misapplied rule in Ohio

2026Right to Evidentiary Hearing in Postconviction Proceedings {¶11} Appellant argues that the trial court misapplied the standard for reviewing a postconviction relief petition as established by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Bunch, 2022-Ohio-4723 .

2026Right to Evidentiary Hearing in Postconviction Proceedings {¶11} Appellant argues that the trial court misapplied the standard for reviewing a postconviction relief petition as established by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Bunch, 2022-Ohio-4723 .

2026Upon review, we agree. {¶10} “[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution forbid the execution of persons with intellectual disability.” Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704 (2014), citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

2025The Ohio Supreme Court has held in State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 39 , “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) therefore does not provide a basis for an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based on its view that the sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” This Court has recently found, “[n]othing in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) permits this Court to independently weigh the evidence in the record and substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court to determine a sentence which best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” State v. Norman, 2024-Ohio- 907

2023As stated by the Ohio Supreme Court in Colom v. Colom, 58 Ohio St.2d 245 , 389 N.E.2d 856 (1979), syllabus, “In a domestic relations action, interlocutory orders are merged within the final decree, and the right to enforce such interlocutory orders does not extend beyond the decree, unless they have been reduced to a separate judgment or they have been considered by the trial court and specifically referred to within the decree.” {¶16} Husband maintains that the court misapplied this doctrine because Husband was not attempting to enforce the interlocutory orders, and he, in fact, had already c

2023As stated by the Ohio Supreme Court in Colom v. Colom, 58 Ohio St.2d 245 , 389 N.E.2d 856 (1979), syllabus, “In a domestic relations action, interlocutory orders are merged within the final decree, and the right to enforce such interlocutory orders does not extend beyond the decree, unless they have been reduced to a separate judgment or they have been considered by the trial court and specifically referred to within the decree.” {¶16} Husband maintains that the court misapplied this doctrine because Husband was not attempting to enforce the interlocutory orders, and he, in fact, had already c

2023Citing State v. Goney, 87 Ohio App.3d 497 (2d Dist.1993), McGee contends that “Evid.R. 403 is biased in favor of admissibility, but this is not the case where the accused is impeached by a prior conviction under Evid.R. 609(A)(2); the unfair prejudice need only outweigh probative value, rather than ‘substantially’ outweigh it.” Id. at 502-03 . {¶ 20} But as this court has observed, the plain language of Evid.R. 609 references both Evid.R. 403(A) and 403(B), and the two rules must be read in conjunction— “[n]otwithstanding Evid.R. 403(A), but subject to Evid.R. 403(B), evidence that the accused

2023Citing State v. Goney, 87 Ohio App.3d 497 (2d Dist.1993), McGee contends that “Evid.R. 403 is biased in favor of admissibility, but this is not the case where the accused is impeached by a prior conviction under Evid.R. 609(A)(2); the unfair prejudice need only outweigh probative value, rather than ‘substantially’ outweigh it.” Id. at 502-03 . {¶ 20} But as this court has observed, the plain language of Evid.R. 609 references both Evid.R. 403(A) and 403(B), and the two rules must be read in conjunction— “[n]otwithstanding Evid.R. 403(A), but subject to Evid.R. 403(B), evidence that the accused

2017Bd. of Revision, 139 Ohio St.3d 212 , 2014-Ohio-1940 , 11 N.E.3d 222, ¶ 9 ; S.Ct.Prac.R. 18.02(B) (“A motion for reconsideration shall not constitute a reargument of the case”). {¶ 35} In an attempt to present an “obvious error,” see Dublin City Schools at ¶ 10, the state asserts that the court misapplied the rule of lenity and the canon of strict construction.

2017Bd. of Revision, 139 Ohio St.3d 212 , 2014-Ohio-1940 , 11 N.E.3d 222, ¶ 9 ; S.Ct.Prac.R. 18.02(B) (“A motion for reconsideration shall not constitute a reargument of the case”). {¶ 35} In an attempt to present an “obvious error,” see Dublin City Schools at ¶ 10, the state asserts that the court misapplied the rule of lenity and the canon of strict construction.

2013No. 04AP-724, 2005-Ohio-2388 , and found that relator had not demonstrated that he had sustained a total loss of use of his right foot because all the medical evidence submitted demonstrated that relator was still able to walk. {¶ 52} Relator contends that this court misapplied the standard from Alcoa and asserts that, under the "all practical intents and purposes test," it is possible to demonstrate a total loss of use while still retaining some ability to walk.

2011The first, second, and third assignments of error are overruled. {¶ 29} In the fourth assignment of error, appellants argue that the trial court misapplied the factors we set forth in Ross, 36 Ohio App.2d 185 , 65 O.O.2d 316 , 304 N.E.2d 396 .

2011The first, second, and third assignments of error are overruled. {¶ 29} In the fourth assignment of error, appellants argue that the trial court misapplied the factors we set forth in Ross, 36 Ohio App.2d 185 , 65 O.O.2d 316 , 304 N.E.2d 396 .

2004Cook further asserts that the trial court misapplied the factors enumerated in R.C. 2929.14 (E)(4). {¶ 31} "Consecutive sentences are reserved for the worst offenses and offenders." Comer, 99 Ohio St.3d 463 , at ¶ 21 (citation omitted).

1999Absent from the disposition of the first appeal, however, was any determination that defendant acted with malice, ill-will, or particularly gross and egregious conduct necessary to justify the trial court's award of punitive damages under International Harvester , supra .

1999Based partially upon that determination, we held that defendant fraudulently concealed the defects, and that the trial court misapplied the doctrine of caveat emptor from the syllabus of Layman v. Binns (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 176 .