Privacy Act violation in Washington

2026The WPA requires exclusion of “ ‘evidence exclusively and directly flowing from a privacy act violation.’ ” Kipp, 179 Wn.2d at 731 n.6 (quoting State v. Faford, 128 Wn.2d 476, 488-89 , 910 P.2d 447 (1996)). 2 “For the exclusionary rule to apply, there must be some proximate causal connection between the misconduct and the evidence.” State v. Mayfield, 192 Wn.2d 871, 889 , 434 P.3d 58 (2019).

2014While the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine generally does not apply to private searches, Washington’s privacy act is applied broadly as to require exclusion of any “evidence exclusively and directly flowing from a privacy act violation.” Faford, 128 Wn.2d at 489 .

2014Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass’n, 169 Wn.2d 516, 526 , 243 P.3d 1283 (2010). iii ¶45 The trial court ruled that SDR’s actions were “action [s] involving public participation and petition” because “the activity that is the subject of the privacy act claim was lawful activity in connection with a judicial proceeding.” This was so, the trial court ruled, because “the meeting that took place in Mr. Grant’s office was certainly in connection with a judicial proceeding” and SDR’s activity was not criminal.

2014Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass'n, 169 Wn.2d 516, 526 , 243 P.3d 1283 (2010). iii The trial court ruled that SDR's actions were "action[s] involving public participation and petition," because "the activity that is the subject of the privacy act claim was lawful activity in connection with a judicial proceeding." This was 22 Our colleagues in Division Two recently explained why the de novo standard of review is appropriate for decisions on anti-SLAPP motions: No Washington court has explicitly stated the standard of review for the trial court's decision to grant or deny a special motion to st

2014Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass’n, 169 Wn.2d 516, 526 , 243 P.3d 1283 (2010). iii ¶45 The trial court ruled that SDR’s actions were “action [s] involving public participation and petition” because “the activity that is the subject of the privacy act claim was lawful activity in connection with a judicial proceeding.” This was so, the trial court ruled, because “the meeting that took place in Mr. Grant’s office was certainly in connection with a judicial proceeding” and SDR’s activity was not criminal.

2014Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass'n, 169 Wn.2d 516, 526 , 243 P.3d 1283 (2010). iii The trial court ruled that SDR's actions were "action[s] involving public participation and petition," because "the activity that is the subject of the privacy act claim was lawful activity in connection with a judicial proceeding." This was 22 Our colleagues in Division Two recently explained why the de novo standard of review is appropriate for decisions on anti-SLAPP motions: No Washington court has explicitly stated the standard of review for the trial court's decision to grant or deny a special motion to st

2007State v. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 225 , 743 P.2d 816 (1987).

2007State v. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 225 , 743 P.2d 816 (1987).

2026Even where the misconduct was a “but-for” cause of the discovery of the evidence, the evidence “ ‘is not subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule, provided that it ultimately is obtained pursuant to . . . other lawful means independent of the unlawful action.’ ” Mayfield, 192 Wn.2d at 889 (quoting State v. Gaines, 154 Wn.2d 711, 718 , 116 P.3d 993 (2005)). 3 However, even if the admission of the call with Samantha was erroneous, any error would be harmless 2 Emphasis added. 3 See also State v. Betancourth, 190 Wn.2d 357, 373 , 413 P.3d 566 (2018) (finding evidence obtained pursuant t

2026Even where the misconduct was a “but-for” cause of the discovery of the evidence, the evidence “ ‘is not subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule, provided that it ultimately is obtained pursuant to . . . other lawful means independent of the unlawful action.’ ” Mayfield, 192 Wn.2d at 889 (quoting State v. Gaines, 154 Wn.2d 711, 718 , 116 P.3d 993 (2005)). 3 However, even if the admission of the call with Samantha was erroneous, any error would be harmless 2 Emphasis added. 3 See also State v. Betancourth, 190 Wn.2d 357, 373 , 413 P.3d 566 (2018) (finding evidence obtained pursuant t

2026Even where the misconduct was a “but-for” cause of the discovery of the evidence, the evidence “ ‘is not subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule, provided that it ultimately is obtained pursuant to . . . other lawful means independent of the unlawful action.’ ” Mayfield, 192 Wn.2d at 889 (quoting State v. Gaines, 154 Wn.2d 711, 718 , 116 P.3d 993 (2005)). 3 However, even if the admission of the call with Samantha was erroneous, any error would be harmless 2 Emphasis added. 3 See also State v. Betancourth, 190 Wn.2d 357, 373 , 413 P.3d 566 (2018) (finding evidence obtained pursuant t

2026The WPA requires exclusion of “ ‘evidence exclusively and directly flowing from a privacy act violation.’ ” Kipp, 179 Wn.2d at 731 n.6 (quoting State v. Faford, 128 Wn.2d 476, 488-89 , 910 P.2d 447 (1996)). 2 “For the exclusionary rule to apply, there must be some proximate causal connection between the misconduct and the evidence.” State v. Mayfield, 192 Wn.2d 871, 889 , 434 P.3d 58 (2019).

2026Even where the misconduct was a “but-for” cause of the discovery of the evidence, the evidence “ ‘is not subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule, provided that it ultimately is obtained pursuant to . . . other lawful means independent of the unlawful action.’ ” Mayfield, 192 Wn.2d at 889 (quoting State v. Gaines, 154 Wn.2d 711, 718 , 116 P.3d 993 (2005)). 3 However, even if the admission of the call with Samantha was erroneous, any error would be harmless 2 Emphasis added. 3 See also State v. Betancourth, 190 Wn.2d 357, 373 , 413 P.3d 566 (2018) (finding evidence obtained pursuant t

2026The WPA requires exclusion of “ ‘evidence exclusively and directly flowing from a privacy act violation.’ ” Kipp, 179 Wn.2d at 731 n.6 (quoting State v. Faford, 128 Wn.2d 476, 488-89 , 910 P.2d 447 (1996)). 2 “For the exclusionary rule to apply, there must be some proximate causal connection between the misconduct and the evidence.” State v. Mayfield, 192 Wn.2d 871, 889 , 434 P.3d 58 (2019).

