ejectment clause in Pennsylvania

1951Youghiogheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Carlet, 92 Pa. Superior Ct. 40 .” The foregoing statement was cited with approval in Botnick v. Chapkis, 166 Pa. Superior Ct. 74 .

1950Youghiogheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Carlet, 92 Pa. Superior Ct. 40 .” Order of the court below is reversed, and the rule ex parte defendant is discharged.

2024Id. at 586-87 .

2017While the Rawlings Court also stated that the landowners’ ejectment claim was not barred by immunity because it was not a claim for damages, id. at 586-87 , that ruling is inconsistent with this Court’s later ruling in Swift that affirmative injunctive relief is subject to the same immunity as damages claims and was unnecessary to the Court’s decision, as the landowners’ claims were held to fall within the real property exception to immunity.

1946The foundation of this right is ‘the Statute of 32 Henry VIII, ch. 34, which is in force in Pennsylvania (Williams et al. v. Notopolos, 259 Pa. 469 ), and under which grantees or assignees of the reversion or assignees of lessors, enjoy the same benefits and remedies which the lessors or grantors themselves had or enjoyed for the breach of any condition, covenant or agreement contained or expressed in leases or grants’: Youghiogheny-Pgh.

1935The foundation of this right is “the Statute of 32 Henry VIII, ch. 34, which is in force in Pennsylvania (Williams et al. v. Notopolos, 259 Pa. 469 ), and under which grantees or assignees of the reversion, or assignees of lessors, enjoy the same benefits and remedies which the lessors or grantors themselves had or enjoyed for the breach of any condition, covenant or agreement contained or expressed in leases or grants”: Youghiogheny-Pgh.

2024Hence, the orphans’ court in these scenarios may order the same relief as the civil division.7 See, e.g., id. (holding that the orphans’ court had jurisdiction to enter a general money judgment for the return of a specific sum of money that he stole from the decedent); Estate of Gilbert, 492 A.2d 401 , 403–04 (Pa.Super. 1985) (ruling that orphans’ court had jurisdiction to inquire into the decedent’s inter vivos sale of property to his daughter while adjudicating the ownership of property still in the decedent’s name when he died); Estate of Hull, 2023 WL 4363981 , at *7 (concluding that, beca

2024Hence, the orphans’ court in these scenarios may order the same relief as the civil division.7 See, e.g., id. (holding that the orphans’ court had jurisdiction to enter a general money judgment for the return of a specific sum of money that he stole from the decedent); Estate of Gilbert, 492 A.2d 401 , 403–04 (Pa.Super. 1985) (ruling that orphans’ court had jurisdiction to inquire into the decedent’s inter vivos sale of property to his daughter while adjudicating the ownership of property still in the decedent’s name when he died); Estate of Hull, 2023 WL 4363981 , at *7 (concluding that, beca

1951Youghiogheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Carlet, 92 Pa. Superior Ct. 40 .” The foregoing statement was cited with approval in Botnick v. Chapkis, 166 Pa. Superior Ct. 74 .

1946In Shappell v. Himelstein (1936), 121 Pa. Superior Ct. 418 , it is said (at p. 421) : “Even without an assigning clause, the assignee would have been entitled to proceed under the ejectment clause of the lease as the assignee of a reversion is entitled to enjoy the same benefits and remedies as a lessor.

1942This was decided in Philadelphia v. Johnson, 208 Pa. 645, 648 , 57 A. 1114 , where we held: “that where a judgment has been entered under an ejectment clause in a lease, no second judgment can be entered under the same clause; and this is the case although the first judgment may have been prematurely entered, or may have been voidable from matters outside the record.” That the defect in the first judgment is formal, cannot be doubted.

1942This was decided in Philadelphia v. Johnson, 208 Pa. 645, 648 , 57 A. 1114 , where we held: “that where a judgment has been entered under an ejectment clause in a lease, no second judgment can be entered under the same clause; and this is the case although the first judgment may have been prematurely entered, or may have been voidable from matters outside the record.” That the defect in the first judgment is formal, cannot be doubted.

1939The opinion in Crozer’s Estate, 296 Pa. 48 , 145 A. 697 , shows that there was evidence of Judge Broomall’s active connection and interest in the J.

1939The opinion in Crozer’s Estate, 296 Pa. 48 , 145 A. 697 , shows that there was evidence of Judge Broomall’s active connection and interest in the J.