing court for a hearing and a new determination as to whether the defendant should be *709 required to make restitution and, if so, the proper amount and the manner of payment (see People v Rodriguez, 73 AD3d at 817 ; People v Vella, 176 AD2d 768 [1991]; People v Kronenberg, 167 AD2d 483, 484 [1990]; People v Barnes, 135 AD2d 825, 826 [1987]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hayesgreen1 sentence2016Accordingly, so much of the judgment as directed the defendant to make restitution must be vacated and the matter remitted to the sentencing court for a hearing and a new determination as to whether the defendant should be *709 required to make restitution and, if so, the proper amount and the manner of payment (see People v Rodriguez, 73 AD3d at 817 ; People v Vella, 176 AD2d 768 [1991]; People v Kronenberg, 167 AD2d 483, 484 [1990]; People v Barnes, 135 AD2d 825, 826 [1987]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Perezgreen1 sentence2016Moreover, the County Court erred in imposing a surcharge in excess of five percent of the entire amount of restitution, as the record contains no affidavit from the official or organization responsible for collecting the surcharge demonstrating that the actual cost of collection and administration will exceed five percent (see Penal Law § 60.27 [8]; People v Perez, 130 AD3d 1496, 1497 [2015]; People v Stachnik, 101 AD3d 1590, 1592 [2012]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Grayson
green
2 sentences2025Relevant to the penalty imposed by a sentencing court are factors that include, among other things, a defendant's demeanor, criminal and social history, truthfulness, attitudes toward society, and prospects for rehabilitation ( see Grayson , 438 US at 50 ; see also CPL 390.30 [1]). 2025Relevant to the penalty imposed by a sentencing court are factors that include, among other things, a defendant's demeanor, criminal and social history, truthfulness, attitudes toward society, and prospects for rehabilitation ( see Grayson , 438 US at 50 ; see also CPL 390.30 [1]). | 2 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Rodriguez
green
2 sentences2019Thus, so much of the judgment as directed the defendant to make restitution, plus a surcharge, must be vacated and the matter remitted to the sentencing court for a hearing and a new determination as to whether the defendant should be required to make restitution, plus the authorized surcharge, and, if so, the proper amount and the manner of payment ( see People v Martinez , 144 AD3d 708 ; People v Rodriguez , 73 AD3d at 817 ; People v Vella , 176 AD2d 768 ). 2016Accordingly, so much of the judgment as directed the defendant to make restitution must be vacated and the matter remitted to the sentencing court for a hearing and a new determination as to whether the defendant should be *709 required to make restitution and, if so, the proper amount and the manner of payment (see People v Rodriguez, 73 AD3d at 817 ; People v Vella, 176 AD2d 768 [1991]; People v Kronenberg, 167 AD2d 483, 484 [1990]; People v Barnes, 135 AD2d 825, 826 [1987]). | 2 | 2016–2019 |
People v. Vella
green
2 sentences2019Thus, so much of the judgment as directed the defendant to make restitution, plus a surcharge, must be vacated and the matter remitted to the sentencing court for a hearing and a new determination as to whether the defendant should be required to make restitution, plus the authorized surcharge, and, if so, the proper amount and the manner of payment ( see People v Martinez , 144 AD3d 708 ; People v Rodriguez , 73 AD3d at 817 ; People v Vella , 176 AD2d 768 ). 2016Accordingly, so much of the judgment as directed the defendant to make restitution must be vacated and the matter remitted to the sentencing court for a hearing and a new determination as to whether the defendant should be *709 required to make restitution and, if so, the proper amount and the manner of payment (see People v Rodriguez, 73 AD3d at 817 ; People v Vella, 176 AD2d 768 [1991]; People v Kronenberg, 167 AD2d 483, 484 [1990]; People v Barnes, 135 AD2d 825, 826 [1987]). | 2 | 2016–2019 |
People v. Thigpen
neutral
2 sentences1992Accordingly, the matter is remitted for a hearing to determine the amount of restitution owed by defendant (see, People v Ramirez, supra; People v Clougher, supra; People v Thigpen, 60 AD2d 860 ). 1984(People v Fuller, 57 NY2d 152 ; People v Julye, 64 AD2d 614 ; People v Thigpen, 60 AD2d 860 ; Penal Law, § 65.10, subd 2, par [g].) 3 The People candidly concede that the sentencing court was in error in delegating that authority to the Probation Department. | 2 | 1984–1992 |
People v. Fuller
green
2 sentences1988Therefore, the sentence must be modified to vacate the order of restitution and the matter remitted to the sentencing court for a hearing on the amount of loss or damage caused by defendant (Penal Law § 60.27 [2]; § 65.10 [2] [g]; People v Fuller, 57 NY2d 152, 157-159 ; People v Dixon, supra; People v Sommer, supra). 1984(People v Fuller, 57 NY2d 152 ; People v Julye, 64 AD2d 614 ; People v Thigpen, 60 AD2d 860 ; Penal Law, § 65.10, subd 2, par [g].) 3 The People candidly concede that the sentencing court was in error in delegating that authority to the Probation Department. | 2 | 1984–1988 |
People v. Philip
green
1 sentence2022As fully described above, this issue was repeatedly raised before the sentencing court by defense counsel, who "made his position with respect to the ruling . . . known to the court" (CPL 470.05[2]; cf. People v Stowe , 15 AD3d 597, 598 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Martinez
