accomplice corroboration rule in Tennessee

2024Turning to the merits, the accomplice corroboration rule has served as a necessary safeguard for criminal defendants against untrustworthy accomplice testimony since “the very beginning of the judicial history of this State.” Sherrill v. State, 321 S.W.2d 811, 814 (Tenn. 1959) (“[T]he Courts . . . of this State seeing the weakness in the accomplice’s testimony required corroboration in all felony cases.”); see, e.g., Hall v. State, 71 Tenn. 552 , 560–64 (Tenn. 1879); Robison v. State, 84 Tenn. 146 , 147–48 (Tenn. 1885); Clapp v. State, 30 S.W. 214 , 216–17 (Tenn. 1895); Winfree v. State, 123 S

2024In subsequent years, the accomplice-corroboration rule remained staunchly intact, with our Court going so far as to create an exception to the rule that required that “a child as an accomplice should be corroborated,” Sherrill v. State, 321 S.W.2d 811, 816 (Tenn. 1959), “even where the accomplice is a child of such tender years as to be incapable of consenting to such crime.” Scott v. State, 338 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Tenn. 1960) (citing Sherrill, 321 S.W.2d at 814–16).

2024Collier, 411 S.W.3d at 895–96 (citing Monts, 379 S.W.2d at 43 ).

2024Id. at 899 (“[W]e overrule all prior Tennessee decisions recognizing the exception that requires corroboration of the testimony of a minor victim of a sex offense despite the fact that the minor could not be charged with the offense.” (emphasis added)).

2024Indeed, “[w]hen the only proof of a crime is the uncorroborated testimony of one or more accomplices, the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction as a matter of law.” State v. Jones, 450 S.W.3d 866, 888 (Tenn. 2014) (citing State v. Collier, 411 S.W.3d 886, 894 (Tenn. 2013) (citing State v. Little, 402 S.W.3d 202, 211-12 (Tenn. 2013)).

2017State v. Collier, 411 S.W.3d 886, 894 (Tenn. 2013) (citing State v. Little, 402 S.W.3d 202, 211-12 (Tenn. 2013)).

2026The requirements of the accomplice corroboration rule are met “if it fairly and legitimately tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime charged.” Id.

2024The accomplice-corroboration rule held “that a conviction may not be based solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice to the offense.” State v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d 411, 419 (Tenn. 2001) (citing State v. Stout, 33 S.W.3d 531 (Tenn. 2001)); State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 803 (Tenn. 1994); Monts v. State, 379 S.W.2d 34, 43 (Tenn. 1964).

2024The accomplice-corroboration rule held that “[a] conviction may not be based solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice to the offense.” State v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d 411, 419 (Tenn. 2001) (citing State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 696-97 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 803 (Tenn. 1994); Monts v. State, 379 S.W.2d 34, 43 (Tenn. 1964)).

2024The accomplice-corroboration rule held “that a conviction may not be based solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice to the offense.” State v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d 411, 419 (Tenn. 2001) (citing State v. Stout, 33 S.W.3d 531 (Tenn. 2001)); State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 803 (Tenn. 1994); Monts v. State, 379 S.W.2d 34, 43 (Tenn. 1964).

2024Abolition of the rule thus cannot be said “to be unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law as it then existed.” Rogers, 532 U.S. at 464 (noting that “the fact that a vast number of jurisdictions have abolished a rule . . . is surely relevant to” this inquiry).

2024Abolition of the rule thus cannot be said “to be unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law as it then existed.” Rogers, 532 U.S. at 464 (noting that “the fact that a vast number of jurisdictions have abolished a rule . . . is surely relevant to” this inquiry).

2024See, e.g., Lease v. Tipton, 722 S.W.2d 379, 379 (Tenn. 1986) (describing this as the “pipeline approach” to retroactivity). 1 I do not disagree with the majority’s analysis in this regard, but what I find even more troubling about the accomplice-corroboration rule is that it was a departure from the common law from the beginning.

2024See, e.g., Lease v. Tipton, 722 S.W.2d 379, 379 (Tenn. 1986) (describing this as the “pipeline approach” to retroactivity). 1 I do not disagree with the majority’s analysis in this regard, but what I find even more troubling about the accomplice-corroboration rule is that it was a departure from the common law from the beginning.

2024I therefore agree with the Court’s abrogation of the accomplice-corroboration rule, but I do so primarily because it is a long-overdue course correction. 2 When Tennessee became a State, it was governed by the common law of England “as it stood at and before the separation of the colonies.” Smith v. State, 385 S.W.2d 748, 750 (Tenn. 1965); see also Moss v. State, 173 S.W. 859 , 861 (Tenn. 1915) (explaining that Tennessee derived its common law from North Carolina, which had adopted the common law of England). 2 II.

2024I therefore agree with the Court’s abrogation of the accomplice-corroboration rule, but I do so primarily because it is a long-overdue course correction. 2 When Tennessee became a State, it was governed by the common law of England “as it stood at and before the separation of the colonies.” Smith v. State, 385 S.W.2d 748, 750 (Tenn. 1965); see also Moss v. State, 173 S.W. 859 , 861 (Tenn. 1915) (explaining that Tennessee derived its common law from North Carolina, which had adopted the common law of England). 2 II.

2024The accomplice-corroboration rule held that “[a] conviction may not be based solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice to the offense.” State v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d 411, 419 (Tenn. 2001) (citing State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 696-97 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 803 (Tenn. 1994); Monts v. State, 379 S.W.2d 34, 43 (Tenn. 1964)).

2024The accomplice-corroboration rule held “that a conviction may not be based solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice to the offense.” State v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d 411, 419 (Tenn. 2001) (citing State v. Stout, 33 S.W.3d 531 (Tenn. 2001)); State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 803 (Tenn. 1994); Monts v. State, 379 S.W.2d 34, 43 (Tenn. 1964).

