Legislature to waive immunity in Texas

2025And, in IT-Davy, it observed that “legislative control over waiving immunity from suit does not mean that the State can freely breach contracts with private parties, or that the State can use sovereign immunity as a shield to avoid paying for benefits the State accepts under a contract” because if a party who contracts with the State feels aggrieved, “it can seek redress by asking the Legislature to waive immunity -35- from suit.” 74 S.W.3d at 854 ; see also CPS Energy v. Elec.

2016See IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 854 (if a party who contracts with the State feels aggrieved, it can seek redress by asking the Legislature to waive immunity from suit).

2024Chapter 271 of the Local Government Code “If immunity is applicable, then the judiciary defers to the legislature to waive such immunity.” Wasson I, 489 S.W.3d at 435 (emphasis in original) (citing Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 332–33).

2019Code § 101.0215(a) ) ). 49 See id. at 152 (examining the third factor, whether the City acted on its own behalf or the State's when entering the contract at issue). 50 See id. at 150 . 51 Wasson I , 489 S.W.3d at 435 . 52 See id. ("If immunity is applicable, then the judiciary defers to the legislature to waive such immunity." (citing Tooke v. City of Mexia , 197 S.W.3d 325 , 332-333 (Tex. 2006) ) ). 53 See Tex. Loc.

2020Despite this deference to the legislature regarding waiver of immunity, “the judicial branch retains the authority and responsibility to determine whether immunity exists in the first place, and to define its scope.” Hillman, 579 S.W.3d at 361 ; Reata Constr., 197 S.W.3d at 375 (“We have consistently deferred to the Legislature to waive such immunity.”) (emphasis original).

2016On appeal, the supreme court explained that it has “generally deferred to the Legislature to waive immunity because the Legislature is better suited to address the conflieting policy issues involved.” Id. at 375 .

2024Chapter 271 of the Local Government Code “If immunity is applicable, then the judiciary defers to the legislature to waive such immunity.” Wasson I, 489 S.W.3d at 435 (emphasis in original) (citing Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 332–33).

2024Page 153 of 740          !"# $%&'$'"(       202 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 , 1 Cranch 137 , 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803); see also Wasson Ints., Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 489 S.W.3d 427, 435 (Tex. 2016) (“If immunity is applicable, then the judiciary defers to the legislature to waive such immunity.”). 203 Redus, 602 S.W.3d at 411 (footnote omitted) (quoting Abutahoun v. Dow Chem.

2011Considering whether statutory provisions were intended by the Legislature to waive immunity, courts may ask “whether a statute makes any sense if immunity is not waived.” Kerrville State Hosp. v. Fernandez, 28 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex.2000); accord, Tex. Dep’t of Tramp, v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 643 (Tex.2004).

2011Considering whether statutory provisions were intended by the Legislature to waive immunity, courts may ask “whether a statute makes any sense if immunity is not waived.” Kerrville State Hosp. v. Fernandez, 28 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2000); accord, Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 643 (Tex. 2004).

2011Considering whether statutory provisions were intended by the Legislature to waive immunity, courts may ask “whether a statute makes any sense if immunity is not waived.” Kerrville State Hosp. v. Fernandez, 28 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex.2000); accord, Tex. Dep’t of Tramp, v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 643 (Tex.2004).

2011Considering whether statutory provisions were intended by the Legislature to waive immunity, courts may ask “whether a statute makes any sense if immunity is not waived.” Kerrville State Hosp. v. Fernandez, 28 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2000); accord, Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 643 (Tex. 2004).

2025See IT–Davy, that governmental entity.” Id. 74 S.W.3d at 854 ; Guillory v. Port of Houston Auth., In this Court, Reata asserts (1) governmental immunity 845 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex.1993); Duhart v. State, 610 did not apply because the City subjected itself to the trial court's jurisdiction by intervening in the lawsuit and seeking S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tex.1980); Lowe v. Tex. Tech Univ., 540 affirmative relief; (2) the Dallas City Charter and section S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1976).

2006See IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 854 ; Guillory v. Port of Houston Auth., 845 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex.1993); Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tex.1980); Lowe v. Tex. Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex. 1976).

2024Page 153 of 740          !"# $%&'$'"(       202 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 , 1 Cranch 137 , 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803); see also Wasson Ints., Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 489 S.W.3d 427, 435 (Tex. 2016) (“If immunity is applicable, then the judiciary defers to the legislature to waive such immunity.”). 203 Redus, 602 S.W.3d at 411 (footnote omitted) (quoting Abutahoun v. Dow Chem.

2024Page 153 of 740          !"# $%&'$'"(       202 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 , 1 Cranch 137 , 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803); see also Wasson Ints., Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 489 S.W.3d 427, 435 (Tex. 2016) (“If immunity is applicable, then the judiciary defers to the legislature to waive such immunity.”). 203 Redus, 602 S.W.3d at 411 (footnote omitted) (quoting Abutahoun v. Dow Chem.

