beginning of the sentencing hearing in Ohio

2019State v. Leopard, 194 Ohio App.3d 500 , 2011-Ohio-3864 , 957 N.E.2d 55, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54 , 2006-Ohio-855 , 846 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 38 . {¶ 17} At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the trial court indicated that it had reviewed the presentence investigation report (PSI) and the State’s sentencing memorandum, which included photographs of the condition of Huffman’s apartment after the incident.

2019State v. Leopard, 194 Ohio App.3d 500 , 2011-Ohio-3864 , 957 N.E.2d 55, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54 , 2006-Ohio-855 , 846 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 38 . {¶ 17} At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the trial court indicated that it had reviewed the presentence investigation report (PSI) and the State’s sentencing memorandum, which included photographs of the condition of Huffman’s apartment after the incident.

2012Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶10} The record here demonstrates that at the beginning of the sentencing hearing the trial court asked the parties if there was any reason not to proceed.

2003The motion to withdraw the guilty plea here was made by Munger's attorney at the beginning of the sentencing hearing and before sentencing, (Tr. 10) and the court stated that there would be a hearing on that issue "at this time." Id.

2022Champaign No. 2015-CA-1, 2015-Ohio-4711, ¶ 11 . {¶ 14} Before applying these nine factors, we will review what was said at the beginning of the sentencing hearing.

2020Similarly, R.C. 2929.12 does not require the trial court to “use specific language or make specific findings on the record in order to evince the requisite consideration of the applicable seriousness and recidivism factors.” Shaw, citing State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215 , 724 N.E.2d 793 (2000). {¶44} At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that the sentence was predicated upon a review of the entire record, including the jury verdict, the presentence investigation report, and the EOCC report that Appellant was appropriate for placement.

2020Similarly, R.C. 2929.12 does not require the trial court to “use specific language or make specific findings on the record in order to evince the requisite consideration of the applicable seriousness and recidivism factors.” Shaw, citing State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215 , 724 N.E.2d 793 (2000). {¶44} At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that the sentence was predicated upon a review of the entire record, including the jury verdict, the presentence investigation report, and the EOCC report that Appellant was appropriate for placement.

2014But Tompkins then contends that “the exchange at the beginning of the sentencing hearing should have put the trial court on notice that the proceeding was possibly flawed and further inquiry should be undertaken.” Id. {¶ 8} Tompkins relies on the following exchange that took place at the sentencing hearing: [COUNSEL FOR THE STATE]: * * * Both of those earlier felonies 4 revolve around the Defendant drinking in a bar and then end up fighting with or punching someone.

2013The Court then ascertained that the Defendant understood the same and with such understanding still wished to enter pleas of Guilty, as contemplated by North Carolina v. Alford, supra, to the crimes of Attempted Pandering Sexually Oriented Matter Involving a Minor, as set forth in Counts Twenty- Six, Twenty-Seven, Twenty-Eight, and Twenty-Nine of the Indictment.” (5/15/12 J.E. at 4). {¶7} At the beginning of the sentencing hearing on July 27, 2012, the trial court first heard arguments on the issue of merger.

2013State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 , 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002). {¶31} At the beginning of the sentencing hearing in this case, the trial court explained that it was merging Counts 1, 4, 5, and 6 (kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and theft with respect to Polk); Counts 2 and 3 (felonious assault with respect to Polk); and Counts 7, 8, and 10 (kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and theft with respect to Williams).

2013State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 , 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002). {¶31} At the beginning of the sentencing hearing in this case, the trial court explained that it was merging Counts 1, 4, 5, and 6 (kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and theft with respect to Polk); Counts 2 and 3 (felonious assault with respect to Polk); and Counts 7, 8, and 10 (kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and theft with respect to Williams).

2006Id. {¶ 10} In this case, trial counsel brought appellant's dissatisfaction with his performance to the attention of the trial court at the beginning of the sentencing hearing.

2006State v. McIntosh, 160 Ohio App.3d 544 , 2005-Ohio-1760 , ¶ 3 . {¶ 10} The common pleas court did not hold a separate hearing on appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, but did allow appellant the opportunity to explain the basis for his motion at the beginning of the sentencing hearing.

2006State v. McIntosh, 160 Ohio App.3d 544 , 2005-Ohio-1760 , ¶ 3 . {¶ 10} The common pleas court did not hold a separate hearing on appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, but did allow appellant the opportunity to explain the basis for his motion at the beginning of the sentencing hearing.

2005State v. Clemons, Montgomery App. No. 20206, 2005-Ohio-436, ¶ 10-13 . {¶ 75} At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, appellant contested some of the restitution figures listed in the PSI, and therefore, we find appellant sufficiently raised the issue of restitution in the court below. {¶ 76} We have reviewed the restitution amounts now contested by appellant on appeal.

1995State v. Lampkin (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 341 , 3 OBR 397, 445 N.E.2d 711 . *721 At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the following colloquy occurred between appellant’s counsel and the trial court: “MR.

1995State v. Lampkin (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 341 , 3 OBR 397, 445 N.E.2d 711 . *721 At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the following colloquy occurred between appellant’s counsel and the trial court: “MR.