2026The WPA requires exclusion of “ ‘evidence exclusively and directly flowing from a privacy act violation.’ ” Kipp, 179 Wn.2d at 731 n.6 (quoting State v. Faford, 128 Wn.2d 476, 488-89 , 910 P.2d 447 (1996)). 2 “For the exclusionary rule to apply, there must be some proximate causal connection between the misconduct and the evidence.” State v. Mayfield, 192 Wn.2d 871, 889 , 434 P.3d 58 (2019).

2026The WPA requires exclusion of “ ‘evidence exclusively and directly flowing from a privacy act violation.’ ” Kipp, 179 Wn.2d at 731 n.6 (quoting State v. Faford, 128 Wn.2d 476, 488-89 , 910 P.2d 447 (1996)). 2 “For the exclusionary rule to apply, there must be some proximate causal connection between the misconduct and the evidence.” State v. Mayfield, 192 Wn.2d 871, 889 , 434 P.3d 58 (2019).

2025Plaintiffs cite to Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., 125 Wn.2d 745, 751 , 888 P.2d 147 (1995), wherein the court held that dismissal under CR 12(b)(6) was “inappropriate … because there is no prior state court decision setting forth the elements of [the claim].” Because the elements of a privacy act claim are well-established, Bravo is inapposite.

2025Plaintiffs cite to Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., 125 Wn.2d 745, 751 , 888 P.2d 147 (1995), wherein the court held that dismissal under CR 12(b)(6) was “inappropriate … because there is no prior state court decision setting forth the elements of [the claim].” Because the elements of a privacy act claim are well-established, Bravo is inapposite.

2021Id. at 604 .

2008Green River Comm'ty College Dist. 10, 107 Wash.2d at 442-43 , 730 P.2d 653 ; Pearson v. Schubach, 52 Wash.App. 716, 725-26 , 763 P.2d 834 (1988), review denied 112 Wash.2d 1008 (1989)." Fay v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 115 Wash.2d 194, 200 , 796 P.2d 412 (1990).

2008Green River Comm'ty College Dist. 10, 107 Wash.2d at 442-43 , 730 P.2d 653 ; Pearson v. Schubach, 52 Wash.App. 716, 725-26 , 763 P.2d 834 (1988), review denied 112 Wash.2d 1008 (1989)." Fay v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 115 Wash.2d 194, 200 , 796 P.2d 412 (1990).

2008Green River Comm'ty College Dist. 10, 107 Wash.2d at 442-43 , 730 P.2d 653 ; Pearson v. Schubach, 52 Wash.App. 716, 725-26 , 763 P.2d 834 (1988), review denied 112 Wash.2d 1008 (1989)." Fay v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 115 Wash.2d 194, 200 , 796 P.2d 412 (1990).

2008Green River Comm'ty College Dist. 10, 107 Wash.2d at 442-43 , 730 P.2d 653 ; Pearson v. Schubach, 52 Wash.App. 716, 725-26 , 763 P.2d 834 (1988), review denied 112 Wash.2d 1008 (1989)." Fay v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 115 Wash.2d 194, 200 , 796 P.2d 412 (1990).

2008Green River Comm'ty College Dist. 10, 107 Wash.2d at 442-43 , 730 P.2d 653 ; Pearson v. Schubach, 52 Wash.App. 716, 725-26 , 763 P.2d 834 (1988), review denied 112 Wash.2d 1008 (1989)." Fay v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 115 Wash.2d 194, 200 , 796 P.2d 412 (1990).

2008Green River Comm'ty College Dist. 10, 107 Wash.2d at 442-43 , 730 P.2d 653 ; Pearson v. Schubach, 52 Wash.App. 716, 725-26 , 763 P.2d 834 (1988), review denied 112 Wash.2d 1008 (1989)." Fay v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 115 Wash.2d 194, 200 , 796 P.2d 412 (1990).

1980App. 260 , 511 P.2d 1013 , review denied, 83 Wn.2d 1003 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 849 , 42 L.Ed.2d 78 , 95 S.Ct. 87 (1974), the court concluded the privacy act does not bar the testimony of a police officer who participated in an illegally recorded conversation, without any involvement in or awareness of the unlawful monitoring and recording of the conversation.

1980App. 260 , 511 P.2d 1013 , review denied, 83 Wn.2d 1003 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 849 , 42 L.Ed.2d 78 , 95 S.Ct. 87 (1974), the court concluded the privacy act does not bar the testimony of a police officer who participated in an illegally recorded conversation, without any involvement in or awareness of the unlawful monitoring and recording of the conversation.

1980Ed. 2d 78 , 95 S. Ct. 87 (1974), the court concluded the privacy act does not bar the testimony of a police officer who participated in an illegally recorded conversation, without any involvement in or awareness of the unlawful monitoring and recording of the conversation.

1980App. 260 , 511 P.2d 1013 , review denied, 83 Wn.2d 1003 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 849 , 42 L.Ed.2d 78 , 95 S.Ct. 87 (1974), the court concluded the privacy act does not bar the testimony of a police officer who participated in an illegally recorded conversation, without any involvement in or awareness of the unlawful monitoring and recording of the conversation.