2019Cf. Prairie View A & M Univ. v. Chatha , 381 S.W.3d 500 , 513 (Tex. 2012) ("We have observed that in order to allow the Legislature to protect not only its policy-making function but also to preserve its interest in managing state fiscal matters, this Court consistently defers to the Legislature to waive immunity from suit.").

2013Thus, it is the Legislature’s function to determine what steps a litigant must take before the state’s immunity is waived.” Id. at 513 (citations omitted).

2009See Tooke , 197 S.W.3d at 332 (courts "defer to the Legislature to waive immunity from contract claims"); Tourneau Houston, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist. , 24 S.W.3d 907, 910 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) ("No one is ever estopped from asserting lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.").

2009See Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 332 (courts “defer to the Legislature to waive immunity from contract claims”); Tourneau Houston, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 24 S.W.3d 907, 910 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (“No one is ever estopped from asserting lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”).

2015Wichita Falls State Hosp., 106 S.W.3d at 696 ; see Reata, 197 S.W.3d at 375 (“[w]e have generally de- ferred to the Legislature to waive immunity”).

2013We defer to the legislature to waive immunity from suit by statute or resolution. 6 Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692 , 695–96 (Tex. 2003).

2024Co., 463 S.W.3d 42, 51 (Tex. 2015)). 204 Id. at 410-11 (quoting Hillman v. Nueces County, 579 S.W.3d 354, 361 (Tex. 2019)).

2020Despite this deference to the legislature regarding waiver of immunity, “the judicial branch retains the authority and responsibility to determine whether immunity exists in the first place, and to define its scope.” Hillman, 579 S.W.3d at 361 ; Reata Constr., 197 S.W.3d at 375 (“We have consistently deferred to the Legislature to waive such immunity.”) (emphasis original).

2026If immunity is applicable, then the judiciary defers to the legislature to waive such immunity.” (citation omitted)). 47 See Stewart, 361 S.W.3d at 568 (“[T]he Takings Clause is self-executing . . . it alone authorizes suit, regardless of whether the Legislature has statutorily provided for it.”). 48 Tex. Prop.

2025See IT–Davy, that governmental entity.” Id. 74 S.W.3d at 854 ; Guillory v. Port of Houston Auth., In this Court, Reata asserts (1) governmental immunity 845 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex.1993); Duhart v. State, 610 did not apply because the City subjected itself to the trial court's jurisdiction by intervening in the lawsuit and seeking S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tex.1980); Lowe v. Tex. Tech Univ., 540 affirmative relief; (2) the Dallas City Charter and section S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1976).

2024Co., 463 S.W.3d 42, 51 (Tex. 2015)). 204 Id. at 410-11 (quoting Hillman v. Nueces County, 579 S.W.3d 354, 361 (Tex. 2019)).

2024Co., 463 S.W.3d 42, 51 (Tex. 2015)). 204 Id. at 410-11 (quoting Hillman v. Nueces County, 579 S.W.3d 354, 361 (Tex. 2019)).

2019See City of San Antonio v. Tenorio , 543 S.W.3d 772 , 786-88 (Tex. 2018) ( Boyd , J., dissenting).

2007Sign, 951 S.W.2d at 409 ; Griffin v. Hawn, 161 Tex. 422 , 341 S.W.2d 151, 152 (1960). 6 .

2007Sign, 951 S.W.2d at 409 ; Griffin v. Hawn, 161 Tex. 422 , 341 S.W.2d 151, 152 (1960). 6 .

2007In the context of contract claims, since one of the “fundamental reason[s] why immunity exists [is] to prevent governmental entities from being bound by the policy decisions of their predecessors,” Catalina Dev., Inc. v. County of El Paso, 121 S.W.3d 704, 706 (Tex.2003), “[w]e defer to the Legislature to waive immunity” because “‘legislative control over sovereign immunity allows the Legislature to respond to changing conditions and revise existing agreements if doing so would benefit the public.’ To ensure that this legislative control is not lightly disturbed, a waiver of immunity must be cl

2006See IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 854 ; Guillory v. Port of Houston Auth., 845 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex.1993); Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tex.1980); Lowe v. Tex. Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex. 1976).

2006See IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 854 ; Guillory v. Port of Houston Auth., 845 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex.1993); Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tex.1980); Lowe v. Tex. Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex. 1976).

2006See IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 854 ; Guillory v. Port of Houston Auth., 845 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex.1993); Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tex.1980); Lowe v. Tex. Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex. 1976).

2006See IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 854 ; Guillory v. Port of Houston Auth., 845 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex.1993); Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tex.1980); Lowe v. Tex. Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex. 1976).

2005See id.