Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
13 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. EBI Companiesgreen2 sentences1993See also EBI Companies v. Lorence, 72 Or App 75 , 695 P2d 61 , rev den 299 Or 118 (1985). 2 In Brown v. EBI Companies, supra, the issue was “whether the claimant is disqualified as a matter of law when neither she nor her attorney has carelessly neglected to make a timely request for hearing but the failure to do so is attributable to someone in the attorney’s office.” 289 Or at 458 . 1980PER CURIAM In Brown v. EBI Companies, 289 Or 455 , 616 P2d 457 (1980), the present petitioner won reversal of a decision of the Court of Appeals that had affirmed the denial of her workers’ compensation claim for failure to file a timely request for a hearing. | 1 | 4 |
Sekermestrovich v. State Accident Insurance Fundgreen2 sentences1995Oregon courts have consistently held that an attorney’s negligent failure to file a timely request for hearing on the denial of workers’ compensation benefits does not constitute good cause excusing such an untimely filing under ORS 656.319(1)(b) 5 “unless the attorney’s reason for failing to file would be good cause if attributed to the claimant.” Sekermestrovich v. SAIF, 280 Or 723, 727 , 573 P2d 275 (1977) (footnote omitted). 1995Oregon courts have consistently held that an attorney’s negligent failure to file a timely request for hearing on the denial of workers’ compensation benefits does not constitute good cause excusing such an untimely filing under ORS 656.319(1)(b) 5 “unless the attorney’s reason for failing to file would be good cause if attributed to the claimant.” Sekermestrovich v. SAIF, 280 Or 723, 727 , 573 P2d 275 (1977) (footnote omitted). | 1 | 3 |
Mendoza v. SAIF Corp.green2 sentences1995See Mendoza v. SAIF, 123 Or App 349, 352-53 , 859 P2d 582 (1993), rev den 318 Or 326 (1994). 1995See Mendoza v. SAIF, 123 Or App 349, 352-53 , 859 P2d 582 (1993), rev den 318 Or 326 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
EBI Companies v. Lorencegreen2 sentences1993See also EBI Companies v. Lorence, 72 Or App 75 , 695 P2d 61 , rev den 299 Or 118 (1985). 2 In Brown v. EBI Companies, supra, the issue was “whether the claimant is disqualified as a matter of law when neither she nor her attorney has carelessly neglected to make a timely request for hearing but the failure to do so is attributable to someone in the attorney’s office.” 289 Or at 458 . 1993See also EBI Companies v. Lorence, 72 Or App 75 , 695 P2d 61 , rev den 299 Or 118 (1985). 2 In Brown v. EBI Companies, supra, the issue was “whether the claimant is disqualified as a matter of law when neither she nor her attorney has carelessly neglected to make a timely request for hearing but the failure to do so is attributable to someone in the attorney’s office.” 289 Or at 458 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Teitelman v. SAIF
green
2 sentences2025It is a clear indication that, in linking the entitlement to a WRME to the basis for a “denial of compensability,” the Cite as 374 Or 271 (2025) 295 legislature was contemplating the basis for the denial when issued.1 Nothing in the legislative history cited by the majority leads to a different conclusion. 2025It is a clear indication that, in linking the entitlement Cite as 374 Or 271 (2025) 295 to a WRME to the basis for a “denial of compensability,” the legislature was contemplating the basis for the denial when issued.1 Nothing in the legislative history cited by the majority leads to a different conclusion. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Endres v. Driver & Motor Vehicle Services Division
neutral
2 sentences2025The Department of Transportation has adopted a rule, OAR 735-090-0000(5)(a)(A), which defines “ ‘[o]ther just cause’ as used in ORS 813.440(1)(g)” to mean, as relevant here, “Circumstances beyond the reasonable control of the petition- ing party and beyond the ability of a reasonable person to foresee,” which “[p]revented the petitioning party from filing a timely request for a hearing as set forth in ORS 813.410(4).” On appeal, petitioner contends, among other points, that the DMV erred when it determined that petitioner Nonprecedential Memo Op: 344 Or App 283 (2025) 285 had not established “ 2025The Department of Transportation has adopted a rule, OAR 735-090-0000(5)(a)(A), which defines “ ‘[o]ther just cause’ as used in ORS 813.440(1)(g)” to mean, as relevant here, “Circumstances beyond the reasonable control of the petition- ing party and beyond the ability of a reasonable person to foresee,” which “[p]revented the petitioning party from filing a timely request for a hearing as set forth in ORS 813.410(4).” On appeal, petitioner contends, among other points, that the DMV erred when it determined that petitioner Nonprecedential Memo Op: 344 Or App 283 (2025) 285 had not established “ | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Nash v. DMV
neutral
2 sentences2025The Department of Transportation has adopted a rule, OAR 735-090-0000(5)(a)(A), which defines “ ‘[o]ther just cause’ as used in ORS 813.440(1)(g)” to mean, as relevant here, “Circumstances beyond the reasonable control of the petition- ing party and beyond the ability of a reasonable person to foresee,” which “[p]revented the petitioning party from filing a timely request for a hearing as set forth in ORS 813.410(4).” On appeal, petitioner contends, among other points, that the DMV erred when it determined that petitioner Nonprecedential Memo Op: 344 Or App 283 (2025) 285 had not established “ 2025The Department of Transportation has adopted a rule, OAR 735-090-0000(5)(a)(A), which defines “ ‘[o]ther just cause’ as used in ORS 813.440(1)(g)” to mean, as relevant here, “Circumstances beyond the reasonable control of the petition- ing party and beyond the ability of a reasonable person to foresee,” which “[p]revented the petitioning party from filing a timely request for a hearing as set forth in ORS 813.410(4).” On appeal, petitioner contends, among other points, that the DMV erred when it determined that petitioner Nonprecedential Memo Op: 344 Or App 283 (2025) 285 had not established “ | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Dotson v. Motor Vehicles Division
green
2 sentences2000Petitioner argued that, as explained in Dotson v. Motor Vehicles Div., 25 Or.App. 393 , 549 P.2d 1143 (1976), overruled in part 33 Or. 2000Petitioner argued that, as explained in Dotson v. Motor Vehicles Div., 25 Or.App. 393 , 549 P.2d 1143 (1976), overruled in part 33 Or. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Blackburn v. MOTOR VEHICLES DIVISION, DEPT.
green
1 sentence2000Petitioner argued that, as explained in Dotson v. Motor Vehicles Div., 25 Or.App. 393 , 549 P.2d 1143 (1976), overruled in part 33 Or. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Lebanon Plywood v. Seiber
green
2 sentences1996Employer responds that claimant was never statutorily or substantively entitled to the overpayment and, consequently, under our decision in Lebanon Plywood v. Seiber, 113 Or App 651 , 833 P2d 1367 (1992), the Board was correct that it had no authority to order employer to pay an additional $6,405, of which $3,202.50 would clearly be an overpayment of compensation. 1996Employer responds that claimant was never statutorily or substantively entitled to the overpayment and, consequently, under our decision in Lebanon Plywood v. Seiber, 113 Or App 651 , 833 P2d 1367 (1992), the Board was correct that it had no authority to order employer to pay an additional $6,405, of which $3,202.50 would clearly be an overpayment of compensation. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Anderson v. Publishers Paper Co.
green
1 sentence1987We commented that the Board had ruled that claimant’s “subjective belief as to the non-compensability of his claim is not good cause for his failure to file a timely request for hearing.” 78 Or App at 516 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.