incontestability clause in Pennsylvania

1939Co., 134 Pa. 45 (1890); Hall v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn., 19 Pa. Superior Ct. 31 (1902).

1928Co., 134 Pa. 45 ; Brady v. Prudential Ins.

1989Hulme v. Springfield Life Insurance Company Inc., 565 P.2d 666 (Okla. 1977) (issue of employment eligibility goes to validity of policy); Bonity v. Travelers Insurance Co., 374 Mass. 320, 331 (1978) (“It [incontestability clause] is designed to require the insurer to investigate and act with reasonable promptness if it wishes to deny liablity on the ground of false representation or warranty by the insured.”); Jackson v. Continental Casualty Co., 412 So. 2d 1364 (La. 1982) (incontestability clause bars defense that beneficiary was not a “legal spouse” and therefore was ineligible for coverage)

1989Since that determination must be made at some time, why is it a hardship to demand it be made when it will permit the insurer to accept or reject the applicant?” Id. at 359 . (emphasis in original) Recent cases likewise have followed the Simpson discoverability analysis and held that the incontestability clause precluded the insurer from raising the defense that the decedent was not an eligible employee at the inception of the policy.

1989Hulme v. Springfield Life Insurance Company Inc., 565 P.2d 666 (Okla. 1977) (issue of employment eligibility goes to validity of policy); Bonity v. Travelers Insurance Co., 374 Mass. 320, 331 (1978) (“It [incontestability clause] is designed to require the insurer to investigate and act with reasonable promptness if it wishes to deny liablity on the ground of false representation or warranty by the insured.”); Jackson v. Continental Casualty Co., 412 So. 2d 1364 (La. 1982) (incontestability clause bars defense that beneficiary was not a “legal spouse” and therefore was ineligible for coverage)

1989First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co. v. United States Life Insurance Co., 421 F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1969) Is a federal court decision which attempted to predict and apply Pennsylvania law on the issue of an incontestability clause barring the defense that the decedent failed to meet the employment eligibility requirement.

1989The other line, led by Crawford v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 56 Ill.2d 41 , 305 N.E.2d 144 (1973), holds that the defense of ineligibility is not barred by an incontestability clause.

1989The other line, led by Crawford v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 56 Ill.2d 41 , 305 N.E.2d 144 (1973), holds that the defense of ineligibility is not barred by an incontestability clause.

1989Perilstein v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 345 Pa. 604 , 29 A.2d 487 (1943).

1989Perilstein v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 345 Pa. 604 , 29 A.2d 487 (1943).

1954Co., 181 F. 2d 606 . (b) The incontestability clause in a life policy applies only to defenses which concern the formation of the contract or those arising because of subsequent conditions broken.

1954It is ineffective to prevent the insurer from asserting a defense that the death waswithout the coverage of the policy: 3 Williston on Contracts (rev. ed.) p. 2280; Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Conaway, 152 N. Y. 449 , 169 N. E. 642 . (c) An aviation exclusion risk provision in a contract of life insurance applies to military and naval as well as civilian aviation: Janco v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 128 ; Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Daniels, 125 Col. 451 , 244 P. 2d 1064 (1952). (d) The rights and obligations arising under the policy were i

1954It is ineffective to prevent the insurer from asserting a defense that the death waswithout the coverage of the policy: 3 Williston on Contracts (rev. ed.) p. 2280; Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Conaway, 152 N. Y. 449 , 169 N. E. 642 . (c) An aviation exclusion risk provision in a contract of life insurance applies to military and naval as well as civilian aviation: Janco v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 128 ; Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Daniels, 125 Col. 451 , 244 P. 2d 1064 (1952). (d) The rights and obligations arising under the policy were i

1954It is ineffective to prevent the insurer from asserting a defense that the death waswithout the coverage of the policy: 3 Williston on Contracts (rev. ed.) p. 2280; Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Conaway, 152 N. Y. 449 , 169 N. E. 642 . (c) An aviation exclusion risk provision in a contract of life insurance applies to military and naval as well as civilian aviation: Janco v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 128 ; Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Daniels, 125 Col. 451 , 244 P. 2d 1064 (1952). (d) The rights and obligations arising under the policy were i

1954It is ineffective to prevent the insurer from asserting a defense that the death waswithout the coverage of the policy: 3 Williston on Contracts (rev. ed.) p. 2280; Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Conaway, 152 N. Y. 449 , 169 N. E. 642 . (c) An aviation exclusion risk provision in a contract of life insurance applies to military and naval as well as civilian aviation: Janco v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 128 ; Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Daniels, 125 Col. 451 , 244 P. 2d 1064 (1952). (d) The rights and obligations arising under the policy were i

1947So, too, where there is a contractual limitation in the policy requiring the insured to take action within a specified time, the issuance of a summons, without a pleading, is a compliance : Ledonne v. Commerce Insurance Co., 307 Pa. 1 , 160 A. 612 , a fire insurance case.

1947So, too, where there is a contractual limitation in the policy requiring the insured to take action within a specified time, the issuance of a summons, without a pleading, is a compliance : Ledonne v. Commerce Insurance Co., 307 Pa. 1 , 160 A. 612 , a fire insurance case.

1939Co., 134 Pa. 45 (1890); Hall v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn., 19 Pa. Superior Ct. 31 (1902).

1938We feel that the incontestability clause has no more application than it had in Doll v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 21 Pa. Superior Ct. 434 , and as stated by the Supreme Court in Sipp v. Philadelphia Life Ins.

1936While the precise question herein decided by us has not heretofore been before the appellate courts of this Commonwealth, our theory as to the legal status of a restored policy which had lapsed is consistent with the view expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Paxson, speaking for this court, in the case of Lantz v. Insurance Co., 139 Pa. 546, 560 , 21 A. 80 , as follows: “The consequence of a default in the payment of the premium is defined in the policy itself.

1936While the precise question herein decided by us has not heretofore been before the appellate courts of this Commonwealth, our theory as to the legal status of a restored policy which had lapsed is consistent with the view expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Paxson, speaking for this court, in the case of Lantz v. Insurance Co., 139 Pa. 546, 560 , 21 A. 80 , as follows: “The consequence of a default in the payment of the premium is defined in the policy itself.

1936Co., 305 Pa. 505 .

1936Co., 112 Pa. Superior Ct. 314 .

1935A similar contention was made, but relief denied thereunder, in the case of Southern Union Life Insurance Co. v. White, 188 S. W. 266 (Texas), the court saying at p. 268: “Appellant makes the proposition that the appellee cannot recover for the reason that she participated in the alleged fraud of the insured.

1931Co., 183 Pa. 563 ; Marcus v. Heralds of Liberty, 241 Pa. 429 .

1931Co., 183 Pa. 563 ; Marcus v. Heralds of Liberty, 241 Pa. 429 .

1919That the undisputed facts would, by force of the covenant first above quoted, constitute a complete defense to this action, in the absence of the incontestability clause, is too clear for argument: Wells v. Insurance Company, 191 Pa. 207 .