neutral
1 sentence2019Thus, so much of the judgment as directed the defendant to make restitution, plus a surcharge, must be vacated and the matter remitted to the sentencing court for a hearing and a new determination as to whether the defendant should be required to make restitution, plus the authorized surcharge, and, if so, the proper amount and the manner of payment ( see People v Martinez , 144 AD3d 708 ; People v Rodriguez , 73 AD3d at 817 ; People v Vella , 176 AD2d 768 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
1 sentence2003The court properly denied defendant’s motion to set aside his sentence as a discretionary persistent felony offender, made on the ground that the procedure under which it was imposed involved unconstitutional factfinding by the sentencing court in violation of Apprendi v New Jersey ( 530 US 466 [2000]). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Pando-Franco v. United States
green
1 sentence2003We need not decide whether People v Rosen ( 96 NY2d 329 [2001], cert denied 534 US 899 [2001]), to the extent that it upholds the constitutionality of the discretionary persistent felony offender procedure, conflicts with Ring v Arizona (536 US 584 [2002]), because the particular facts upon which the sentencing court based its determination were all permissible under Apprendi , in that they constituted facts found by the jury in the instant case, prior convictions and undisputed matters of record. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Ring v. Arizona
green
1 sentence2003We need not decide whether People v Rosen ( 96 NY2d 329 [2001], cert denied 534 US 899 [2001]), to the extent that it upholds the constitutionality of the discretionary persistent felony offender procedure, conflicts with Ring v Arizona (536 US 584 [2002]), because the particular facts upon which the sentencing court based its determination were all permissible under Apprendi , in that they constituted facts found by the jury in the instant case, prior convictions and undisputed matters of record. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Rosen
green
1 sentence2003We need not decide whether People v Rosen ( 96 NY2d 329 [2001], cert denied 534 US 899 [2001]), to the extent that it upholds the constitutionality of the discretionary persistent felony offender procedure, conflicts with Ring v Arizona (536 US 584 [2002]), because the particular facts upon which the sentencing court based its determination were all permissible under Apprendi , in that they constituted facts found by the jury in the instant case, prior convictions and undisputed matters of record. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Campbell v. Pesce
green
1 sentence1995Wright merely sanctioned an inherent authority of the sentencing court where the error was a "slip of a tongue” or as later affirmed in Campbell (supra, at 169 ) the Court had "merely misspoken.” The Legislature has clearly defined the parameters for correcting illegal sentences. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Clougher
green
1 sentence1992Accordingly, the matter is remitted for a hearing to determine the amount of restitution owed by defendant (see, People v Ramirez, supra; People v Clougher, supra; People v Thigpen, 60 AD2d 860 ). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Ramirez
green
1 sentence1992Accordingly, the matter is remitted for a hearing to determine the amount of restitution owed by defendant (see, People v Ramirez, supra; People v Clougher, supra; People v Thigpen, 60 AD2d 860 ). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Kelley
green
1 sentence1992The colloquy between the sentencing court and defense counsel was insufficient to establish the victim’s monetary loss (cf., People v Kelsky, 144 AD2d 386, 387 , lv denied 73 NY2d 787 ). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Sommer
green
1 sentence1988Therefore, the sentence must be modified to vacate the order of restitution and the matter remitted to the sentencing court for a hearing on the amount of loss or damage caused by defendant (Penal Law § 60.27 [2]; § 65.10 [2] [g]; People v Fuller, 57 NY2d 152, 157-159 ; People v Dixon, supra; People v Sommer, supra). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
People v. Castrechino
green
1 sentence1988Therefore, the sentence must be modified to vacate the order of restitution and the matter remitted to the sentencing court for a hearing on the amount of loss or damage caused by defendant (Penal Law § 60.27 [2]; § 65.10 [2] [g]; People v Fuller, 57 NY2d 152, 157-159 ; People v Dixon, supra; People v Sommer, supra). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
People v. Harris
green
1 sentence1986The sentencing court at bar, however, properly determined that defendant had knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty to the predicate felony (see, People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9 ). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. Julye
green
1 sentence1984(People v Fuller, 57 NY2d 152 ; People v Julye, 64 AD2d 614 ; People v Thigpen, 60 AD2d 860 ; Penal Law, § 65.10, subd 2, par [g].) 3 The People candidly concede that the sentencing court was in error in delegating that authority to the Probation Department. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.