2024See State v. Jones, 450 S.W.3d 866, 888 (Tenn. 2014); see also State v. Hawkins, 519 S.W.3d 1 , 58–59 (Tenn. 2017) (affirming the intermediate appellate court’s application of the accomplice corroboration rule), overruled on other grounds by State v. Enix, 653 S.W.3d 692 (Tenn. 2022).

2024See State v. Jones, 450 S.W.3d 866, 888 (Tenn. 2014); see also State v. Hawkins, 519 S.W.3d 1 , 58–59 (Tenn. 2017) (affirming the intermediate appellate court’s application of the accomplice corroboration rule), overruled on other grounds by State v. Enix, 653 S.W.3d 692 (Tenn. 2022).

2024In subsequent years, the accomplice-corroboration rule remained staunchly intact, with our Court going so far as to create an exception to the rule that required that “a child as an accomplice should be corroborated,” Sherrill v. State, 321 S.W.2d 811, 816 (Tenn. 1959), “even where the accomplice is a child of such tender years as to be incapable of consenting to such crime.” Scott v. State, 338 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Tenn. 1960) (citing Sherrill, 321 S.W.2d at 814–16).

2024Turning to the merits, the accomplice corroboration rule has served as a necessary safeguard for criminal defendants against untrustworthy accomplice testimony since “the very beginning of the judicial history of this State.” Sherrill v. State, 321 S.W.2d 811, 814 (Tenn. 1959) (“[T]he Courts . . . of this State seeing the weakness in the accomplice’s testimony required corroboration in all felony cases.”); see, e.g., Hall v. State, 71 Tenn. 552 , 560–64 (Tenn. 1879); Robison v. State, 84 Tenn. 146 , 147–48 (Tenn. 1885); Clapp v. State, 30 S.W. 214 , 216–17 (Tenn. 1895); Winfree v. State, 123 S

2024The court further criticized the accomplice-corroboration rule’s tendency to arbitrarily show preference towards bystander testimony over accomplice testimony, and the tendency of the rule to undermine the “fundamental principle . . . that, in a criminal case tried before a jury, assessing a witness’s credibility is a matter solely for the jury.” Id. at 917–18 (quoting Devincentz v. State, 191 A.3d 373, 379 (Md. 2018)).

2024See State v. Ballinger, 93 S.W.3d 881, 888 (Tenn. Crim.

2024App. 1968); Prince v. State, 529 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Tenn. Crim.

2024Tenn. Sept. 24, 2012) (§ 1983 action awarding plaintiffs monetary damages and granting injunctive relief prohibiting future “48-hour holds” in jail without probable cause and requiring sheriff to maintain records of all persons admitted to county jail)); see further Nelson v. Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting John Danforth, Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of Society’s Interest in Commercial Stability and Contractual Integrity, 81 Colum.

2024See State v. Jones, 450 S.W.3d 866, 888 (Tenn. 2014); see also State v. Hawkins, 519 S.W.3d 1 , 58–59 (Tenn. 2017) (affirming the intermediate appellate court’s application of the accomplice corroboration rule), overruled on other grounds by State v. Enix, 653 S.W.3d 692 (Tenn. 2022).

2024See State v. Jones, 450 S.W.3d 866, 888 (Tenn. 2014); see also State v. Hawkins, 519 S.W.3d 1 , 58–59 (Tenn. 2017) (affirming the intermediate appellate court’s application of the accomplice corroboration rule), overruled on other grounds by State v. Enix, 653 S.W.3d 692 (Tenn. 2022).

2024See State v. Thomas, No. W2019-01202-SC-R11-CD, –S.W.3d –, 2024 WL 979852 , at *13 (Tenn. 2024) (abrogating the accomplice-corroboration rule prospectively “to all trials commencing after the date of the mandate[]” and not “retroactively to change the holding in this case and other pending cases that have not yet reached final judgment.”); see State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22 , 43 n.9 (Tenn. 2014) (citing Rhodes v. Lauderdale Cnty., Tenn., 2012 WL 4434722 (W.D.

2024CORROBORATION OF ACCOMPLICE TESTIMONY Finally, the Defendant argues that neither of his convictions can be sustained because Mr. Metcalf was an accomplice and his testimony was not corroborated by independent evidence.9 At trial, the court submitted to the jury the question of whether Mr. Metcalf was an accomplice and instructed the jury that it could not convict the Defendant on Mr. Metcalf’s testimony alone unless “other evidence must independently lead to the conclusion that a crime was committed and that the defendant was involved in it.” At the time of the Defendant’s crimes, our law prov

2024See State v. Thomas, 687 S.W.3d 223 , 245 (Tenn. 2024) (“[I]n the interest of fairness, we will apply the common law accomplice-corroboration rule to Ms. Turner’s case, but the rule will be abolished in its current form going forward and that change shall be applied to all trials commencing after the date of the mandate [issued on March 18, 2024 ].”).

2024In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d 387, 394 (Tenn. 2009).

2024Turning to the merits, the accomplice corroboration rule has served as a necessary safeguard for criminal defendants against untrustworthy accomplice testimony since “the very beginning of the judicial history of this State.” Sherrill v. State, 321 S.W.2d 811, 814 (Tenn. 1959) (“[T]he Courts . . . of this State seeing the weakness in the accomplice’s testimony required corroboration in all felony cases.”); see, e.g., Hall v. State, 71 Tenn. 552 , 560–64 (Tenn. 1879); Robison v. State, 84 Tenn. 146 , 147–48 (Tenn. 1885); Clapp v. State, 30 S.W. 214 , 216–17 (Tenn. 1895); Winfree v. State, 123 S