Oregon Supreme Court analysis in Oregon

2015Moro v. State of Oregon, 354 Or 657, 661-62 , 320 P3d 539 (2014).

2015Moro v. State of Oregon, 354 Or 657, 661-62 , 320 P3d 539 (2014).

2015The parties have not materially challenged the special master’s recommended findings, which we have adopted unless otherwise noted.2 1 Because we hold that the COLA amendments may not be applied retrospec- tively, we also void, for the reasons set out below, 357 Or at 232-33 , the provi- sions of SB 861 allowing for certain supplemental payments to retirees that were intended to mitigate the impact of that retrospective application. 2 We previously considered a motion to disqualify the sitting judges of the Oregon Supreme Court from hearing this case and a motion to disqualify Judge Bushong fr

2015The parties have not materially challenged the special master’s recommended findings, which we have adopted unless otherwise noted.2 1 Because we hold that the COLA amendments may not be applied retrospec- tively, we also void, for the reasons set out below, 357 Or at 232-33 , the provi- sions of SB 861 allowing for certain supplemental payments to retirees that were intended to mitigate the impact of that retrospective application. 2 We previously considered a motion to disqualify the sitting judges of the Oregon Supreme Court from hearing this case and a motion to disqualify Judge Bushong fr

2026The court will then analyze the parties’ interpretations of the federal exempt interest statute, which is relevant for tax year 2024 because for that year the full relief Plaintiff seeks is available only if his social security income and his income from interest on federal debt obligations are both excluded from AGI. 14 A. Article IX, Section 9 To determine how Article IX, Section 9, a referred constitutional amendment, may apply to the facts in this case, the court applies the Oregon Supreme Court’s framework, which “‘look[s] to the text, context, and legislative history of the amendment to

2026The court will then analyze the parties’ interpretations of the federal exempt interest statute, which is relevant for tax year 2024 because for that year the full relief Plaintiff seeks is available only if his social security income and his income from interest on federal debt obligations are both excluded from AGI. 14 A. Article IX, Section 9 To determine how Article IX, Section 9, a referred constitutional amendment, may apply to the facts in this case, the court applies the Oregon Supreme Court’s framework, which “‘look[s] to the text, context, and legislative history of the amendment to

2026The court will then analyze the parties’ interpretations of the federal exempt interest statute, which is relevant for tax year 2024 because for that year the full relief Plaintiff seeks is available only if his social security income and his income from interest on federal debt obligations are both excluded from AGI. 14 A. Article IX, Section 9 To determine how Article IX, Section 9, a referred constitutional amendment, may apply to the facts in this case, the court applies the Oregon Supreme Court’s framework, which “‘look[s] to the text, context, and legislative history of the amendment to

2026The court will then analyze the parties’ interpretations of the federal exempt interest statute, which is relevant for tax year 2024 because for that year the full relief Plaintiff seeks is available only if his social security income and his income from interest on federal debt obligations are both excluded from AGI. 14 A. Article IX, Section 9 To determine how Article IX, Section 9, a referred constitutional amendment, may apply to the facts in this case, the court applies the Oregon Supreme Court’s framework, which “‘look[s] to the text, context, and legislative history of the amendment to

2023To begin, the court considers whether and how to apply the Oregon Supreme Court’s framework for analyzing statutes pursuant to Gaines, 346 Or at 171-72 .

2022As we explain, unlike the Oregon Supreme Court’s analysis in Machuca, the Fourth Amendment analysis articulated in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 US 141, 148 , 133 S Ct 1552 , 185 L Ed 2d 696 (2013) requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances to determine if exigency existed, and the dissipation of alcohol in the blood is but one 338 State v. Portulano of many factors to consider.

2022As we explain, unlike the Oregon Supreme Court’s analysis in Machuca, the Fourth Amendment analysis articulated in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 US 141, 148 , 133 S Ct 1552 , 185 L Ed 2d 696 (2013) requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances to determine if exigency existed, and the dissipation of alcohol in the blood is but one 338 State v. Portulano of many factors to consider.

2016See also Storm v. McClung, 334 Or 210, 221 , 47 P3d 476 (2002) (citing Smothers for observation that “this court previously had failed definitively to establish and consistently apply any one theory regarding the protections afforded by the remedies guarantee”); Greist v. Phillips, 322 Or 281, 304 , 906 P2d 789 (1995) (Unis, J., concurring in part) (complaining about the court’s “inconsistent” approach to the remedy guarantee); Junping Han, The Constitutionality of Oregon’s Split-Recovery Punitive Damages Statute, 38 Willamette L Rev 477, 529-30 (2002) (noting shifts in Oregon Supreme Court an

2016See also Storm v. McClung, 334 Or 210, 221 , 47 P3d 476 (2002) (citing Smothers for observation that “this court previously had failed definitively to establish and consistently apply any one theory regarding the protections afforded by the remedies guarantee”); Greist v. Phillips, 322 Or 281, 304 , 906 P2d 789 (1995) (Unis, J., concurring in part) (complaining about the court’s “inconsistent” approach to the remedy guarantee); Junping Han, The Constitutionality of Oregon’s Split-Recovery Punitive Damages Statute, 38 Willamette L Rev 477, 529-30 (2002) (noting shifts in Oregon Supreme Court an

2015Plaintiff relies on the Oregon Supreme Court’s analysis in Southard , noting that, in that case, like this one, the evidence came from a “credentialed expert, surrounded with the hallmarks of the scientific method,” and thereby created the “risk that the jury ‘may be overly impressed or prejudiced by a perhaps misplaced aura of reliability or validity of the evidence.’” 347 Or at 140 -41 (quoting Brown, 297 Or at 439 ).

2015It was that set of facts that led the Oregon Supreme Court to rule that the statutory term “ ‘actually occupied and used’ pertains to whether or not the premises are then being prepared to carry out purposes of the exempt charity and if they are they fall within the legislative intent.” Willamette University, 245 Or at 349 .

2015Plaintiff relies on the Oregon Supreme Court’s analysis in Southard , noting that, in that case, like this one, the evidence came from a “credentialed expert, surrounded with the hallmarks of the scientific method,” and thereby created the “risk that the jury ‘may be overly impressed or prejudiced by a perhaps misplaced aura of reliability or validity of the evidence.’” 347 Or at 140 -41 (quoting Brown, 297 Or at 439 ).

2013It is also dispositively distinguishable from the alternative approach proffered by the wife in Hisquierdo , by which an offset in the property division would have been based on the value of the husband’s railroad retirement benefits. 439 US at 588 .

1999Article I, section 12, provides, in part, that “[n]o person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offence.” Both the state and defendant appear to assume that the Oregon Supreme Court’s analysis in Brown v. Multnomah County District Court, 280 Or 95 , 570 P2d 52 (1977), an Article I, section 11, case, should be the touchstone of our Article I, section 12, analysis.

1999Article I, section 12, provides, in part, that “[n]o person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offence.” Both the state and defendant appear to assume that the Oregon Supreme Court’s analysis in Brown v. Multnomah County District Court, 280 Or 95 , 570 P2d 52 (1977), an Article I, section 11, case, should be the touchstone of our Article I, section 12, analysis.

1974In Bembridge v. Miller, supra, a case involving tender of a liquidated sum of money, the court stated that the effect of tender and refusal “* * * is to cut off the tenderer’s, liability, other than for the debt, for damages and interest arising from nonpayment * * (Emphasis supplied.) 235 Or at 402-03 .