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13 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 2000–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re: Adopt. of M.R.D. and T.M.D. Appeal of: M.C.green2 sentences2026Subsequently, in M.R.D., supra, we determined that a mother who sought to terminate the parental rights of her children’s father, and retain her own parental rights [J-35-2025] - 9 while allowing her own father to adopt her children, could not demonstrate cause shown under Section 2901 so as to excuse her from strict compliance with the relinquishment requirement. 2026Further, as discussed above, this interpretation is consonant with the underlying purpose of the relinquishment requirement of an existing parent’s rights prior to adoption, which is “to facilitate a ‘new parent-child relationship’ between the child and the adoptive parent.” M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1128 ; see also In re B.E., 377 A.2d at 156 (“Termination of parental rights permits the child and the adoptive parent or parents to establish a new parent-child relationship through adoption.”). | 7 | 9 |
In Re Adoption of R.B.F.green2 sentences2026On appeal, the parties argued that, pursuant to Section 2901, they should be allowed to show cause to excuse them from the relinquishment requirement because they were not legally permitted to marry and, thus, “as in a stepparent adoption, the only means to guarantee family integrity ordinarily achieved through termination of existing legal parent’s rights would be through preservation of that parent’s rights.” R.B.F., 803 A.2d at 1201 (emphasis omitted). 2022This exception to the relinquishment requirement as set forth in Section 2903, however, “applies solely to ‘stepparent’ situations and has no application to unmarried persons.”10 In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1197 (Pa. 2002); see also L.J.B., 18 A.3d at 1108 (stating, “where no new parent-child relationship is contemplated, the involuntary termination of parent rights is not permitted under the Adoption Act” (original quotation marks and ellipses omitted)). | 6 | 6 |
In Re Adoption of L.J.B.green2 sentences2022This exception to the relinquishment requirement as set forth in Section 2903, however, “applies solely to ‘stepparent’ situations and has no application to unmarried persons.”10 In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1197 (Pa. 2002); see also L.J.B., 18 A.3d at 1108 (stating, “where no new parent-child relationship is contemplated, the involuntary termination of parent rights is not permitted under the Adoption Act” (original quotation marks and ellipses omitted)). 2017Id., at 1127 (footnote omitted). - 11 - J-S24015-17 The Court held that the mother and the maternal grandfather had failed to establish legal cause to excuse the requirement that the mother relinquish her parental rights under § 2711 prior to the proposed adoption, and, thus, the adoption could not proceed, stating as follows: In the standard adoption case, termination and relinquishment of parental rights is necessary so that the child may be adopted by, and form new bonds with, his or her new family, unencumbered by the former legal parents. | 2 | 2 |
McQuiston's Adoptiongreen2 sentences2000See McQuiston’s Adoption, 238 Pa. at 309-10 , 86 A. at 206 . ¶ 8 The second reason for my dissent is that the Majority refuses to recognize the discretion that 23 Pa.C.S. § 2901 bestows upon a trial court in deciding whether to decree an adoption notwithstanding the fact that a parent’s rights to an adoptee have not been terminated. 2000See McQuiston’s Adoption, 238 Pa. at 309-10 , 86 A. at 206 . ¶ 8 The second reason for my dissent is that the Majority refuses to recognize the discretion that 23 Pa.C.S. § 2901 bestows upon a trial court in deciding whether to decree an adoption notwithstanding the fact that a parent’s rights to an adoptee have not been terminated. | 2 | 2 |
In Re BEgreen1 sentence2026Further, as discussed above, this interpretation is consonant with the underlying purpose of the relinquishment requirement of an existing parent’s rights prior to adoption, which is “to facilitate a ‘new parent-child relationship’ between the child and the adoptive parent.” M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1128 ; see also In re B.E., 377 A.2d at 156 (“Termination of parental rights permits the child and the adoptive parent or parents to establish a new parent-child relationship through adoption.”). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Adoption of S.E.G.green2 sentences2016See In re Adoption of S.E.G., 901 A.2d 1017, 1018 (Pa. 2006). 2016See In re Adoption of S.E.G., 587 Pa. 568 , 901 A.2d 1017, 1018 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.